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Chapter 1
Introduction
Public expenditure on infrastructure such as roads, ports, or communication systems,
public research and education spending as well as the enforcement of the “rule of law”
are vital to the production possibilities of firms, and thus to the economic potential of an
economy. Easterly and Rebelo (1993) and, more recently, Canning and Pedroni (2004)
find empirical evidence for long-run growth effects associated with public investment in
infrastructure. Similarly, Knack and Keefer (1995) and Kaufmann and Kraay (2002)
establish that the strength of the rule of law has a positive impact on long-run economic
growth. This dissertation studies in four essays the theoretical relationship between such
forms of productive government activity and long-run economic growth.
Solow (1970) and Arrow and Kurz (1970) already discussed criteria for optimal public
investment in the context of the neoclassical growth model. However, in the long run
the per capita growth rate in this type of model depends entirely on the exogenous rate
of technological progress. Thus, in order to assess the effect of productive government
activity on long-run economic growth, this dissertation focuses on endogenous growth
models in which variations in fiscal policy parameters may have an effect on long-run
growth. First, we give a comprehensive overview of the existing literature. Then, we
address some of its shortcomings and hitherto unexplored issues.
Chapter 2 provides a critical survey of the recent theoretical literature that studies the
role of productive government expenditure for sustained economic growth. For this
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purpose, we develop a uniform analytical framework in which the seminal paper in this
field, Barro (1990), as well as the ensuing contributions can be discussed and compared.
The existing literature incorporates, as we argue, many but not all relevant facets of the
link between productive government activity and economic growth. Three of them are
addressed in more detail in this dissertation.
First, the existing literature usually models the services derived from productive govern-
ment activity as an argument in the production function of individual firms. In this way
productive government expenditure enhances the productivity in the economy by raising
the marginal product of private capital. This appears to be a natural form of modeling
for services derived from public infrastructure, i. e., from roads, power and communica-
tion networks or the public education system. However, activities that strengthen the
rule of law such as police services, courts, the design and enforcement of patent rights,
or the stability of laws and institutions are better viewed as affecting the ability of peo-
ple to retain the rights to their goods or profits from production; thereby shaping their
incentives to invest, innovate, and produce.
Second, the main body of the existing literature is rooted in the tradition of investment-
based endogenous growth models, in which growth originates with private investment
either in physical or human capital. Incorporating productive government activity into
idea-based endogenous growth models, i. e., models in which growth arises from tech-
nological innovations, allows us to analyze new questions, e. g., related to the effect of
public policy on the incentives to invest in innovations and the speed of technological
progress.
Third, in the literature presented in the second chapter the share of productive govern-
ment expenditure is either exogenous or chosen by a benevolent planner while in reality
it is the outcome of an election process, and thus reflects fundamental characteristics of
the process of collective decision-making and the distribution of preferences and endow-
ments in the population. In other words, this literature does not capture how changes
in the distribution of preferences, for instance due to population aging, endogenously
affect government activity and economic growth via a democratic voting process.
Chapter 3 addresses the first and the second point by studying the government’s ability
and willingness to enforce the rule of law and the ensuing consequences for innovation and
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economic growth in an endogenous growth framework with an expanding set of product
varieties. The strength of the rule of law influences economic growth by determining the
profit that firms expect from an innovation investment.
Chapters 4 and 5 focus on the third point. Population aging, i. e., the process by which
older individuals become a proportionally larger fraction of the total population, is one
of the most important demographic phenomena of our time. For instance, in Germany
the old-age dependency ratio, which measures the ratio of elderly persons to non-elderly
adults, increased from 16 in 1955 to 28 in 2005. Thus, in 2005 100 individuals of
working age had to support 28 retired individuals. According to forecasts of the United
Nations this ratio will rise to 59 in the year 2050. Population aging is likely to alter the
support for different types of government spending, thereby affecting economic growth.
A typical concern raised in the public debate is that population aging, by increasing the
political weight of the elderly, leads to increased spending on the elderly, e.g., on health
and care services. For instance, the former German president Roman Herzog in 2008
issued the warning that Germany risks becoming a “pensioners’ democracy” (Rentner-
Demokratie). It is feared that this trend crowds out public productive expenditure and
increases the overall tax burden, thus slowing down economic growth. To theoretically
evaluate this question, Chapters 4 and 5 incorporate heterogeneity in age and preferences
as well as a democratic voting process into the analysis.
The following sections contain more detailed summaries of Chapters 2 to 5. The disser-
tation is organized in such a way that the chapters can be read independently of each
other. All references are collected in the bibliography.
Chapter 2: Survey
The second chapter, which is based on Irmen and Kuehnel (2009), establishes a well-
defined analytical framework in which we then review the recent theoretical literature
that aims at the identification of possible channels through which productive govern-
ment activity and its financing affect economic growth and welfare. In this framework,
the services derived from productive government activity directly enter the production
function of individual firms such that there are constant returns to scale from these
services and private capital. Our setup allows government activity to be either a flow or
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a stock variable. In the former case, government spending corresponds to the provision
of public services that instantaneously affect the production technology of firms. In the
latter case, today’s government spending adds to the stock of public capital and affects
the future production technology of firms. In both cases, the presence of productive gov-
ernment activity assures sustained growth of per capita variables. Moreover, following
most of the literature, the framework is set up in continuous time with many identical
infinitely-lived dynasties.
We first focus on the flow model. The benchmark scenario introduces government ex-
penditure as a pure public good into the production function of individual firms. We
then extend the analysis to incorporate other relevant aspects presented in the literature
that interact with the effect of productive government expenditure on economic growth.
They include adjustment costs, congestion effects, utility-enhancing public consumption
services, endogenous labor supply both in closed and small open economies. The flow
modeling approach is appealing because of its analytical simplicity: we show that an un-
derstanding of the mechanics and the core results of each aspect can be gained from the
study of the respective Euler equation. We use this property to characterize the deter-
minants of the equilibrium growth rate and to analyze the role of fiscal policy measures
on this growth rate. Moreover, for each variant we conduct a welfare analysis and derive
the circumstances under which the Pareto-efficient allocation can be implemented.
The main insights of this approach can be summarized as follows. Productive govern-
ment expenditure affects the steady-state growth rate of consumption through a direct
effect on the technology and an indirect effect on investment incentives through its fi-
nancing. In a closed economy, the direct effect is always strictly positive. The reason for
this is that the consumption growth rate positively depends on the rate of return to pri-
vate capital, which in turn increases in productive government activity. By contrast, in a
small open economy, the consumption growth rate is independent of domestic production
conditions such that the direct effect is zero. If productive government spending is fully
financed by an income tax, then the indirect effect on consumption growth is strictly
negative because such a tax reduces the after-tax marginal return on private capital.
Thus, in the polar case of full income tax financing, the opposing forces of the direct
and indirect effect give rise to a growth-maximizing share of productive government ex-
penditure. In most variants of the flow model, this growth-maximizing share corresponds
to the output elasticity of the public input. Generally, the welfare-maximizing, i. e., the
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Pareto-efficient, share of productive government expenditure coincides with the growth-
maximizing one. However, when government not only spends on productive purposes,
but also provides public consumption services this need not be the case. As public con-
sumption services are non-productive but utility-enhancing, their provision may drive
a wedge between the goals of growth and welfare maximization. Finally, we show that
in each setting appropriate fiscal policy measures can implement the Pareto-efficient al-
location. For instance, a strictly positive income tax rate may be used to correct for
overaccumulation of private capital due to a negative externality such as congestion.
Then, we turn to the stock approach. Modeling productive government expenditure
as a stock variable appears to be more realistic as many public services like public
infrastructure are considered to be stocks. However, this approach makes the analysis
more complicated because it entails complex transitional dynamics and the steady-state
growth rate is no longer determined by the Euler equation alone. Nevertheless, we argue
that the analysis of the balanced growth path in the stock case confirms most results
that are obtained in the flow case. The most important difference occurs in the welfare
analysis. The fact that current public investment only becomes productive tomorrow
whereas the cost in terms of foregone consumption is paid today reduces the welfare-
maximizing share of government investment. However, the stock approach allows us to
address new questions that cannot be raised in a flow context. We make this point with
an analysis that introduces an additional productive use of government expenditure,
namely the maintenance of public capital.
Finally, the last part of Chapter 2 considers three more fundamental variations of the
analytical framework and checks the robustness of the policy implications derived so far.
First, in a stochastic version of the flow model the policy implications turn out to be
similar in spite of the fact that precautionary savings drive a wedge between the goals
of growth and welfare maximization. Second, under increasing returns to scale multiple
equilibria exist. This makes it hard to formulate policy recommendations because there
is no natural way to select among multiple equilibria. Third, in a non-scale endogenous
growth model productive government services cease to have an effect on the steady-state
growth rate. The reason for this is that in a non-scale model the steady-state growth
rate is entirely determined by the technology of the economy and its consistency with a
balanced growth path.
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Chapter 3: Rule of Law, Innovation, and Growth
The focus of the third chapter is on the link between a weak rule of law, firms’ incentives
to engage in innovation investments, and economic growth. For this purpose, the chapter
incorporates an imperfect rule of law into an endogenous growth framework where growth
results from an expanding set of product varieties a` la Grossman and Helpman (1991).
The rule of law is imperfect in the sense that producing firms’ property rights over profits
are not fully secured. One may think of firms being subject to partial expropriation by
an organization such as the mafia. The strength of the rule of law is then captured by
the fraction of profits protected from expropriation.
In a first step, we take the strength of the rule of law as exogenous. In this scenario, we
establish that a weak rule of law, because of the resulting weak innovation incentives, is a
major reason why an economy may be caught in a ”no-growth trap”. Hence, a minimum
strength of the rule of law can be thought of as a necessary condition for sustained
growth. However, a weak rule of law may be Pareto-improving. This is the case when
the equilibrium growth rate exceeds the Pareto-efficient one. Such a situation occurs
in the variety expansion growth model when the gains from specialization captured by
the CES production function are small (see Be´nassy, 1998; de Groot and Nahuis, 1998).
Then, a weakening of innovation incentives is indeed preferable. A means to accomplish
this is a weaker rule of law which essentially acts on innovation incentives as a ”mafia
tax”.
In a second step, we endogenize the strength of the rule of law by allowing the govern-
ment to use tax resources to improve its strength. We consider two situations. First, the
government can invest produced output in the enforcement of the rule of law. Second,
the government has to hire a fraction of the workforce as policemen who then enforce
the rule of law. In the first case, government intervention can always shift the economy
from a no-growth path onto a path with strictly positive growth. In the second case,
the necessity to employ a scarce resource reduces the government’s ability to move the
economy to a positive growth equilibrium. In both cases, government activity that as-
sures positive equilibrium growth rates may not be optimal from a welfare point of view.
This is the case if the costs of fighting the mafia induce an instantaneous welfare loss in
terms of foregone current consumption that outweighs the increasing future consump-
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tion possibilities that arise along a path with strictly positive growth. Moreover, we find
that a government intervention is more likely to be desirable if the economic environ-
ment is more prone to growth, e. g., if the economy’s research technology is sufficiently
productive or its market size large enough.
Chapters 4 and 5: Democratic Voting and the Implications of
Population Aging
The purpose of the fourth and fifth chapter is to analyze how population aging endoge-
nously affects taxes, the composition of government spending, and long-run economic
growth via a democratic voting process.
The fourth chapter approaches this question by incorporating heterogeneity and a demo-
graphic structure directly into a version of the infinitely-lived agent (ILA) endogenous
growth framework presented in the second chapter. More specifically, we consider a con-
tinuum of infinitely-lived households, each of them comprising not only working young
but also economically-dependent elderly members. The age composition of a household
is captured by the so-called support ratio, which measures the share of workers among
the number of total household members. Households are heterogeneous with respect to
their support ratio. Then, population aging corresponds to a shift in the distribution
of households such that there are more households with a small support ratio. This
shift leaves the overall size of the population unaffected. Besides a productive public
input, the government provides a public consumption good that satisfies the preferences
of the elderly. Both types of government spending are fully financed via taxes on house-
hold income. By majority voting, the households determine the policy mix that will be
implemented by the government with full commitment in all periods.
In a first step, we show that for a given time-invariant public policy mix there exists
a unique decentralized competitive equilibrium in which all households (independent
of their support ratio) accumulate at the same rate. However, the age composition of
each household determines its level of aggregate household income and consumption per
household member.
In a second step, we endogenize government policy. To derive the political equilibrium,
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we first establish that each household has a unique most preferred policy mix that
does not depend on time. While all households want the same share of output to be
invested in productive purposes, they prefer different shares of output to be spent on
the public consumption good that benefits their elderly members, and therefore different
tax levels. Household preferences can be ranked according to their idiosyncratic support
ratio: households with a smaller support ratio prefer higher spending on the elderly.
The equilibrium policy mix then coincides with the one preferred by the median voter.
Finally, population aging is predicted (i) to increase public spending on the elderly (as
a share of output), (ii) not to affect productive government expenditure (as a share of
output), (iii) to raise the overall tax burden, and (iv) to lower the economy’s growth
rate.
Thus, the fourth chapter shows that the link between population aging, endogenous gov-
ernment spending, and endogenous economic growth can be analyzed in a heterogeneous
agent version of the standard infinite-horizon framework used by most of the literature.
The qualitative results of this approach are in line with notions voiced in the public
debate.
The fifth chapter compares these results to those obtained in a model of overlapping
generations in which agents live for two periods and vote each period.
Population aging now corresponds either to an exogenous, permanent decline in fertility
or to an exogenous, permanent increase in life expectancy. Both phenomena increase the
economy’s old-age dependency ratio and change the population size. We focus on the
same public spending categories: productive public expenditure and a public consump-
tion good that yields utility to the elderly. The government finances its expenditure by
levying a uniform, proportional tax on the income of the young and the old.
As government policy choices are of differing concern to the young and the old, they dis-
agree on which policy mix they prefer to be implemented. The resolution of the resulting
political conflict is modeled under the assumption of probabilistic voting. This assures
that the policy proposals represent the interests of both groups of society, reflecting the
political process in representative democracies more realistically than the median voter
model.
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Rational, forward-looking agents vote on government policy at the beginning of each
period. Since elections take place each period, policy makers cannot commit to future
policy choices. Voters therefore have to form expectations about future policies. In
particular, the rational young voters are aware that the current policy choices influence
the evolution of the economy, and thus next period’s policy choices. In this respect, we
focus on Markov perfect equilibria, i. e., equilibria in which the policy choices expected
for a certain period depend only on the value of the fundamental state variable at that
time. Such an equilibrium in which voters consider the economic as well as political
repercussions of their policy choices is called a politico-economic equilibrium.
In this setup, population aging has two opposing effects on economic growth. On the
one hand, population aging, by increasing the relative weight that the political process
attaches to the interests of the old relative to the young, (i) increases public spending on
the elderly (as a share of output), (ii) does not affect productive government spending
(as a share of output), and (iii) increases the income tax rate. The latter depresses the
economy’s growth rate of per capita variables. These results are qualitatively the same
as in Chapter 4. On the other hand, for a given policy mix population aging acceler-
ates economic growth. This positive growth effect is due to reduced capital dilution if
population aging follows a decline in fertility. In contrast, an increase in life expectancy
positively impinges on economic growth by increasing the incentives to save. In both
scenarios, we find that the second effect dominates the first such that population aging
overall increases the economy’s long-run growth rate.
Chapter 2
Productive Government
Expenditure and Economic Growth
- A Survey
2.1 Introduction
Few would dispute that public expenditure on infrastructure such as roads, ports, or
communication systems, public research spending as well as the provision of basic edu-
cation and medical services raises the economic potential of an economy. At least since
the influential study of Aschauer (1989) and the following discussion (see de Haan and
Romp, 2007, for a recent survey of this empirical literature) it is argued that a rise in
productive government activity increases output. Easterly and Rebelo (1993) and, more
recently, Canning and Pedroni (2004) find evidence for long-run growth effects associated
with public investment in infrastructure. In addition, many case studies highlight the
growth-enhancing potential associated with such investments (see, e. g., OECD, 2007).
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a critical survey on the recent theoretical
literature that aims at the identification of possible links between productive government
activity and long-run economic growth and the assessment of the resulting allocation in
terms of welfare. To accomplish this, we have to focus on endogenous growth models
10
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where variations in fiscal policy parameters may have an effect on long-run growth.1 To
the best of our knowledge, Barro (1990) is the seminal paper in this field. It introduces
government expenditure as a public good into the production function of individual
firms. In this way the rate of return to private capital increases which in turn stimulates
private investment and growth.
We show that the ensuing literature is able to extend Barro’s analysis to incorporate
many relevant aspects that interact with the effect of public services on economic growth.
They include adjustment costs, congestion effects, utility-enhancing public consumption
services, endogenous labor supply both in closed and small open economies. We establish
that the mechanics and the core results for each aspect can be gained from the study of
the respective Euler equation. We use this approach to characterize the determinants
of the equilibrium growth rate and to analyze the role of fiscal policy measures on this
growth rate. Moreover, we conduct a welfare analysis and derive the circumstances
under which the welfare-maximizing allocation can be implemented.2
While Barro (1990) treated productive government expenditure as a flow variable, the
paper by Futagami et al. (1993) introduces the provision of productive government
services as a stock. At first sight, this approach is more appealing because services like
public infrastructure are more realistically described as stocks. However, the advantage
in terms of realism has a price in terms of analytical complexity. For instance, this
approach usually entails complex transitional dynamics and the steady-state growth
rate is no longer determined by the Euler equation alone. Nevertheless, we argue that
the analysis of the balanced growth path in the stock case confirms most results that
are obtained in the flow case. An important difference occurs in the welfare analysis.
The fact that current public investments become only productive tomorrow tends to
reduce the welfare-maximizing share of government investment. We show that these
findings are robust in a setting where a flow and a stock of public services are provided
simultaneously.
1For the study of various aspects of public expenditure in the neoclassical growth model, the inter-
ested reader is referred to Arrow and Kurz (1970), Aschauer (1988), Barro (1989), Baxter and King
(1993), Fisher and Turnovsky (1995), or Fisher and Turnovsky (1998).
2Throughout we stick to a continuous-time framework with infinitely-lived dynasties. Moreover, we
do not explicitly consider education and human capital formation as a government activity. This is
at the heart of, e. g., Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) or, more recently, Go´mez (2008). See Zagler and
Du¨rnecker (2003) for a survey of this literature.
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However, the stock approach allows to address new questions that cannot be raised
in a flow context. We make this point with an analysis that introduces an additional
productive use of government expenditure, namely the maintenance of the stock of public
capital.
Finally, we turn to more fundamental variations of the analytical framework and ask
for the robustness of the policy implications derived so far. For a stochastic setting we
conclude that the policy implications are similar in spite of the fact that precautionary
savings drive a wedge between the goals of growth and welfare maximization. In contrast,
we argue that the knife-edge assumption of constant returns to scale with respect to
private and public capital is responsible for many findings. For instance, under increasing
returns multiple equilibria are endemic. This complicates the policy implications as the
effect of fiscal policy measures is now conditional on expectations. Similarly, if productive
government services are provided in a non-scale model, they cease to have an effect on
the steady-state growth rate.
In light of these findings, we conclude that future research ought to focus on a deeper
understanding of the policy implications that matter in reality. Certainly, a focus on the
analysis of productive government services on economic growth in idea-based endoge-
nous growth models is likely to enhance our understanding of the relationship between
productive government expenditure and economic growth.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 sets out the basic
analytical framework. In Section 2.3 we deal with the flow model and variants of this
approach. Section 2.4 presents variants of the stock approach and compares them to
the respective flow cases. Important extensions such as uncertainty, increasing returns
and non-scale models are covered in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 concludes. The Appendix
derives somewhat more complicated results that appear in Section 2.4.1.
2.2 The Basic Analytical Framework
Consider a closed economy in continuous time with many identical and competitive
household-producers and a government. We denote per-household variables by small
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letters, whereas capital letters represent aggregates. For instance, k(t) is the private
capital input of an individual firm at t, and K(t) the economy’s aggregate capital stock
at t. Henceforth, we suppress the time argument whenever this does not cause confusion.
We represent household-producers by the interval [0, N ], N > 1, such that K = Nk.
The “number” of household-producers remains constant over time. The economy has
one good that can be consumed or invested. At all t, prices are expressed in units of the
contemporaneous output of this good.
Each producer has access to the per-period production function
y = f(k, g) = Ak1−αgα, 0 < α < 1, (2.1)
where y denotes firm output at t, A > 0 the time-invariant total factor productivity,
and g the services derived by the firm from productive government activity at t. Private
capital, k, has a positive but diminishing marginal product, and for simplicity does
not depreciate.3 The function f has constant returns to scale with respect to both
inputs. The possibility of steady-state growth arises since government activity acts as
a countervailing force on the diminishing marginal product of private capital. To keep
the marginal and the average productivity of private capital constant, in a steady state
k and g have to grow at the same rate. To simplify the exposition, we work with the
Cobb-Douglas specification.
Household-producers are infinitely-lived and derive utility in each period from private
consumption. Their intertemporal utility is
u =
∞∫
0
e−ρt ln c dt, (2.2)
where ρ > 0 is the instantaneous rate of time preference. For expositional convenience,
we stick to a logarithmic per-period utility function. Most of the results presented in
what follows readily extend to more general per-period utility functions with a constant
3Labor is not mentioned as a separate input in the production function. This is a valid shortcut if
we interpret the profit of each firm as the wage income that is earned by labor. More precisely, we may
admit to each household-producer an exogenous per-period labor endowment l¯ = 1 that is inelastically
supplied and consider a production function y = Ak1−α
(
l¯g
)α
. Marginal cost pricing of labor and a real
wage consistent with firms hiring l¯ determines the wage income equal to the profit income of firms that
produce according to (2.1) without labor. This is an implication of Euler’s law for linear-homogeneous
functions.
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elasticity of intertemporal substitution different from unity. Each household-producer
receives net output and determines how much to consume and how much to invest in
private capital. Her flow budget constraint is
k˙ = (1− τy) f (k, g)− (1 + τc)c− τ, (2.3)
where τy and τc denote time-invariant tax rates on income/output and consumption,
and τ is a lump-sum tax. When choosing c and k to maximize her utility the indi-
vidual household-producer takes the level of public services as given and disregards the
possible impact of her decision on the amount of public services provided. Then, her
intertemporal optimization leads to the Euler condition
γc = (1− τy)∂f
∂k
− ρ, (2.4)
i. e., the growth rate of consumption γc depends on the difference between the after-tax
private marginal return on private capital and the rate of time preference. Throughout,
we assume that the economy is sufficiently productive to sustain a strictly positive growth
rate γc.
We denote G the aggregate amount of productive government activity at t from which
individual firms derive the services g. Conceptually, G may be a flow or a stock variable.
In the former case, government spending corresponds to the provision of public services
that instantaneously affect the production technology of firms. In the latter case, today’s
government spending adds to the stock of public capital and affects the future production
technology of firms. In any case, the government claims resources from household-
producers and transforms them one-to-one into a productive input to which firms get
access. We assume that the government’s budget is balanced in all periods. Let Y and
C denote aggregate output and consumption at t and define total tax receipts at t by
T ≡ τyY + τcC + τN . Then, the budget constraint at t is
G = T or G˙ = T (2.5)
for the flow and the stock case, respectively. Throughout, we focus on tax-financed
expenditure and disregard funding via public debt.
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2.3 Productive Government Activity as a Flow
Along a steady-state growth path with all variables growing at a constant rate, govern-
ment expenditure must be proportionate to the size of the economy. To comply with
this requirement, we stipulate for all t that
G = θG Y, (2.6)
where θG ∈ (0, 1) is a time-invariant constant measuring the fraction of current output
that constitutes the current flow of productive government expenditure. If G includes
public investment as well as government expenditure on public order and safety, on
economic affairs, and on health and education, one finds for a sample of 19 Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries that the average θG over
the time period 1995 to 2002 ranges between 10% and 20%.4
2.3.1 The Pure Public Good Case
Following Barro (1990), we first consider the case where government services are neither
rival nor excludable. In this case, G is a pure public good and g = G such that the
production function (2.1) becomes
y = AGαk1−α, 0 < α < 1. (2.7)
One may of think of G as government expenditure on basic education, the provision of
medical services, or public research spending that increases the productivity of private
inputs of all firms in the same manner.
4This finding is based on our own computations. We use data collected in UNdata (2008). Public
investment corresponds to gross fixed capital formation of general government. Government expendi-
ture on public order and safety, on economic affairs, and on health and education are subcategories
of government final consumption expenditure. The sample includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. This selection of
OECD countries maximizes the number of countries and the length of the time period for which a full
set of comparable annual data on the components of G mentioned above are available. The sample
average of θG across countries and time is approximately 15%.
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Decentralized Equilibrium
Following the reasoning that led to the Euler equation (2.4) we find
γc = (1− τy)(1− α)A
(
G
k
)α
− ρ. (2.8)
The ratio of government spending per unit of private capital consistent with condi-
tion (2.6), the aggregation Y = Ny, and the production function (2.7) is G/k =
(ANθG)
1/(1−α). Upon substitution of the latter in (2.8) we obtain
γc = (1− τy)(1− α) (ANαθαG)
1
1−α − ρ. (2.9)
At this stage, three remarks are in order. First, there are admissible values for τy,
τc, τ , and θG that satisfy the budget constraint (2.5). Hence, given τc and τ , τy and
θG that appear in (2.9) are not independent. Second, one can show that the economy
immediately jumps onto its steady-state path along which all per capita variables grow
at rate γc. Third, the equilibrium growth rate depends on the “number” of household-
producers, i. e., there is a scale effect. The latter occurs since individual firm productivity
depends on aggregate spending (G = θGY ). Then, with more firms the externality is
more pronounced.5
An interesting question is how the size of the government and the mode of funding gov-
ernment spending affects the economy’s steady-state growth rate. A useful benchmark
has τc = τ = 0 such that θG = τy. In this case, there is a growth-maximizing expenditure
share equal to the output elasticity of government expenditure, θ∗G = α (Barro, 1990).
6
Intuitively, it balances two opposing effects. A rise in θG increases the private marginal
product of private capital and reduces its after-tax value through a necessary increase
in the distortionary income tax. At θ∗G, government expenditure satisfies the so-called
natural condition of productive efficiency, i. e., the marginal contribution of government
5 To eliminate the scale effect one may assume that the government service is not excludable but
rival such that each producer receives a proportionate share of government services, i. e., g = G/N .
In this case, the economy’s steady-state growth rate is γc = (1 − τy)(1 − α) (AθαG)1/(1−α) − ρ and is
independent of N . We shall get back to this case in Section 2.3.3 where we discuss different forms of
congestion.
6For more general production functions f(k, g) with constant returns to scale in its inputs the
growth-maximizing expenditure share remains equal to the respective output elasticity. This elasticity,
however, need not be constant but may vary with G and other parameters. This generalization may
prevent closed-form solutions (see, e. g., Ott and Turnovsky, 2006, for a discussion)
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expenditure to aggregate output is one.7 The steady-state growth rate may be further
increased if a strictly positive consumption or lump-sum tax is levied. In the present
context, a consumption tax acts like a lump-sum tax and both may be used to reduce the
distortionary income tax. However, there is little reason why the steady-state growth
rate should be arbitrarily large because faster economic growth has a cost in terms of
foregone consumption. To assess the desirability of a given consumption growth rate we
have to compare it to the allocation chosen by an omniscient social planner.
Pareto Efficiency
Contrary to the household-producer, the social planner knows that - given θG - the choice
of k affects the level of government expenditure G through condition (2.6) and Y = Ny.
Hence, he perceives the production function of the representative household-producer as
y = (ANαθαG)
1
1−α k. (2.10)
The aggregate resource constraint is Nk˙ = Ny − G − Nc. It results as the sum of all
individual flow budget constraints (2.3) in conjunction with the government’s budget
constraint and (2.6). Expressed in per household terms, this is
k˙ = (1− θG)y − c. (2.11)
Throughout, we shall refer to an allocation as constrained Pareto-efficient if the planner
takes the share of government expenditure θG as a given constant. The unconstrained
or, in short, the Pareto-efficient allocation is the one obtained when the planner chooses
θG optimally.
Here, the constrained Pareto-efficient allocation obtains from the maximization of u
given by (2.2) with respect to c and k subject to (2.11). The corresponding Euler
7To grasp the natural condition of productive efficiency consider a coal mine that uses its coal as
an input. Then, what is the output-maximizing amount of the coal input? Intuitively, as long as an
additional unit of coal raises output by more than one unit it will be used; if its marginal product is
smaller, it will not. The quantity that maximizes output obtains when the marginal product of coal in
its production is one. In the present context, we have from equation (2.7) with Y = Ny = ANGαk1−α:
dY/dG = α (Y/G) = α/θ∗G = 1.
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condition delivers the steady-state growth rate of all per household variables and is
given by
γPc = (1− θG) (ANαθαG)
1
1−α − ρ. (2.12)
The first term on the right-hand side is the social marginal return on private capital.
It need not coincide with the after-tax private marginal product that matters in (2.9).
The comparison of the equilibrium to the planner’s growth rate reveals that
γc = γ
P
c ⇔ (1− τy)(1− α) = 1− θG. (2.13)
These growth rates generically differ for two reasons. First, in equilibrium intertemporal
prices are distorted due to the income tax. If the government sets τy = 0 to eliminate
this distortion and finances its expenditure via lump-sum taxes these growth rates may
still differ as θG need not be equal to α. This reflects the second difference. The planner
internalizes the externality associated with the provision of the public good, i. e., when
choosing c and k he accounts for condition (2.6).
If we extend the planner’s choice set and allow him to determine the size of the gov-
ernment in addition to c and k, one finds that he chooses θPG = α. The Pareto-efficient
growth rate is then given by γPc of (2.12) with θG = α. As a consequence, the equilibrium
and the Pareto-efficient allocation coincide if τy = 0 and θG is chosen optimally.
2.3.2 Productive Public Expenditure and Adjustment Costs
Often the productive use of new private capital requires adjustment costs. Examples
include costs for the installation of equipment or the schooling of employees. Adjustment
costs increase the effective costs of private investment and may therefore discourage the
accumulation of private capital. Here, we introduce this feature into the pure public
good framework of the previous section.
Following Turnovsky (1996a), we assume that productive government expenditure re-
duces adjustment costs. For instance, due to a better road network the setup costs of
a new factory may be lower. We capture this feature with an adjustment cost function
per unit of investment given by φ (θG) i/(2k), where i denotes investment per household-
producer. A higher share of government activity reduces adjustment costs, though at
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a declining rate, i. e., φ′ < 0 < φ′′. As in Hayashi (1982), we assume that adjustment
costs are proportional to the rate of investment per unit of installed capital and not to
the absolute level of investment. Accordingly, the investment cost function is
ϕ(i, k, φ (θG)) ≡
(
1 +
φ (θG)
2
i
k
)
i. (2.14)
Decentralized Equilibrium
Individual household-producers choose a plan (c, k, i) for each t to maximize u of (2.2)
subject to the constraints
i = k˙ and (2.15)
(1− τy)AGαk1−α − τ = (1 + τc)c+ ϕ(i, k, φ (θG)), (2.16)
where the latter equalizes disposable income to consumption and investment outlays.
The resulting optimality condition with respect to i reveals that the current-value shadow
price of installed capital in units of current output is equal to the marginal investment
costs, i. e.,
q = 1 + φ (θG)
i
k
. (2.17)
Hence, for an investing firm (i > 0) the value of installed capital exceeds unity. With
(2.15) it follows that the steady-state growth rate of private capital is
γk =
q − 1
φ (θG)
. (2.18)
The Euler equation is now given by
γc =
(1− τy)(1− α) (AθαGNα)
1
1−α
q
+
q˙
q
+
(q − 1)2
2qφ (θG)
− ρ. (2.19)
The first three terms on the right-hand side represent the rate of return on acquiring a
unit of private capital at price q. The first term denotes the after-tax private marginal
return on private capital deflated by the cost of capital q. The second term is the rate of
capital gain. The third term reflects the marginal reduction in adjustment costs when
k increases for given i deflated by q. In the absence of adjustment costs q = 1 for all t
and (2.19) reduces to (2.9).
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In the steady state, per household variables such as c, k, and i grow at the same rate;
from (2.17) we also have q˙ = 0. Using (2.17) and (2.18) in the Euler condition (2.19)
delivers the steady-state growth rate implicitly as
φ (θG)
2
γ2c + [1 + φ (θG) ρ] γc = (1− τy)(1− α) (AθαGNα)
1
1−α − ρ. (2.20)
Hence, the right-hand side of (2.20) coincides with the equilibrium growth rate of (2.9)
where adjustment costs are absent. However, since the left-hand side of (2.20) increases
faster than proportionately in γc, the resulting steady-state growth rate must be smaller
with than without adjustment costs.
Turning to the effect of productive government expenditure on the steady-state growth
rate for the benchmark scenario with full income tax funding (θG = τy) we find
dγc
dθG
=
−γcφ′ (θG)
(
γc
2
+ ρ
)
+ α (1− θG) ykθG − (1− α)
y
k
1 + φ (θG) (γc + ρ)
. (2.21)
The latter highlights three channels through which government activity affects the
growth rate. First, the reduction in adjustment costs (φ′ < 0) increases the growth
rate. The second and the third channel matter in the same way as in the scenario with-
out adjustment costs: on the one hand, productive government expenditure enhances
the productivity of the existing capital stock, on the other hand, the government must
balance its budget which brings about a rise in the distortionary income tax rate.
Observe that a growth-maximizing expenditure share θ∗G ∈ (0, 1) may exist. It must
be strictly greater than in the world without adjustment costs since dγc/dθG|θG=α > 0
(Turnovsky, 1996a). If government expenditure is fully funded by a non-distortionary
lump-sum tax the third channel in (2.21) vanishes such that an increase in government
spending unambiguously raises the growth rate.
Pareto Efficiency
The social planner internalizes (2.6) and the equilibrium condition K = Nk. He maxi-
mizes utility (2.2) subject to the resource constraint (1− θG) y = c+ ϕ(i, k, φ (θG)) and
i = k˙, where y is given by (2.10). Following the steps that led to the implicit statement
of the equilibrium growth rate in (2.20), we obtain here
φ (θG)
2
(
γPc
)2
+ [1 + φ (θG) ρ] γ
P
c = (1− θG) (AθαGNα)
1
1−α − ρ. (2.22)
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The latter generalizes (2.12) to the case with adjustment costs. Again the left-hand side
is strictly convex in γPc such that the constrained optimal growth rate is smaller under
adjustment costs.
If we allow the social planner to determine the size of θG optimally, the welfare-maximi-
zing share of government expenditure, θPG, is greater than α, thus exceeding its level
without adjustment costs. Intuitively, the possibility to reduce adjustment costs provides
an additional incentive for the government to expand its activity relative to the size of
the economy.
The comparison of the equilibrium to the constrained optimal growth rate reveals that
both rates are the same if the right-hand sides of (2.20) and (2.22) take on the same value.
From (2.13) we know that this is the case whenever (1−τy)(1−α) = 1−θG. Interestingly,
adjustment costs alter the implications of this condition for the optimal tax policy. For
instance, if government expenditure is fully financed via lump-sum taxes (τy = 0), then
the Pareto-efficient growth rate cannot be implemented since θPG > α. The reason is that
a higher θPG does not only internalize the externality associated with the pure public good
but also reflects the planner’s incentive to reduce adjustment costs. Therefore, at θPG
the equilibrium incentives to invest are too pronounced relative to the efficient growth
rate. Accordingly, a strictly positive income tax τPy =
(
θPG − α
)
/ (1− α) > 0 is needed
to support the Pareto-efficient allocation.
2.3.3 Public Goods Subject to Congestion
Often, the services derived from the provision of a public good are subject to congestion.
Congestion effects arise if public goods are partially rival, i. e., their use as a productive
input by one firm diminishes their usefulness to other firms. Examples include road
infrastructure or police and fire protection.
Two forms of congestion can be distinguished, relative and aggregate (absolute) conges-
tion. In the former case, the level of services derived by an individual firm depends on
its size relative to the aggregate of firms. We refer to aggregate congestion if the level of
services received by the individual firm is decreasing in the aggregate usage. As noted
by Eicher and Turnovsky (2000, p. 344) highway usage is an example of the former and
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police protection an example of the latter:
“Unless an individual drives his car, he derives no service from a publicly
provided highway, and in general the services he derives depend upon his own
usage relative to that of others in the economy, as total usage contributes
to congestion. Police protection may serve as an example of absolute con-
gestion: in principle, people always enjoy this service, independent of their
own actions, though the amount of service they may actually derive varies
inversely with aggregate activity and the demands this places on the limited
resources devoted to this public service.”
To study relative congestion, we use the ratio of individual to aggregate private capital,
k/K, to measure the size of an individual firm relative to the economy. Then, the
productive services that a firm derives from public expenditure G is
g = G
(
k
K
)1−σG
, (2.23)
where σG ∈ [0, 1] parameterizes the degree of relative congestion associated with the
public good G. This specification includes the pure public good case (without conges-
tion) for σG = 1. As σG declines, congestion becomes more pronounced. Yet, as long
as σG ∈ (0, 1), the government services derived by a firm of size k increases if G and K
grow at the same rate. Barro and Sala-´ı-Martin (1992) analyze the case where σG = 0.
Then, g increases only if G grows faster than K. The latter case is called proportional
congestion (Turnovsky, 2000b, p. 618). As in equilibrium K = Nk, the public good is
then rival yet not excludable and the individual firm receives its proportionate share of
services g = G/N .
One specification the literature uses to capture aggregate congestion is g = GKσG−1,
σG ∈ [0, 1], i. e., government services are independent of firm size. With this specification,
the firms’ production function ceases to exhibit constant returns to scale in private and
public capital. Therefore, steady-state growth can only arise under additional restrictive
conditions. To avoid these complications, we restrict attention to the case of relative
congestion with and without excludability.8 If a public good is excludable, then the
government can identify the user and charge an access fee.
8See, e. g., Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) for a discrete-time model with absolute congestion. Their
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2.3.3.1 Relative Congestion Without Excludability
Under relative congestion, we obtain the production function of the individual firm from
(2.1) and (2.23) as
y = A
(
G
K
)α (
k
K
)−σG α
k. (2.24)
Decentralized Equilibrium
Individual firms believe that a rise in k increases their benefit from the provision of
public services and disregard the impact of their investment decision on G and K.
Applying the reasoning that led to the Euler equation (2.9) and taking into account
that G/k =
(
AθGN
1−α(1−σG))1/1−α we find
γc = (1− τy)(1− σGα) (ANσGαθαG)
1
1−α − ρ. (2.25)
Again, the first term on the right-hand side is the after-tax marginal private return on
private capital. An increase in the degree of congestion, i. e., a decline in σG, has two
effects on γc: On the one hand, it augments the output elasticity of private capital,
1 − σGα. On the other hand, it weakens the scale effect through NσGα. Which effect
dominates depends on the number of household-producers and σG.
As in the pure public good case, the growth-maximizing share of government expenditure
θ∗G for the benchmark scenario with full income tax financing is equal to α (Turnovsky,
1996c).
Pareto Efficiency
The social planner is aware of the negative externality that the choice of k by an individ-
ual firm exerts on the production technology of all other firms via the implied increase
in the aggregate capital stock K. He also knows that in a symmetric configuration no
firm can gain an advantage from the provision of public services by raising its capital
setup has a one period lag between the collection of taxes and the conversion of these revenues into
public services. Hence, methodologically this study belongs to the “stock case” to which we turn in
Section 2.4. Ott and Soretz (2007) argue that relative congestion of productive government activity
may also be important for the spatial distribution of economic activity.
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stock. Since all firms are identical, no firm can increase its size relative to other firms
and/or the economy.
In other words, the planner internalizes the equilibrium condition K = Nk in (2.23)
which then reduces to g = GNσG−1. As a consequence, with (2.6) the relevant pro-
duction function is y = (ANσG αθαG)
1/(1−α) k and the constrained efficient growth rate of
consumption becomes
γPc = (1− θG) (ANσG αθαG)
1
1−α − ρ. (2.26)
The comparison of the equilibrium growth rate (2.25) to the constrained optimal growth
rate (2.26) gives
γc = γ
P
c ⇔ (1− τy)(1− σG α) = 1− θG. (2.27)
With σG < 1 the latter two equations generalize (2.12) and (2.13) to the case of conges-
tion. With congestion, the equilibrium growth rate may again be too high relative to the
efficient one. To see this, consider the case where θG is chosen optimally, i. e., θ
P
G = α.
Then, if government expenditure is entirely financed by lump-sum taxes, i. e., τy = 0, it
holds that γc > γ
P
c . Intuitively, congestion drives a wedge between the private and the
social marginal return to private capital and induces an incentive to over-accumulate
private capital in the decentralized equilibrium. From (2.27) we derive the income tax
rate for an optimally chosen share of government expenditure as
τPy =
α (1− σG)
1− σGα , with
dτPy
dσG
< 0. (2.28)
An income tax rate τPy eliminates this wedge and implements the Pareto-efficient allo-
cation. Clearly, τPy increases the stronger the degree of congestion. In the extreme case
of proportional congestion all government expenditure should be financed via income
taxes, i. e., τPy = θ
P
G = α.
2.3.3.2 Relative Congestion With Excludability
Some public services subject to congestion are excludable. This means that a potential
user of the service can be identified and charged a user fee. Examples include highways,
bridges, universities, or schools.
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Ott and Turnovsky (2006) extend the previous setup and introduce a second public
service that is excludable. The modified production function of individual firms is
y = f(k, g, e) = Agαeβk1−α−β, 0 < α, β < 1, (2.29)
where e is the benefit derived by the firm from the excludable public service. Just as
the non-excludable public service G, the excludable one is subject to relative congestion
such that
e = E
(
k
K
)1−σE
; (2.30)
here, E is the total amount of the excludable public service supplied by the government,
and σE ∈ [0, 1] measures the degree of relative congestion. Using (2.30) and (2.23) in
(2.29) gives the production function as perceived by the individual firm
y = A
(
G
K
)α(
k
K
)−ασG (E
K
)β (
k
K
)−βσE
k. (2.31)
For the government, the key difference between the provision of G and E is that the
former must be financed through taxes whereas the latter can be financed through a
fee paid by the individual user. Denote p this fee per unit of E. Then, the expression
for the balanced government budget (2.5) becomes G + E = τyY + τcC + τN + pEN .
Similar to condition (2.6) for G, we assume that the provision of E is proportionate to
the size of the economy, i. e., E = θE Y for all t.
Decentralized Equilibrium
For the individual household-producer, the new element is that besides c and k, she also
determines in each period her demand for the excludable public service. The associated
expenditure pEd must be added to the flow budget constraint (2.3) which modifies to
k˙ = (1− τy) f (k, g, e)− (1 + τc)c− τ − pEd.
Since the choice of Ed does not affect utility directly, it is chosen to maximize the right-
hand side of the flow budget constraint. The associated optimality condition equates
the marginal after-tax product of the excludable input to its marginal cost, i. e.,
(1− τy) ∂y
∂Ed
= (1− τy)β y
Ed
= p. (2.32)
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The latter delivers the demand of each household-producer, Ed(p). Since E is a public
good, in equilibrium we have E = Ed(p). Together with the proportionality constraint
E = θE Ny, we obtain from (2.32) the equilibrium value of p as
p =
(1− τy)β
θEN
. (2.33)
Intuitively, the equilibrium user fee declines with the total number of users.
Applying the same reasoning that led to the Euler equation (2.25) delivers the equilib-
rium growth rate
γc = (1− τy)(1− ασG − βσE)
(
ANσG α+σE βθαGθ
β
E
) 1
1−α−β − ρ, (2.34)
which generalizes (2.25) of the non-excludable public input case to β > 0. Since firms
neglect the congestive consequences of their own choice of the private capital input on
the aggregate economy, they continue to overestimate the before-tax marginal product
of capital.
Finally, consider the growth-maximizing government expenditure shares for the bench-
mark scenario where the provision of G is fully financed through income taxes, i. e,
θG = τy. With two public goods and a user fee given by (2.33) the two shares θG and θE
are linked by the government budget such that θE = β (1− θG). Using this condition,
we obtain θ∗G = α and θ
∗
E = β (1− α).
Pareto Efficiency
The social planner internalizes congestion effects, i. e., he considers (2.31) in conjunction
with K = Nk and the proportionality conditions Y = G/θG = E/θE. Then, y =(
ANσG α+σE βθαGθ
β
E
)1/(1−α−β)
k and the resource constraint is k˙ = (1 − θG − θE)y − c.
The constrained efficient growth rate obtains as
γPc = (1− θG − θE)
(
ANσG α+σE βθαGθ
β
E
) 1
1−α−β − ρ, (2.35)
the first term on the right-hand side denoting the social marginal return on private
capital.
If the social planner is allowed to choose θG and θE optimally, he picks θ
P
G = α and
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θPE = β.
9
The comparison of the equilibrium to the constrained optimal growth rate reveals that
γc = γ
P
c ⇔ (1− τy)(1− σGα− σEβ) = 1− θG − θE. (2.36)
The latter has interesting consequences for the budgeting of government services. To
see this, consider the case where θPG = α and θ
P
E = β. Then, (2.33) and (2.36) deliver
the following pair (τPy , p
P ) that implements the efficient allocation
τPy =
(1− σG)α + (1− σE)β
1− σGα− σEβ and p
P =
1
N
(
1− α− β
1− σGα− σEβ
)
. (2.37)
To satisfy the government’s budget constraint at (τPy , p
P ) a residual lump-sum tax or
subsidy may be necessary.
As a benchmark, consider the case where σG = σE = 1 such that both public services are
congestion-free. Then, τPy = 0 and p
P = 1/N , i. e., there is no distortion of intertemporal
prices and each firm’s demand for the excludable public service satisfies the natural
efficiency condition ∂y/∂Ed = pP = 1/N . In this case, the user fee fully finances the
provision of E. However, the provision of G must be financed through some lump-sum
tax to guarantee a balanced budget (Ott and Turnovsky, 2006).
In the presence of congestion, τPy > 0 is necessary to correct for the congestion externali-
ties. However, as τPy increases the price of the excludable service must fall since its after-
tax marginal product declines. Then, the provision of E requires cross-subsidization.
2.3.4 Public Consumption Services
Many publicly provided services matter for an economy because they directly enhance
the utility of households without affecting technology. Examples include cultural and
recreational public services such as museums, public parks, or public social events like
fireworks. To study the role of such public consumption services, we extend the analysis
9Again, this result can be linked to the natural condition of productive efficiency. We obtain from
equation (2.31) with K = Nk and Y = Ny that dY/dG = α (Y/G) = α/θPG = 1 and dY/dE =
β (Y/E) = β/θPE = 1. Hence, the marginal product of both government services provided out of current
production is one.
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of the pure public good case of Section 2.3.1 and add a non-excludable service that enters
the utility function. This service is subject to absolute congestion. With these properties,
our analysis combines the framework of Barro (1990) and Turnovsky (1996c).10
The household’s intertemporal utility is now
u =
∞∫
0
e−ρt (ln c+ bh lnh) dt, (2.38)
where h is the service the individual household derives from the public consumption good,
and bh ≥ 0 measures the relative weight of this form of consumption. For simplicity, the
per-period utility is separable in c and h.
The public consumption good is subject to aggregate congestion in total output such
that the service, h, derived by each household falls short of the aggregate service, H,
provided by the government. More precisely, we follow Turnovsky (1996c) and stipulate
h = HσH
(
H
Y
)1−σH
; (2.39)
here, σH ∈ [0, 1] measures the degree of aggregate congestion with σH = 1 and σH =
0 capturing the special cases of a pure public good and of proportional congestion,
respectively.
On the production side, we maintain the production function of equation (2.7). On the
government side, we need to add H as government expenditure such that a balanced
budget requires G + H = τyY + τcC + τN . As in the previous sections, we tie the size
of H to the size of the economy: H = θHY .
Decentralized Equilibrium
The individual household-producer behaves as in Section 2.3.1. SinceH is non-excludable,
there is no optimization with respect to h. Moreover, when choosing k, she disregards
the link between k, aggregate output Y , and h that materializes under congestion.
10Cazzavillan (1996) studies the role of a public good that simultaneously affects per-period utility
and the production function of the representative household-producer. Under a more general utility
function that allows for increasing returns in the consumption externality of public expenditure, he
shows that local indeterminacy and endogenous stochastic fluctuations may arise.
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As a result, the expression of the consumption growth rate in equilibrium is again given
by (2.9).11 However, if at least some part of H is funded via the distortionary income
tax, then, the level of γc that satisfies the government’s budget constraint is smaller. To
see this, consider the benchmark where G+H = τyY . Then, τy = θG + θH such that
γc = (1− θG − θH)(1− α) (ANαθαG)
1
1−α − ρ. (2.40)
Since the government channels additional resources into non-productive uses, the latter
falls short of (2.9) with τy = θG. For the same reason, the growth-maximizing expendi-
ture share of the productive government services θ∗G = α(1−θH), declines in θH . Further,
in this case the growth-maximizing share of public consumption services is zero.
Pareto Efficiency
The omniscient planner considers the individual production function as in (2.10). The
resource constraint is k˙ = (1 − θG − θH)y − c. The key new element appears in the
per-period utility function. The planner knows that the congestion effect of equation
(2.39), the proportionality requirement, H = θHY , and the aggregation Y = Ny imply
h = θH (Ny)
σH . Hence via (2.10), the choice of k directly affects per-period utility for
σH > 0. The resulting constrained efficient steady-state growth rate is
γPc = (1− θG − θH) (ANαθαG)
1
1−α − ρ
1 + bhσH
. (2.41)
The first term on the right-hand side is the social marginal return on private capital. The
second term is the social rate of time preference. The provision of the non-productive
public service reduces this rate. Intuitively, the presence of bh captures the fact that a
higher capital stock tomorrow raises the level of h, and hence tomorrow’s utility. This
effect is stronger the smaller the congestion effect.12
The equilibrium and the planner’s growth rate coincide if and only if
γc = γ
P
c ⇔ (ANαθαG)
1
1−α [(1− τy)(1− α)− (1− θG − θH)] = ρ
[
1− 1
1 + bhσH
]
.(2.42)
11This result hinges to some extent on the separability of c and h in the per-period utility function.
If the marginal utility of c depends on h, then the household’s willingness to postpone consumption
depends on the growth rate of h. In a steady state with congestion, the latter need not coincide with
the steady-state growth rate of all other per-capita variables. We leave a more detailed study of the
impact of the interaction between c and h on the steady-state growth rate for future research.
12In the special case of proportional congestion, where σH = 0, the effect of k on h disappears because
(2.39) in conjunction with H = θHY implies h = θH .
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The term in brackets on the left-hand side reflects the possible deviation of the private
from the social marginal rate of return on private capital. The gap between these rates
depends on the way government finances its expenditure. A novelty compared to the
pure public good case of Section 2.3.1 is the deviation of the private and the social rate
of time preference that appears on the right-hand side.
We may expand the planner’s choice set and allow him to determine the size of θG and
θH . Then, the efficient pair
(
θPG, θ
P
H
)
satisfies the following optimality conditions
θPG = α
[
θPH (σH − 1) + 1
]
, (2.43)
θPH =
bhρ
1 + bhσH
[
ANα
(
θPG
)α] −11−α . (2.44)
Assume that the pair
(
θPG, θ
P
H
)
is unique in [0, 1]2 such that equations (2.43) and (2.44)
intersect only once as depicted in Figure 2.1.
θPH
θPGα 1
1
bhρ
1+bhσh
(ANα)
1
1−α
bhρ
1+bh
(ANα)
1
1−α
A
C
B
Figure 2.1: Efficient pair
(
θPG, θ
P
H
)
Intersection A corresponds to the case where bh = 0 and σH ∈ [0, 1]. Then, there
is no utility associated with h. Hence, independently of the degree of congestion, the
planner chooses θPH = 0 and θ
P
G = α and the optimal allocation coincides with the one
of Section 2.3.1. Case B has bh > 0 and σH ∈ (0, 1). Here, θPH > 0 and 0 < θPG < α.
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Moreover,
dθPG
dbh
< 0 and
dθPH
dbh
> 0, (2.45)
dθPG
dσH
> 0 and
dθPH
dσH
< 0. (2.46)
Since bh > 0, the planner is ready to provide public consumption services according to
the optimality condition ∂u/∂H = ∂u/∂c. As a consequence, the relative size of G falls.
To grasp the effect of congestion, recall that the planner is aware of the positive effect
of θG on h in the utility function. This effect is more pronounced the lower the degree
of congestion. Hence, a rise in σH increases θ
P
G. In the limit σH → 1, H is a pure public
good and θPG → α as shown as intersection C in Figure 2.1. In any case, the welfare-
maximizing share of public consumption services is positive. Hence, the provision of
public consumption services may introduce a wedge between the goals of growth and
welfare maximization.13
The income tax rate that implements the Pareto-efficient allocation is found to be τPy =
(1− σH) θPH . Hence, without the congestion externality, i. e., σH = 1, no income tax is
needed to implement the Pareto-efficient allocation.
2.3.5 Endogenous Labor Supply
This section incorporates the labor-leisure decision, i. e., individual labor supply becomes
endogenous. In this context, a consumption tax as well as a tax on labor income are
distortionary since they affect the trade-off between consumption and leisure. Contrary
to the analysis of Section 2.3.4, public consumption expenditure turns out to have a
positive effect on the equilibrium growth rate. We develop an intuition for this result
following the presentation of Turnovsky (2000a).
The representative agent has a per-period time endowment equal to one and allocates
the fraction l ∈ (0, 1) to leisure and (1 − l) to work. The per-period utility function
13Park and Philippopoulos (2002) confirm this result in a setting that allows for a different set of
second-best optimal policies.
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takes the positive utility of leisure into account. More precisely, we stipulate
u =
∞∫
0
[ln c+ bh lnh+ bl ln l] e
−ρt dt, bh, bl ≥ 0. (2.47)
Since the focus is on the role of labor supply, we abstract from congestion effects associ-
ated with the provision of public consumption services, i. e., σH = 1 in (2.39) such that
h = H.
On the production side, we incorporate labor as a productive input and generalize the
production function of (2.7) to
y = A [G (1− l)]α k1−α, 0 < α < 1. (2.48)
Hence, there are constant returns to scale both with respect to private capital and
labor, and with respect to public and private capital. The former implies zero profits
in a competitive environment whereas the latter allows for steady-state growth of labor
productivity.
On the government side, we split the proportional income tax τy into a tax on wage
income at rate τw and a tax on capital income at rate τr. With w and r denoting the
real wage and the real rate of return on private capital, the balanced government budget
becomes G+H = τww(1− l)N + τrrK + τcC + τN .
Decentralized Equilibrium
Household-producers choose a plan (c, l, k) for each t such that (2.47) is maximized
subject to the budget constraint k˙ = (1− τw)w(1− l) + (1− τr)rk − (1 + τc)c− τ .
Following the steps that led to Euler equation (2.9) we obtain
γc = (1− τr)(1− α) (ANαθαG)
1
1−α (1− l) α1−α − ρ. (2.49)
Observe that l appears as a determinant of γc. Intuitively, since labor and capital are
complements in the production function (2.48), more leisure reduces the marginal rate
of return on private capital. Moreover, l is a choice variable that needs to be pinned
down.
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To find a second condition that determines the level of leisure consistent with steady-
state growth, consider the product market equilibrium condition that coincides with the
economy’s resource constraint k˙ = (1− θG − θH) y − c. Expressing the latter in terms
of the growth rate of private capital and using the static optimality condition for the
consumption-leisure decision14 delivers
γk =
[
(1− θG − θH)−
(
1− τw
1 + τc
)
α
bl
(
l
1− l
)]
(ANαθαG)
1
1−α (1− l) α1−α . (2.50)
A steady state needs γc = γk. If this requirement gives rise to a unique and strictly
positive steady-state growth rate, then there is a time-invariant level of steady-state
leisure depending on the policy variables θG, θH , τr, τw, τc.
Turnovsky (2000a) shows that a rise in either public consumption services (θH ↑) or
in public productive services (θG ↑) financed by a lump-sum tax increases the steady-
state growth rate. As to θH , this is the result of two opposing forces. For a given
labor supply, the growth rate declines since the government claims additional resources.
However, households increase their labor supply to make up for this negative income
effect. Overall the steady-state growth rate increases due to greater employment. These
effects do not materialize when labor supply is inelastic as in Section 2.3.4. In such a
setting a lump-sum financed increase in θH has no impact on steady-state growth.
The same two forces also operate in the case of an increase in θG. In addition, there
is a third effect since a higher θG raises the equilibrium wage and, hence, the labor
supply. As a result, the steady-state growth rate increases further such that ∂γc/∂θG >
∂γc/∂θH > 0.
If the lump-sum tax is accompanied by a consumption tax and/or a tax on wage income
the positive link between steady-state consumption growth rate γc and θi, i = G,H,
weakens. The reason is the distorted consumption-leisure decision, i. e., the household
tries to avoid the additional tax burden and substitutes leisure for labor. Hence, with
endogenous labor supply, a consumption tax ceases to be lump-sum and impinges on
the economy’s growth rate.
14The latter condition requires the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption to
equal the relative price of both goods, i. e., blc/l = w(1 − τw)/(1 + τc). Marginal cost pricing of labor
gives w = αy/(1 − l). Using both equations, we can determine the ratio c/y, which is then used to
derive (2.50).
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Pareto Efficiency
The social planner chooses a plan (c, l, k) for each t to maximize household utility subject
to the economy’s resource constraint. Compared to the optimization of competitive
households, the omniscient planner takes into account that the choice of l and k has an
effect on the level of government consumption services. Since H = θHY appears in the
utility function this channel affects the constrained optimal steady-state growth rate of
consumption.
Given l, the optimization generates the following expressions for the planner’s choice of
γPc and γ
P
k :
γPc =
(1− θG − θH)
1− bhΩ(l) (AN
αθαG)
1
1−α (1− l) α1−α − ρ, (2.51)
γPk = (1− θG − θH)
1− Ω(l)(1 + bh)
1− bhΩ(l) (AN
αθαG)
1
1−α (1− l) α1−α . (2.52)
Here, Ω(l) ≡ αl/ [bl(1− α)(1− l)]. The presence of bhΩ(l) in the Euler equation (2.51)
captures the fact that, for a given level of leisure/labor, the presence of utility-enhancing
government consumption expenditure increases the benefits from capital investment to-
day, lowering the consumption-output ratio and positively affecting the growth rate of
consumption.15 Further, the additional term bhΩ(l) in the numerator of (2.52) reflects
the fact that, from the planner’s point of view, the marginal disutility of labor is lower
since more labor means a higher consumption of H. Via this channel, the consumption-
output ratio is lowered and the growth rate of capital is positively affected.
If we add the steady-state requirement γPc = γ
P
k , then (2.51) and (2.52) give an expression
for the constrained optimal steady-state growth rate that is similar to (2.41) with σH = 1
and a level of labor supply yet to be determined
γPc = (1− θG − θH) (ANαθαG)
1
1−α (1− l) α1−α − ρ
1 + bh
. (2.53)
In addition, (2.51) and (2.52) determine the steady-state labor supply implicitly.16
15The latter dominates the negative effect of leisure on the rate of return of private capital for any
value of l if bh/bl > 1. If 0 < bh/bl < 1, this only applies for not too small values of l.
16This condition is Ω(l)(1 + bh(1 + z(l))) = z(l), where
z(l) ≡ ρ
[
(1− θG − θH) (AθαG)
1
1−α (1− l) α1−α
]−1
.
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We can use our results to derive conditions under which a fiscal policy mix implements
the constrained efficient allocation. This requires
γc = γ
P
c ⇔ (1− τr)(1− α) =
1− θG − θH
1− bhΩ(l) , (2.54)
γk = γ
P
k ⇔
(
1− τw
1 + τc
)
(1− α)Ω(l) = (1− θG − θH) Ω(l)
1− bhΩ(l) . (2.55)
According to the first of these conditions, τr has to be set such that the private marginal
after-tax return on private capital equals the social rate of return on private capital.
The second condition equalizes the consumption-output ratios of the equilibrium and
planner’s choice. It is then straightforward to see that the desired policy mix must
satisfy the condition (Turnovsky, 2000a)
(1− τr)
(
1 + τc
1− τw
)
= 1. (2.56)
Intuitively, the effect of a distortionary tax on capital income can be offset by a com-
pensating distortion of the consumption-leisure trade-off that strengthens labor supply.
As long as lump-sum taxation is a feasible option any policy mix satisfying (2.56) is
consistent with the government’s budget constraint.17
If the social planner is allowed to pick θG and θH optimally, one finds that the optimal
choice involves
θPG = α and θ
P
H = (1− α) bhΩ(l), (2.57)
i. e., the optimal share of productive government expenditure satisfies the natural con-
dition of productive efficiency, and the optimal share of consumption expenditure is tied
to the optimal level of leisure. Interestingly, from (2.54) and (2.55) the implementation
of (θPG, θ
P
H) is only possible if τr = 0 and τw = −τc.
2.3.6 Small Open Economy
Next, we turn to a small open economy with productive government expenditure, where
agents are free to accumulate internationally traded bonds in a perfect world capital
17Raurich (2003) studies optimal tax policies in the model of Turnovsky (2000a) assuming that neither
lump-sum nor consumption taxes are admissible, yet the government’s budget must be balanced in all
periods.
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market. To highlight the role of openness we restrict attention to a pure public good
such that the production function of household-producers is given by (2.7). Moreover,
we abstract from the presence of public consumption services.
As bonds and private capital are perfect substitutes as stores of value, in equilibrium
they must pay the same after-tax rate of return, which is tied to the exogenous world
interest rate r¯. Hence, with government expenditure a fixed fraction of aggregate output
according to (2.6) and an exogenous labor supply, this implies
(1− τy)(1− α) (AθαGNα)
1
1−α = r¯(1− τb), (2.58)
where τb is the tax rate on foreign bond income. Obviously, the pair of tax rates τy
and τb that satisfies this condition cannot be chosen independently. To circumvent this
problem, we introduce adjustment costs such that the price of installed capital, q, is
variable and adjusts in equilibrium such that these after-tax rates of return are the same
for any arbitrarily specified tax rates. The investment cost function is independent of
government activity and given by
ϕ(i, k) ≡
(
1 +
i
2k
)
i, (2.59)
which simplifies (2.14) by fixing φ = 1.
First, we study the case of an exogenous labor supply and then incorporate a labor-leisure
trade-off. We shall see that the implications for government activity substantially differ
in both cases. The exposition is based on Turnovsky (1999a).
2.3.6.1 Exogenous Labor Supply
Decentralized Equilibrium
Denote b the stock of net foreign bonds held by a household-producer at t and recall
that k is the stock of capital in her (domestic) firm. Then, her flow budget constraint is
given by
b˙ = r¯(1− τb)b+ (1− τy)y − (1 + τc)c− ϕ(i, k)− τ. (2.60)
The government budget modifies to G = τyY + τcC + rτbbN + τN .
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The objective of household-producers is to choose a plan (c, i, b, k) that maximizes utility
(2.2) subject to (2.60) and k˙ = i. From the individual’s optimality conditions with
respect to c and b we obtain the Euler equation as
γc = r¯(1− τb)− ρ. (2.61)
Hence, in a small open economy, the consumption growth rate is independent of domestic
production conditions. It only depends on the given world interest rate, the tax rate on
foreigns bonds, and on the rate of time preference.
The optimality conditions with respect to k and i deliver
q = 1 +
i
k
, (2.62)
r¯(1− τb) = (1− τy)(1− α) (Aθ
α
GN
α)
1
1−α
q
+
q˙
q
+
(q − 1)2
2q
. (2.63)
As we saw in (2.17) the value of installed capital for an investing firm is greater than
one. Equation (2.63) is a non-linear differential equation that describes the evolution of
q such that the after-tax rate of return on traded bonds is equal to the after-tax rate of
return on private domestic capital. The latter comprises the same elements as discussed
following equation (2.19). Observe that (2.63) collapses to (2.58) for q = 1.
Turning to the steady state, we know from (2.62) that private domestic capital grows at
the rate γk = q − 1, where q satisfies (2.63) for q˙ = 0.18 Thus, the steady-state growth
rate of capital (and output) depends on the domestic production technology as well as on
various fiscal policy parameters. In contrast to the closed economy, consumption, capital
and output generically grow at different rates, with the difference being reconciled by
the accumulation of traded bonds.
As to the role of government activity on steady-state growth one finds that (Turnovsky,
1999a)
dγk
dθG
> 0,
dγc
dθG
= 0;
dγk
dθG
∣∣∣∣
θG=τy
Q 0 ⇔ α Q θG, dγc
dθG
∣∣∣∣
θG=τy
= 0. (2.64)
18 The presence of convex adjustment costs may prevent the existence of a balanced growth path; for
a discussion see Turnovsky (1996b). Further, the transversality condition of the household-producer’s
problem requires r¯ (1− τb) > γk and implies that only the smaller root of (2.63) is consistent with
steady-state growth. Moreover, at this root, the right-hand side of (2.63) is negatively sloped.
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The first two derivatives describe the effect of a rise in government expenditure financed
through an adjustment in lump-sum taxes. The steady-state growth rate of capital
increases since a higher θG increases the marginal product of capital such that the
steady-state value of q in (2.63) increases; hence, γk = q − 1 rises. Due to (2.61),
γc is independent of θG. The second two derivatives consider the benchmark case where
government activity is only financed by income taxation, i. e., θG = τy. This introduces
an offsetting effect on the steady-state value of q since a necessary rise in taxes reduces
the after-tax marginal product of capital in (2.63). As in previous sections, there is a
growth-maximizing share of government expenditure equal to α at which the price of
installed capital is maximized.
The effect of τb on steady-state growth is given by
dγk
dτb
> 0,
dγc
dτb
< 0. (2.65)
Intuitively, an increase in the tax on bond income lowers the net rate of return on
traded bonds, which requires a lower rate of return on installed capital, hence a higher
q according to (2.63). Moreover, a higher τb reduces the households’ willingness to
postpone consumption and γc declines.
Pareto Efficiency
The planner maximizes u with respect to c, i, k, and b subject to k˙ = i and the resource
constraint
b˙ = (1− θG)y + r¯b− c− ϕ (i, k) . (2.66)
Accordingly, we obtain the constrained efficient steady-state growth rates of consumption
and capital as
γPc = r¯ − ρ and γPk = qP − 1, (2.67)
where qP is determined by
r¯ =
(1− θG) (AθαGNα)
1
1−α
qP
+
(qP − 1)2
2qP
. (2.68)
The interpretation of (2.67) and (2.68) mimics the one of (2.61) and (2.63) in the de-
centralized equilibrium. Due to the presence of τb, we have γ
P
c > γc. It follows that
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τb = 0 is necessary to implement the constrained efficient allocation. Then, for the same
reasons set out in Footnote 18, we find
q Q qP ⇔ γk Q γPk ⇔
θG − α
1− α Q τy. (2.69)
Allowing the social planner to additionally determine the optimal size of the government
reveals that the growth-maximizing share of government expenditure is also welfare-
maximizing, i. e., θPG = α. If θG 6= α, we obtain that capital and interest income should
be taxed at different rates. This result is driven by the assumption that government
expenditure is a fixed fraction of output and thereby independent of interest income.
2.3.6.2 Endogenous Labor Supply
In this section we introduce an endogenous labor supply in the small open economy of
the previous section.
Decentralized Equilibrium
The household-producer chooses a plan (c, l, i, b, k) to maximize
u =
∞∫
0
[ln c+ bl ln l] e
−ρt dt (2.70)
subject to k˙ = i, the budget constraint b˙ = (1− τw)w(1− l) + (1− τr)rk + r¯(1− τb)b−
(1 + τc)c−ϕ (i, k)− τ , and the production function (2.48). This leads to the conditions
for consumption and domestic capital growth (2.61) and (2.62) as well as the following
optimality conditions
r¯(1− τb) = (1− τr)(1− α) (AN
αθαG)
1
1−α (1− l) α1−α
q
+
q˙
q
+
(q − 1)2
2q
, (2.71)
c
y
=
(
1− τw
1 + τc
)
α
bl
(
l
1− l
)
. (2.72)
In the steady state q˙ = 0 such that (2.71) determines the equilibrium price of installed
capital given l. Condition (2.72) implies that in a steady state with constant labor
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supply c and y must grow at the same rate. Moreover, one can show that in a steady
state y, k, and G must grow at the same rate. It follows that
γk = q − 1 = r¯(1− τb)− ρ = γc. (2.73)
Equation (2.73) implies that, contrary to the case with exogenous labor supply, in equi-
librium capital, output, and consumption grow at the same rate determined by the net
interest rate on foreign bonds and the rate of time preference. Hence, with endoge-
nous labor supply the production side is irrelevant for the steady-state growth rates of
consumption and domestic capital (Turnovsky, 1999a).
From (2.73) it follows that out of the set of fiscal policy variables, only changes in
τb generate steady-state growth effects. The reason is that (2.73) also pins down q.
Therefore, in a steady state changes in θG, τr, and τb lead to adjustments of labor supply
such that (2.71) remains valid. One readily verifies that dl/dθG > 0, dl/dτr < 0, and
dl/dτb > 0. Moreover, since τw and τc do not show up in (2.71) it follows that these
taxes are essentially lump-sum, i. e., dl/dτw = dl/dτc = 0. This is in stark contrast to the
results obtained under endogenous labor supply in the closed economy of Section 2.3.5.
Pareto Efficiency
The social planner chooses a plan (c, l, i, b, k) to maximize individual utility (2.70) subject
to k˙ = i and the resource constraint (2.66) where y is given by (2.48). Following the
same procedure as in the decentralized setting we obtain the steady-state conditions
γPk = q
P − 1 = r¯ − ρ = γPc (2.74)
r¯ =
(1− θG) (ANαθαG)
1
1−α (1− l) α1−α
qP
+
(qP − 1)2
2qP
(2.75)
c
y
=
(
1− θG
1− α
)
α
bl
(
l
1− l
)
. (2.76)
The tax rates that replicate the constrained efficient steady-state path, bring (2.71) -
(2.73) in line with (2.74) - (2.76). These are τb = 0 and (1 − τr)(1 + τc)/(1 − τw) = 1,
where the latter is a restatement of condition (2.56) derived for the closed economy.
The welfare-maximizing share of government expenditure is equal to α. Moreover, with
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θG = θ
P
G, the optimal tax rates can be shown to be τr = 0 and τw = −τc. This confirms
the results of the small open economy with exogenous labor supply and for the closed
economy with endogenous labor supply. However, here the choice of θPG does not have a
growth effect but assures the static efficiency of the steady state.
2.4 Productive Government Activity as a Stock
The difference between the stock and the flow approach to modeling productive govern-
ment activity is that G(t) is not provided out of current output but results from past
public investments, i. e., G(t) is the aggregate stock of public capital at t.
The first paper that treats productive government activity as a stock in our analytical
framework is Futagami et al. (1993). These authors assume that the public capital
stock is a pure public good such that g = G. Here, we begin our discussion of the stock
approach by directly allowing for the congestion of public services. Then, we incorporate
two aspects that arise only if we think of productive government activity as a stock.19
2.4.1 Public Goods Subject to Congestion
We follow Turnovsky (1997a) and assume that current public investment is a constant
fraction of aggregate output denoted by θG ∈ (0, 1). We abstract from depreciation such
that G evolves according to
G˙ = θGY. (2.77)
The household-producer’s production technology continues to be as in (2.1). As a con-
sequence, in the stock case G will only be a constant fraction of Y in the steady state,
19The stock modeling approach has incorporated many facets that we will not discuss in detail. For
instance, Lau (1995) and Chen (2006) incorporate public consumption expenditure affecting the per-
period utility function. See Baier and Glomm (2001) and Raurich-Puigdevall (2000) for stock models
with an endogenous labor supply. Turnovsky (1997b) is the reference for a small open economy. This
framework is applied by Chatterjee et al. (2003) to analyze the process of developmental assistance
through unilateral capital transfers tied to investment in public capital. Go´mez (2004) devises a fis-
cal policy that allows to implement the Pareto-efficient allocation when investments are irreversible.
Devarajan et al. (1998) study alternative ways how to provide public capital.
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whereas in the flow case this holds for all t in accordance with condition (2.6).
Let the service derived by the individual household-producer g be given by (2.23). As in
the flow model of Section 2.3.3.1, the individual household-producer chooses c and k to
maximize utility u of (2.2) subject to her flow budget constraint (2.3) and the production
function (2.24) which we repeat here for convenience
y = A
(
G
K
)α (
k
K
)−σG α
k.
In her intertemporal optimization the individual household-producer neglects her impact
on the aggregate private capital stock K and takes the stock of public capital G as given.
Then, the Euler condition obtains as
γc = (1− τy)(1− σGα)ANα(σG−1)
(
G
k
)α
− ρ ≡ γc
(
G
k
, τy
)
, (2.78)
where we use the fact that in equilibrium K = Nk.
This growth rate looks similar to the Euler condition in the flow model (see, e. g., equa-
tion (2.8) where σG = 1). Again, the first term on the right-hand side of the Euler
equation is the private marginal product of private capital. In the flow model, the ra-
tio G/k is determined by exogenous parameters since G is proportionate to Y at all t.
Therefore, the growth rate of consumption is time-invariant. Here, this is not the case
since the proportionality of G and Y occurs only in the steady state. As a consequence,
additional differential equations are needed to fully characterize the dynamical system.
To derive these conditions, we divide the aggregate resource constraint (2.11) by k and
the public accumulation equation (2.77) by G. Taking into account that equilibrium
production is given by
y = ANα(σG−1)
(
G
k
)α
k, (2.79)
we find two additional differential equations in G and k
γG = θGAN
α(σG−1)+1
(
G
k
)α−1
≡ γG
(
G
k
)
, (2.80)
γk = (1− θG)ANα(σG−1)
(
G
k
)α
− c
k
. (2.81)
The dynamical system of the economy is then described by equations (2.78), (2.80), and
(2.81) in conjunction with initial conditions k0, G0, and the transversality condition of
the household-producer’s optimization problem.
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Here, we focus on the steady state and its properties. From (2.78) and (2.79), G, k, and
y have the same steady-state growth rate. This growth rate and the steady-state ratio,
(G/k)|ss, can be obtained from (2.78) and (2.80). Figure 2.2 (left) illustrates the loci γc
and γG as functions of G/k.
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Figure 2.2: Steady-State Growth Rates: Decentralized Equilibrium (left) and the Im-
plementation of the Pareto-Efficient Allocation (right).
Next, we turn to the effect of fiscal policy variables on steady-state growth. A lump-sum
financed increase in the share of government investment, θG, corresponds to an upward
shift of the γG-locus in Figure 2.2 (left), which implies a higher steady-state growth
rate. If instead of a lump-sum tax a distortionary income tax is used for funding such
that θG = τy, then in addition the γc-locus pivots downwards. The overall effect on the
steady-state growth rate depends on the relative strength of both shifts. Analytically,
one can show that
dγc
dθG
R 0 ⇔ α R θG. (2.82)
Hence, as in the flow model, the growth-maximizing share of government investment is
θ∗G = τ
∗
y = α (Futagami et al., 1993).
Pareto Efficiency
In contrast to the individual household-producers the social planner not only chooses
c and k but also the public capital stock G to maximize utility (2.2) subject to the
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aggregate resource constraint (2.11) and the accumulation equation of public capital
(2.77) with aggregate production y given by (2.79). This problem delivers the steady-
state Euler equation20
γPc = (1− θG)
∂y
∂k
+ θGN
∂y
∂G
− ρ. (2.83)
The first two terms on the right-hand side have an interpretation as the social return
of an additional marginal unit of output. Along the optimal path, the planner allocates
the fraction 1 − θG of this unit to private capital and the fraction θG to public capital.
This partition is imposed by the public accumulation equation (2.77). The second term
corresponds to the benefit of a marginal increase in the provision of public capital asso-
ciated with θG units of current output. Since the planner views G as a pure public good,
the marginal increase in aggregate output is N times the marginal increase in individual
output.
In light of (2.79) and (2.80), (2.83) can be written as
γPc = (1− θG) (1− α)ANα(σG−1)
(
G
k
)α
+ αγG − ρ. (2.84)
In a steady state γPc = γG such that (2.84) becomes
γPc = (1− θG)ANα(σG−1)
(
G
k
)α
− ρ
1− α ≡ γ
P
c
(
G
k
, θG
)
. (2.85)
The steady-state ratio (G/k)|Pss is then determined by the conditions (2.85) and (2.80).
See Figure 2.2 (right) for an illustration.
Comparing γc of (2.78) to γ
P
c of (2.85) shows that
γc = γ
P
c ⇔ ANα(σG−1)
(
G
k
)α
[(1− τy)(1− σG α)− (1− θG)] = −ρα
1− α. (2.86)
Hence, an income tax rate τy that implements (G/k)|Pss given θG exists. It is lower the
lower the degree of congestion (i. e., the larger σG) and higher the greater θG.
Allowing the planner to choose θG optimally delivers
θPG = α−
ρ
ANσG α
(
1−α
α
)1−α < α. (2.87)
20A detailed derivation of this and other results discussed in this section can be found in the appendix
of this chapter.
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Interestingly, θPG falls short of the growth-maximizing level θ
∗
G = α (Turnovsky, 1997a).
This difference occurs as the advantage of a larger public investment share only materi-
alizes tomorrow whereas the cost in terms of foregone consumption is paid today. This
intertemporal aspect explains why θPG declines in ρ. Since the benefit of an increase
in the stock of public capital accrues to all firms, θPG increases in N . Notice that no
intertemporal consideration is present when θPG is determined in the flow model of Sec-
tion 2.3.3.1. Therefore, in that case the growth-maximizing and the welfare-maximizing
expenditure shares coincide, i. e., θ∗G = θ
P
G = α.
One can show that an income tax rate equal to
τPy =
α (1− σG)
1− σG α , (2.88)
implements the Pareto-efficient steady-state allocation involving θPG. The optimal income
tax corrects for the congestion externality and recommends the same tax rate as in the
flow model of Section 2.3.3.1 (see equation 2.28). The larger the degree of congestion
the greater the optimal income tax.21
A curious implication arises when the degree of congestion is sufficiently high, i. e., σG
close to zero. For instance, in the extreme case of proportional congestion, σG = 0,
τPy = α > θ
P
G such that the government should impose an income tax rate in excess of
its current investment costs and refund the excess revenue in form of lump-sum taxes.
In the respective flow model (equation 2.28) the optimal income tax is τPy = α = θ
P
G
so that government expenditure is exactly covered. Thus, in the stock model a larger
income tax rate is required in order to offset the incentive to overaccumulate private
capital due to congestion.
21Marrero and Novales (2005) show that the presence of a significant level of wasteful public expen-
diture that does neither affect the economy’s technology nor preferences is another reason for why a
positive income tax leads to faster long-run growth and higher welfare than lump-sum taxes. Turnovsky
(1997b) confirms the results of (2.87) and (2.88) for a small open economy with exogenous labor supply
and private and public investments subject to adjustment costs.
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2.4.2 Maintenance of Public Capital
Due to its use or the passage of time, a fraction of the current stock of public capital
depreciates. Maintenance refers to investments that replace depreciated public capital.
Conceptually, the incorporation of such replacement investments requires the identifi-
cation of wear and tear with different parts of the existing public capital stock. Since
here this stock comprises homogeneous capital goods, such an identification is not pos-
sible. Therefore, we follow the literature, in particular Rioja (2003) and Kalaitzidakis
and Kalyvitis (2004), and model replacement investments as an attempt to reduce the
instantaneous rate of depreciation of public capital. The new question is then how the
economy splits up its expenditure on public capital into “new” public capital goods and
in replacement investments, i. e., investments that reduce the rate of depreciation.
Denote GI the per-period investments in “new” public capital goods and M the level of
per-period maintenance investments. Then, the economy’s gross investment is GI +M .
With D denoting depreciation, the stock of public capital evolves according to G˙ =
GI +M −D.
As proposed by Kalaitzidakis and Kalyvitis (2004), we model the difference between
replacement investments and actual depreciation as
D −M ≡ δG
(
M
Y
)
G, with δG(.) > 0 > δ
′
G(.). (2.89)
The idea is that a higher level of maintenanceM reduces the level of depreciation whereas
a more intense usage measured by Y increases it. With (2.89) the accumulation of public
capital is governed by
G˙ = GI − δG
(
M
Y
)
G. (2.90)
We assume that the government finances its total expenditure, GI+M , via income taxes
such that the government’s budget constraint is
M +GI = τyY. (2.91)
Let θM and (1−θM) denote the shares of total government expenditure that are allocated
to maintenance and “new” capital goods, respectively, i. e.,
M = θMτyY and GI = (1− θM)τyY. (2.92)
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To simplify, we abstract from congestion effects such that the individual household-
producer’s production function is (2.7) which we restate here for convenience22
y = A
(
G
k
)α
k.
Decentralized Equilibrium
The individual household-producer chooses c and k to maximize her utility u given by
(2.2) subject to her flow budget constraint k˙ = (1 − τy)y − c. The Euler condition is
then
γc = (1− τy)(1− α)A
(
G
k
)α
− ρ, (2.93)
which corresponds to (2.78) for σG = 1. The growth rates of public and private cap-
ital result from the public accumulation equation (2.90) and the individual’s resource
constraint
γG = (1− θM)τyAN
(
G
k
)α−1
− δG(θMτy), (2.94)
γk = (1− τy)A
(
G
k
)α
− c
k
. (2.95)
Then, the dynamical system of the economy is given by (2.93) - (2.95) and initial condi-
tions k0, G0, and the transversality condition of the household-producer’s optimization
problem.
Analogously to the previous section, we obtain the steady-state ratio (G/k)|ss and the
common steady-state growth rate for c, G, and k from (2.93) and (2.94). These equa-
tions also reveal that no clear cut comparative statics for the steady-state growth rate
with respect to θM and τy are available. However, a steady-state growth-maximizing
share of maintenance investments, θ∗M , can be determined, at least implicitly. The total
differential of (2.93) and (2.94) delivers the condition
AN
[(
G
k
)∗]α−1
= −δ′G (θ∗Mτy) . (2.96)
Intuitively, the optimal allocation of current output to public capital investments satisfies
∂G˙/∂GI = ∂G˙/∂M , i. e., the last marginal unit spent on maintenance contributes the
22See Dioikitopoulos and Kalyvitis (2008) for an analysis of public capital maintenance and conges-
tion.
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same amount to the change in public capital stock as the last marginal unit spent on
“new” public capital goods.
Kalaitzidakis and Kalyvitis (2004) show further that the growth-maximizing income tax
rate, τ ∗y , evaluated at θM = θ
∗
M is
τ ∗y =
α
1− θ∗M(1− α)
> α. (2.97)
This result contrasts with the finding of the previous sections where the growth-maximi-
zing tax rate was found to equal α. Intuitively, the presence of maintenance adds a
productive use to public capital expenditure. To exploit this opportunity, the optimal
income tax should be higher than without it. To strengthen this intuition we introduce
an explicit functional form such that δG = (θMτy)
−ε, ε > 0. Then, τ ∗y of (2.97) becomes
τ ∗y =
α (ε+ 1)
1 + αε
. (2.98)
In the limit ε → 0, the effect of maintenance vanishes and the optimal income tax is
τ ∗y = α. On the other hand, the effect of maintenance becomes more pronounced the
larger ε and τ ∗y → 1 as ε→∞.23
Further, it can be shown that the growth-maximizing share of new public capital goods,
(GI/Y )
∗ = (1 − θ∗M)τ ∗y < α. With δG = (θMτy)−ε, we find using (2.98) in (2.97) that
θ∗M = ε/ (ε+ 1). Then,
(GI/Y )
∗ =
α
1 + αε
< α. (2.99)
Hence, for ε = 0 we are back in the case without maintenance and (GI/Y )
∗ = α.
Moreover, as ε→∞ all public expenditure goes to maintenance and (GI/Y )∗ → 0.
23Similar to the present setup, Greiner and Hanusch (1998) have a stock model where government
expenditure can be allocated to two uses. They are the accumulation of the public capital stock and a
subsidy to private capital accumulation. The point of their paper is that a rise in the subsidy rate for
private capital investment is not necessarily growth-enhancing because it diverts resources away from
productive government spending. Moreover, these authors show that for strictly positive subsidy rates
the growth-maximizing income tax rate is strictly greater than α. Hence, the qualitative finding of
(2.97) may also be the consequence of a growth policy that strengthens the investment incentives of
private firms.
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2.4.3 Stock-Flow Model of Public Goods
Thus far, we have considered either the flow or the stock approach to modeling public
services. An interesting question taken up by Tsoukis and Miller (2003) and Ghosh and
Roy (2004) is whether and how new implications for growth and welfare arise if both
approaches appear simultaneously.
Let Gf denote the flow of public services and Gs the stock of public capital. Then, a
natural extension of the production function (2.7) is
y =
(
GβsG
1−β
f
)α
k1−α, 0 < β < 1. (2.100)
We assume that G˙s = θGsY and Gf = θGfY . Moreover, total government expenditure
is fully financed via a distortionary income tax and continues to be a fixed fraction of
output, i. e.,
G˙s +Gf = τyY = θGY, θG ≡ θGs + θGf . (2.101)
Tsoukis and Miller (2003) show that the growth-maximizing shares are
θ∗G = α, θ
∗
Gs = αβ, θ
∗
Gf
= α(1− β). (2.102)
Hence, each facet of public expenditure receives a share equal to its respective output
elasticity.
The Pareto-efficient allocation mimics the properties of the previous sections. In par-
ticular, one finds that the equilibrium shares of total expenditure and of public capital
investment are too large relative to their welfare-maximizing level whereas the equilib-
rium flow share is the welfare-maximizing one, i. e.,
θPG < θ
∗
G, θ
P
Gs < θ
∗
Gs , θ
P
Gf
= θ∗Gf . (2.103)
Ghosh and Roy (2004) analyze the question how the government by deciding on the ratio
of the two types of public spending can at least partially compensate for the non-optimal
choices of the private sector.
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2.5 Variations on a Theme
2.5.1 Stochastic Environments
Turnovsky (1999c) studies the role of productive government expenditure in a stochastic
version of the flow model with congestion as presented in Section 2.3.3.1. He finds that
under uncertainty the growth-maximizing level of government expenditure depends on
the degree of relative risk aversion. If the latter is strong, then the growth-maximizing
expenditure share exceeds the Pareto-efficient one.
On the production side, uncertainty is introduced via a productivity shock, du, that is
independent and identically distributed - normal with zero mean and variance σ2udt > 0.
This shock is proportional to the current mean flow of output. More precisely, the
flow of output, dy, produced by the individual household-producer over the small time
period (t, t + dt) is dy = Agαk1−α[dt + du], where g is given by (2.23). Government
expenditure comprises a deterministic, productivity-enhancing component, G, and a
stochastic component, G′. The total flow of resources claimed by the government over
the period dt amounts to dG¯ = Gdt+G′du. Both types of government expenditure are
fixed fractions of the aggregate mean rate of the output flow, i. e., G = θGNAg
αk1−α
and G′ = θ
′
GNAg
αk1−α. Thus, the fraction θG now represents the government’s choice of
the (deterministic) size of government, while θ
′
G represents the fraction of the aggregate
output shock absorbed by the government.
To allow for varying degrees of risk aversion the per-period utility function is now
(c1−v − 1) /(1− v), v ≥ 1. Here, v is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
This setting delivers a unique stochastic balanced growth path where the mean growth
rate depends on the degree of relative risk aversion, the variance of the shock, the shares
of government expenditure, and the degree of relative congestion. With σ2u = 0 and
v = 1 this growth rate collapses to the one under certainty as given by (2.25). To
interpret the equilibrium under uncertainty we follow Turnovsky (1999c) and consider
reasonable degrees of relative risk aversion to be v > 1.
The mean steady-state growth rate increases in the variance of du. Intuitively, a higher
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variance of the shocks means higher risk. Therefore, more risk-averse agents increase
their precautionary savings, which allows for faster growth.
The deterministic growth-maximizing share of government expenditure under full income
tax financing, θ∗G, exceeds α. The reason is that a higher θG raises the productivity of
private capital and, since the shock is proportional to output, magnifies the volatility of
output. As the latter induces more precautionary savings that increase the mean growth
rate there is an additional reason to increase θG.
The introduction of uncertainty reduces the Pareto-efficient share of deterministic gov-
ernment expenditure below θ∗G. Intuitively, the planner takes the individual’s risk aver-
sion into account and chooses a smaller steady-state growth rate that comes along with
lower volatility. The optimal tax structure that implements the Pareto-efficient alloca-
tion has to internalize the congestion externality. This is accomplished with a strictly
positive income tax. This tax reduces the growth rate of the economy and, hence, the
degree of volatility.24
2.5.2 Increasing Returns
Thus far, we have assumed that the production function of the individual firm exhibits
constant returns to scale with respect to private capital and productive government
expenditure at the social level. Constant returns are, among others, responsible for the
existence of a balanced growth path and the absence of transitional dynamics in the
flow models based on Barro (1990). Intuitively, this assumption is not mandatory. For
instance, in developing countries the density of the road network may be so low that
twice as much private capital and twice as many roads more than double output.
Conceptually, in the presence of external effects associated with productive government
expenditure, the expected return on private capital investments of individual firms de-
24Turnovsky (1999b) considers a small open economy under the same uncertainty as above. He shows
that the Pareto-efficient share of government expenditure is greater in the open than in the closed
economy if and only if the economy is a net creditor. The reason is that some of the risk of domestic
productivity shocks is exported and reduces the volatility of domestic income. Hence, for a given degree
of risk aversion, the individual is ready to accept a greater volatility caused by a bigger size of the
government.
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pends on the investment decisions of all other firms. Thus, there is scope for a self-
fulfilling prophecy (Krugman, 1991). If all household-producers believe the return on
investment to be high, they will invest a lot today. Then, tomorrow aggregate output
and, accordingly, government expenditure will be large. The latter raises the return on
investment such that the belief of a high rate of return is confirmed in equilibrium.
Abe (1995) and Zhang (2000) incorporate increasing returns at the social level into
the flow setup and find multiple equilibria and sophisticated transitional dynamics.25
For instance, the dynamical system of Abe (1995) delivers a new locally-stable and
stationary steady state in addition to an endogenous growth path. Accordingly, the
economy may be trapped in a sufficiently small neighborhood of the stationary steady
state. Alternatively, a coordinated hike in investment activity may push the economy
sufficiently far away from this steady state such that it embarks on an endogenous growth
path. The latter may be either due to a self-fulfilling prophecy or to an unpredicted and
temporary rise in government activity.26
2.5.3 Non-Scale Growth
In previous sections, we have emphasized that the steady-state growth rate depends on
the size of the economy measured by the “number” of household-producers - at least as
long as the provision of the public good has an element of non-rivalry (see Footnote 5).
The larger N , the faster the economy grows. This finding is often referred to as the scale
effect and has been criticized on both empirical and theoretical grounds (see Jones,
1995).27 Here, it arises since the level of government expenditure is tied to the size of
25Both authors generalize the production function (2.7) to y = AGαkβ where α + β > 1. Moreover,
they allow for the public good to affect per-period utility. Abe (1995) adopts the research production
function of Romer (1986, p. 1019) to model capital accumulation.
26Some details necessary to guarantee the success of the suggested government intervention are quite
involved. Zhang (2000) reaches similar policy conclusions, e. g., when his interior stationary steady
state is an unstable focus.
27The scale effect is a feature of the first-generation endogenous growth models of Romer (1990),
Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Aghion and Howitt (1992). Here, it results from the specification
of the production function for new knowledge. Subsequent idea-based growth models follow Jones
(1995) and modify this functional relationship to find qualitatively similar steady-state growth rates
as the one derived in equation (2.106). See Jones (1999) for a concise summary of this literature and
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the economy measured by aggregate output Ny.
Eicher and Turnovsky (2000) study productive government spending as a flow in a non-
scale endogenous growth model in the spirit of Jones (1995). As new elements, their
approach incorporates population growth, i. e., a constant growth rate of the “number”
of household-producers, γN 6= 0, and a simultaneous treatment of relative and aggregate
congestion of public services.28 The latter is achieved with a modification of equation
(2.23). Here, the functional form of productive services derived by an individual firm
from public expenditure is
g = G
(
k
K
)1−σR
KσA−1, (2.104)
where σR, σA ∈ [0, 1] parameterize the degree of relative and aggregate congestion, re-
spectively. Clearly, σR = σA = 1 is the special case of a pure public good.
In addition, Eicher and Turnovsky (2000) allow for increasing or decreasing returns to
scale in the production function of the individual firm such that (2.1) is replaced by
y = Akβgα with α, β ∈ [0, 1]. Upon combining this production function and equations
(2.104) and (2.6) one obtains at the social level
y = (AθαG)
1
1−α k
α(σA−1)+β
1−α N
α(σR+σA−1)
1−α . (2.105)
The latter is consistent with a balanced growth path involving γc = γk = γy if
γc =
α (σR + σA − 1)
1− β − ασA γN R 0. (2.106)
To fix ideas, assume that the marginal product of capital in (2.105) is strictly positive,
i. e., α(σA − 1) + β > 0, and let γN > 0. If the denominator of (2.106) is positive, then
the marginal product of capital is decreasing in (2.105). As a consequence, y cannot
grow as fast as k unless some of the growth of y is due to population growth. Indeed,
the numerator is only strictly positive if the output elasticity of labor is positive such
that population growth contributes positively to the growth of y. In turn, this is the
case if the degrees of congestion are not too pronounced.
The way we find the steady-state growth rate of (2.106) is quite different from previous
sections. In fact, here we are not concerned with first-order conditions to determine
Eicher and Turnovsky (1999) for a general treatment.
28Pintea and Turnovsky (2006) study the role of relative and aggregate congestion in a two-sector
non-scale model with private and “public” firms.
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intertemporal prices and, hence, the households’ Euler condition. Instead, we require the
consistency of equal growth rates of per capita variables with the economy’s technology
given by (2.105). As a result, the steady-state growth rate is independent of preference
parameters like ρ or fiscal policy variables such as θG. Consequently, the derivation of
a growth-maximizing share of government expenditure θ∗G as discussed in Section 2.3
becomes irrelevant.
By contrast, a welfare-maximizing share of government expenditure, θPG, can still be
determined since the static allocation consistent with steady-state growth need not be
efficient. Eicher and Turnovsky (2000) show that θPG = α. Moreover, there is a time-
invariant income tax rate that implements the Pareto-efficient allocation τPy = α(2 −
σR−σA)/(β+α(1−σR)). Intuitively, τPy internalizes both externalities caused by relative
and aggregate congestion. Clearly, τPy decreases in σR and σA.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
What is the role of productive government expenditure for sustained economic growth?
The literature surveyed in this chapter provides a rich set of hints to a full-fledged
answer.
First, it establishes an analytical framework in which productive government activity is
necessary for balanced growth of per capita variables. Without government activity, we
would be back in the neoclassical growth model without technical change and sustained
long-run growth. In this framework, government activity can be treated either as a flow
or as a stock. In both cases the technology of the economy has the following properties.
At the level of individual firms, there are constant returns to scale with respect to
private capital, k, and the services derived from productive government activity, g. At
the social level, two assumptions imply that the production function of the individual
firm becomes, at least asymptotically, linear in k. First, services, g, derived by individual
firms are proportional to the level of total government activity, G. Second, the current
flow of government expenditure is proportional to the size of the economy. In the flow
case, since G = θGY , the linearity in k holds at all t; in the stock case, since G˙ = θGY ,
this linearity holds only in the steady state.
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As a consequence, the steady-state properties of the scenarios under scrutiny are similar
to those of the AK-model such that the Euler equation determines the steady-state
growth rate. We use this property to study and compare the link between productive
government activity, economic growth, and welfare in different economic settings.
Second, productive government expenditure affects the steady-state growth rate of con-
sumption through a direct effect on the technology and an indirect effect on investment
incentives through the mode of financing. The direct effect is strictly positive except for
the small open economy where consumption growth is determined by parameters that
are exogenous to the domestic economy. This can be verified from the first column of
Table 2.1. It shows the effect of a larger government share, θG, on consumption growth
under full lump-sum financing. Another polar case has full income tax financing. Such
a tax reduces the after-tax marginal return on private capital. Hence, the indirect effect
on consumption growth is strictly negative. Column 2 in Table 2.1 reveals that these
opposing forces tend to give rise to a growth-maximizing government share. In most
settings, this share is equal to the output elasticity of the public input, α. If the gov-
ernment service in addition reduces adjustment costs, then θ∗G > α; if the government
also provides consumption services, then θ∗G < α.
Third, the welfare-maximizing, i. e., Pareto-efficient, share of government expenditure
- Column 3 of Table 2.1 - need not coincide with the growth-maximizing government
share. This reflects the trade-off involved in the consumption-savings decision that the
planner takes into account: faster growth requires higher investment outlays and reduces
consumption today. Most interestingly, here the difference between the flow and the
stock variant matters. In the stock case, the benefit from government expenditure today
is smaller since it augments output only tomorrow. Therefore, the welfare-maximizing
share of government expenditure is smaller.
Fourth, as shown in Column 4 of Table 2.1, appropriate fiscal policy measures can
implement the Pareto-efficient allocation. Intuitively, a strictly positive income tax can
be used to correct for overaccumulation of private capital due to a negative externality
such as congestion.
Arguably, within this well-defined analytical framework further facets of the link between
productive government expenditure and sustained economic growth can be studied. One
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important aspect for economic growth is the government’s ability and willingness to en-
force “the rule of law.” On the one hand, we can think of private corruption that a
strong government may want to combat. This introduces an alternative form to use col-
lected resources in a productive way. An interesting question is then what the optimal
degree of corruption depends on if a given amount of tax revenues must be allocated
towards competing productive tasks. This goes beyond Mauro (1996) who introduces
corruption as a proportional tax on income in the setup of Barro (1990) and finds no
distortion in the composition of public spending.29 On the other hand, the government
itself may be weak and corrupt, hence, an impediment to economic growth.30 One way
to incorporate the consequences of inefficient government behavior is to assume that
the government cannot transform collected tax revenues one-to-one into, say, productive
public infrastructure. Finally, an interesting and related question concerns the determi-
nants of the share of productive government expenditure. While in the models discussed
above θG was either exogenous or chosen optimally by a planner, in reality this pa-
rameter reflects fundamental characteristics of the process of collective decision-making
and the distribution of preferences and endowments (see, e. g., Chapters 4 and 5 of this
dissertation).
How about the role of productive government expenditure for sustained economic growth
once we leave the well-defined analytical framework based on Barro (1990)? Arguably,
one weakness of this approach is the knife-edge assumption of constant returns to scale
(see, e. g., Solow (1994) for a critique of such assumptions). We have seen in Section 2.5.2
that increasing returns substantially alter the predictions of the growth performance.
While the presence of increasing returns is empirically not implausible the policy rec-
ommendations of these models are hard to formulate since there is no natural way to
select among multiple equilibria. Clearly, more research is needed here.
Some authors argue forcefully against the framework of Barro (1990) because neither the
prediction of scale effects nor the dependency of the steady-state growth rate on taxation
29The third chapter of this dissertation analyzes the optimal enforcement of the rule of law in the
context of an idea-based endogenous growth model. In Chapter 3, government investment into the rule
of law determines the fraction of firms’ profits that are protected from expropriation by the “mafia”
and shapes the incentives to engage in innovation investments. As this investment is costly, the optimal
degree of mafia activity is always positive and depends on the economic environment of the economy.
30See Acemoglu (2005) for a different notion of weak and strong states and their implications for
economic development.
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finds empirical support (see, e. g., Peretto, 2003). Indeed, the steady-state growth rate
generated by non-scale models tends to be independent of government activity and
the size of the economy. However, as we have seen in Section 2.5.3, the steady-state
growth rate in the model of Eicher and Turnovsky (2000) is entirely determined by the
technology of the economy and its consistency with a balanced growth path. The role of
economic agents is then quite passive. Moreover, in cross-country growth regressions the
partial correlation between population growth and the growth rate of per-capita GDP
is often found to be negative (see, e. g., Barro and Sala-´ı-Martin, 2004; Kormendi and
Meguire, 1985).
In any case, it seems fair to say that the main body of the existing literature on
productive government expenditure and economic growth is rooted in the tradition of
investment-based endogenous growth models. In view of the strength and weaknesses
of this approach it will be desirable in future research to incorporate productive gov-
ernment expenditure into idea-based endogenous growth models. This allows to address
new questions, e. g., related to the effect of government activity on the productivity of an
economy’s research technology. On the other hand, these studies will generate findings
that should be compared to those presented in this chapter in order to select robust
policy implications. Chapter 3 of this dissertation is a first step in this direction.
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2.7 Appendix
The Pareto-Efficient Allocation of Section 2.4.1
Derivation of Equation (2.83)
The present-value Hamiltonian for the social planner’s optimization problem is
H = ln c e−ρt + λe−ρt
[
(1− θG)ANα(σG−1)Gαk1−α − c
]
+ υe−ρtθGANα(σG−1)+1Gαk1−α.
The optimality conditions with respect to c, k and G, for a given θG, then obtain as
1
c
= λ (2.107)
(1− α)ANα(σG−1)
(
G
k
)α
[(1− θG) + µNθG] = ρ− λ˙
λ
(2.108)
αANα(σG−1)
(
G
k
)α−1
µ
[(1− θG) + µNθG] + µ˙
µ
= ρ− λ˙
λ
, (2.109)
where µ ≡ υ/λ denotes the endogenously determined shadow value of public capital in
terms of private capital.
Then, (2.107) to (2.109) deliver the planner’s consumption growth rate, γPc , and a dif-
ferential equation describing the evolution µ
γPc = (1− α)ANα(σG−1)
(
G
k
)α
[(1− θG) + µNθG]− ρ, (2.110)
µ˙ =
[
(1− α)µG
k
− α
]
ANα(σG−1)
(
G
k
)α−1
[(1− θG) + µNθG]. (2.111)
The growth rates of private and public capital are given by (2.80) and (2.81). For
convenience, we repeat them here
γG = θGAN
α(σG−1)+1
(
G
k
)α−1
, (2.112)
γk = (1− θG)ANα(σG−1)
(
G
k
)α
− c
k
. (2.113)
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As the steady-state equilibrium of this economy is one in which consumption, private
and public capital all grow at the same rate, it is convenient to express equations (2.110)-
(2.113) in terms of the stationary variables z ≡ G/k and x ≡ c/k. Then, the following
set of differential equations determines the equilibrium dynamics of this economy
z˙
z
= θGAN
α(σG−1)+1zα−1 − (1− θG)ANα(σG−1)zα + x (2.114)
x˙
x
= [(1− θG) + µNθG](1− α)ANα(σG−1)zα − (1− θG)ANα(σG−1)zα (2.115)
+ x− ρ
µ˙ = [(1− α)µz − α]ANα(σG−1)zα−1[(1− θG) + µNθG]. (2.116)
Further, the following transversality conditions must hold
lim
t→∞
λke−ρt = 0 and lim
t→∞
υGe−ρt = 0.
The steady-state condition z˙ = x˙ = q˙ = 0 delivers
x− (1− θG)ANα(σG−1)zα = −θGANα(σG−1)+1zα−1, (2.117)
x− (1− θG)ANα(σG−1)zα = ρ− [(1− θG) + µNθG](1− α)ANα(σG−1)zα, (2.118)
[(1− α)µz − α]ANα(σG−1)zα−1 [(1− θG) + µNθG] = 0. (2.119)
Equation (2.119) implies that the steady-state value of µ is given by
µ =
α
1− α
1
z
. (2.120)
Substituting (2.120) into (2.110) delivers
γPc = AN
α(σG−1)zα−1 [(1− θG)(1− α)z + αNθG]− ρ
= (1− θG) (1− α)ANα(σG−1)zα︸ ︷︷ ︸
∂y/∂k
+θGN αAN
α(σG−1)zα−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
∂y/∂G
−ρ, (2.121)
such that (2.121) corresponds to equation (2.83) of Section 2.4.1 with y given by (2.79).
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Derivation of θPG of Equation (2.87)
Maximizing the Hamiltonian with respect to θG, i. e., ∂H/∂θG = 0, delivers
λANα(σG−1)Gαk1−α = υANα(σG−1)+1Gαk1−α
µP =
1
N
.
Hence, for an unconstrained Pareto-optimum µ˙ = 0 is required. From (2.120) it follows
that zP = αN/(1 − α), and thus z˙ = 0. Then, from (2.116) and the transversality
condition we know that also x must be constant at all times. Equalizing the right-hand
sides of (2.117) and (2.118) and substituting zP and µP gives
θGAN
ασG
(
α
1− α
)α−1
= (1− α)ANασG
(
α
1− α
)α
− ρ (2.122)
ρα
1− α = (α− θG)AN
ασG
(
α
1− α
)α
. (2.123)
Resubstituting (2.123) into (2.118) we obtain
xP = ρ+ (α− θG)ANασG
(
α
1− α
)α
= ρ+
ρα
1− α
=
ρ
1− α.
Moreover, solving (2.122) for θG delivers
θPG = α−
ρ
ANασG
(
1−α
α
)1−α , (2.124)
which corresponds to (2.87) in the main text.
Derivation of τPy of Equation (2.88)
From (2.110) with µ = µP we obtain
γPc = (1− α)ANα(σG−1)
(
zP
)α − ρ. (2.125)
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Then, comparing γc of (2.78) to γ
P
c of (2.125) reveals that
γc = γ
P
c ⇔ (1− τy)(1− σG α) = (1− α).
Thus, the income tax rate that implements the Pareto-efficient allocation is given by
τPy =
α (1− σG)
1− σG α ,
which corresponds to (2.88).
Chapter 3
Innovation, Growth, and the
Optimal Enforcement of the
Rule of Law
3.1 Introduction
The legal framework of an economy is often thought of as defining the rules of the game
that economic agents play. However, what really matters for the incentives of these
agents is the strength of the “rule of law”. While precise definitions of this term are
hard to come by, they usually involve the notion of an economy’s degree of property
rights protection, the enforceability of contracts, the likelihood of crime and violence,
and the effectiveness of an economy’s judiciary (see, e. g., Kaufmann et al., 2007; Weil,
2009, p. 346). The focus of this chapter is on the link between a weak rule of law,
the incentives to engage in innovation investments, and endogenous economic growth.
On the positive side, we want to know whether a minimum rule of law enforcement is a
prerequisite for economic growth. On the normative side, we ask whether a stronger rule
of law is desirable and discuss the circumstances under which the government should
intervene and use resources to strengthen the enforcement of the rule of law.
This chapter addresses these questions in an endogenous growth framework where growth
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is the result of an expanding set of product varieties in the sense of Grossman and
Helpman (1991). The strength of the rule of law is captured by the fraction of profits
taken away by, say, mafia activity. This “mafia tax” (Maddison and Pollicino, 2003)
deters innovation investments and reduces economic growth. Thus, the framework of this
chapter is consistent with the empirical literature that establishes a positive relationship
between the strength of the rule of law and economic growth (see, e. g., Kaufmann and
Kraay, 2002; Clague et al., 1999; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Barro, 1996, for a recent
survey of the empirical literature see Aron, 2000). It is also in line with recent empirical
support for a positive link between the rule of law and entrepreneurship (Estrin et al.,
2009) or technological development (Gime´nez and Sanau´, 2007).
In a first step, we take the strength of the rule of law as exogenous and abstract from
government interventions. In this scenario, we establish that a weak rule of law is a
major reason why an economy may be caught in a no-growth trap. Hence, a minimum
strength of the rule of law can be thought of as a necessary condition for sustained
growth. Though, on the normative front, we show that a weaker rule of law may be
Pareto-improving. This is the case when the equilibrium growth rate exceeds the Pareto-
efficient one.1 Then, it is indeed preferable to weaken innovation incentives. A means
to accomplish this is a weaker rule of law which essentially acts as a “mafia tax” on
innovation incentives.
In a second step, we endogenize the strength of the rule of law. First, we assume that
the government collects final output via taxes and invests these resources to strengthen
the rule of law. We find that such government activity can shift the economy from a
no-growth path onto a path with strictly positive growth. Second, we analyze the case
where the government has to hire a fraction of the workforce as policemen who then
enforce the rule of law. We show that the necessity to employ a scarce resource reduces
the government’s ability to move the economy to a positive growth equilibrium.
Government activity that triggers positive equilibrium growth rates may not be optimal
from a welfare point of view. Indeed, we characterize environments where no growth
is better than some growth even if the government is able to intervene. For instance,
this is the case if the economy’s research technology is sufficiently unproductive or if its
1Be´nassy (1998) and de Groot and Nahuis (1998) establish this possibility in the variety expansion
growth model when the gains from specialization captured by the CES production function are small.
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market size is too small.
This chapter relates and contributes to at least two different strands of the literature
on property rights and growth. First, it makes a contribution to the literature on
predation, economic growth, and governmental enforcement of property rights. This
literature includes Economides et al. (2007), Zak (2002), and Dincer and Ellis (2005).2
These three studies explicitly model individuals’ decision how to allocate their time or
resources between productive and expropriative activities. Individuals have access to an
expropriation technology, the specific design of which determines how many and what
type of equilibria exist. In contrast to these papers, we do not model the decision of
individuals to exert an expropriative activity or not. Rather, we assume the existence
of a mafia that diverts resources from the production to the household sector. Hence,
the focus of our analysis is on the consequences of mafia activity rather than on the
conditions that may cause a mafia to operate. An advantage of this approach is that the
equilibrium we identify for each setting is unique and allows for clear-cut predictions.
Second, this chapter contributes to the literature that studies the relationship between in-
tellectual property rights (IPR), i. e., the danger of imitation and the erosion of monopoly
power, growth, and welfare in the framework of the variety expansion growth model. Re-
lated studies include Kwan and Lai (2003) and Furukawa (2007). They analyze the social
benefits and costs of IPR protection assuming that the government can choose the de-
gree of IPR protection at no cost. By contrast, the focus of this chapter is on the role
of property rights over profits. In our model the strength of the rule of law determines
the share of monopoly profits that is protected from expropriation. Moreover, we argue
that the enforcement of the rule of law through governments is endogenous and costly.
Accordingly, the optimal degree of law enforcement equilibrates the advantage of better
incentives and faster growth to the disadvantage of foregone consumption used up as an
enforcement device.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents a basic
analytical setup. Section 3.3 establishes the dynamic general equilibrium and compares
it to the Pareto-optimum for an exogenous strength of the rule of law. In Section 3.4
we endogenize the strength of the rule of law. Here we also derive our main results
2See, e. g., Grossman and Kim (1996), Tornell (1997) and Lindner and Strulik (2004) for the analysis
of predation and growth in environments without a law enforcing government.
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on the effect of government intervention on growth and welfare. Section 3.4.1 deals
with the case where the rule of law can be strengthened through an investment of final
output whereas Section 3.4.2 presents the case where labor is needed to enforce the
rule of law. Section 3.5 concludes. Proofs are relegated to Appendix A. Appendix B
contains additional material. It establishes the robustness of the qualitative results for
a lab-equipment specification of the variety expansion growth model.
3.2 The Basic Setup
We consider a closed economy with four sectors and a mafia. In later sections a gov-
ernment will be added. Households work, consume, and save. The final-good sector
produces a consumption good out of a variety of existing intermediate goods. The
intermediate-good sector consists of monopolistically competitive firms that manufacture
one intermediate good using labor as the only input. The blueprint for the production
of each intermediate good is invented in a research sector. The rule of law is imperfect in
the sense that property rights in the intermediate-good sector are not fully secured. One
may think of intermediate-good firms being subject to expropriation by an organization
such as the mafia.
We interpret the strength of the rule of law as the fraction of profits in the intermediate-
good sector that is protected from expropriation and denote it by q ∈ [0, 1]. Mafia
income is “laundered” and increases consumption and savings of the household sector.
The Household Sector
There is a continuum of identical households of mass 1. We study their behavior through
the lens of a single representative household that supplies the time-invariant aggregate
labor endowment L inelastically to the intermediate-good and the research sectors. Her
consumption-savings decision maximizes intertemporal utility
U =
∫ ∞
0
ln c(t) e−ρtdt, (3.1)
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where c(t) is consumption at date t and ρ the subjective discount rate. Henceforth, we
suppress time arguments whenever this does not cause confusion. Household income
comprises at each t labor income, returns on assets, Ω, and laundered mafia income, M ,
such that the household’s flow budget constraint is given by
Ω˙ = wL+ rΩ +M − pcc, with Ω(0) > 0. (3.2)
Here, w denotes the wage rate at t, r the rate of return on assets, and pc the price of
the consumption good. The budget constraint (3.2) captures the fact that in a closed
economy total mafia income is laundered, re-introduced into the economy, and used for
consumption or saving of the household sector.
The household’s maximization of (3.1) is subject to (3.2) and a No-Ponzi condition.
Following Grossman and Helpman (1991), we choose consumption expenditure as the
nume´raire, i. e., pcc = 1 at all t. Then, the Euler condition implies r = ρ, and the
transversality condition is lim
t→∞
e−ρtΩ(t) = 0.
The Final-Good Sector
The final-good firms produce a homogeneous output y out of a variety of exiting in-
termediates, and then sell it to the household sector for consumption. The production
function is
y =
[
A(σ−1)(1−α)
∫ A
0
x(j)αdj
]1/α
, (3.3)
where A ∈ R++ is the “number” of available intermediate goods at t and x(j), j ∈ [0, A]
denotes the quantity of intermediate-good input j used at t. The parameter α ∈ (0, 1)
determines the elasticity of substitution between any pair of intermediates,  ≡ 1/(1−α).
Following Ethier (1982), the term in front of the integral introduces σ > 0 as a measure
of the gains from specialization. As σ increases, these gains become more pronounced,
for σ → 0 they vanish.
The representative producer of y is competitive and chooses {x (j)}Aj=0 to maximize
pcy −
∫ A
0
p(j)x(j)dj at all t, where p(j) is the price of input j.
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The Intermediate-Good Sector
Each intermediate-good firm j ∈ [0, A] produces a single intermediate good in a mo-
nopolistically competitive environment with demand x(j) = yp(j)−/P , where P ≡
[A(σ−1)(1−α)
∫ A
0
p(j′)1−dj′]/(−1). The production function for all varieties is x(j) = l(j),
where l(j) is the amount of labor hired by firm j. The price p(j) charged by intermediate-
good firm j maximizes his profits pi(j) = q [p(j)− w] yp(j)−/P . Here, q ∈ [0, 1] denotes
the fraction of profits that remains in the hands of intermediate-good producer j after
the mafia has made its claims. The weaker the rule of law, i. e., the lower q, the lower
are the net profits of intermediate-good producers. Intermediate-good producers regard
q as a given constant. The resulting monopoly price satisfies p(j) = p = w/α such that
x(j) = x = yA
σ
1−−1 and pi(j) = pi = q(1− α)px.
The Research Sector
Previous to the marketing of an intermediate good it is invented by competitive research
firms. The production function of the research sector for new intermediates is
A˙ = ALA/a, (3.4)
where LA is the aggregate amount of labor used for research and a is a productivity
parameter. Once a new variety is invented, it is sold by auction to the highest bidder
who also receives a perpetual patent. Accordingly, the price for such a patent at t
is v(t) =
∫∞
t
pi(s)e−ρ(s−t)ds. The profit-maximization problem of the representative
research firm is then to choose LA that maximizes vALA/a− wLA. For LA to be finite
the first-order condition is
v ≤ wa
A
with “ = ”, if A˙ > 0. (3.5)
3.3 Exogenous Strength of the Rule of Law
The purpose of this section is to examine the effect of an exogenously given strength of
the rule of law on innovation activity and growth. In particular, we show that and how a
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weak enforcement of the rule of law causes the economy to be trapped in an equilibrium
without growth.
3.3.1 Dynamic General Equilibrium
Given q, the Dynamic General Equilibrium (DGE) consists of an allocation {c(t),Ω(t),
M(t), y(t), x(j, t), l(j, t), Lx(t), LA(t), A(t)}t=∞t=0 and a price system {r(t), pc(t), w(t),
p(j, t), v(j, t)}t=∞t=0 such that households, final-good, intermediate-good and research firms
behave optimally at all t, the market for the final good clears, i. e., c(t) = y(t), there
is full employment of labor at all t, i. e., Lx(t) + LA(t) = L, the capital market values
firms according to fundamentals and Ω(t) = A(t)v(t). Moreover, total mafia income at
t is equal to the fraction 1− q of total gross profits in the intermediate-good sector, i. e.,
M(t) = (1− q)A
(
pi(t)
q
)
.
The following proposition establishes the existence of a steady-state equilibrium with
and without growth.
Proposition 3.1. The steady-state growth rate of intermediate-good varieties is
g∗A = max
{
0,
q(1− α)L− aαρ
a [(1− α)q + α]
}
≡ g∗A(q). (3.6)
The economy immediately jumps to the steady state for any admissible set of initial
conditions.
Moreover, the steady-state growth rate of consumption is given by
g∗c ≡
c˙
c
=
σ
− 1 g
∗
A. (3.7)
Proposition 3.1 reveals that the steady-state growth rates of the economy depend on
the exogenously given strength of the rule of law. If q = 1, then its enforcement is
perfect, and we are back in the world of Grossman and Helpman (1991), where the
economy’s growth rates depend on g∗A(1) = max {0, (1− α)L/a− αρ}. Whether this
rate is strictly positive hinges on the parameters a, ρ, α, and L, which characterize the
economic environment. The effect of an imperfectly enforced rule of law on the steady-
state allocation depends crucially on whether this set of parameters allows for strictly
positive growth or not.
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Corollary 3.1. It holds that
1. if g∗A(1) > 0, then there is qmin ∈ (0, 1) such that g∗A > 0 and g∗c > 0 if and only if
q > qmin. If q > qmin, then dgA/dq > 0.
Moreover,
∂qmin
∂α
> 0,
∂qmin
∂ρ
> 0,
∂qmin
∂a
> 0,
∂qmin
∂L
< 0. (3.8)
2. if g∗A(1) = 0, then the strength of the rule of law has no growth effects.
Statement 1 of Corollary 3.1 applies to the case of a strictly positive growth rate under
a perfect rule of law. Then, an imperfect enforcement of the rule of law may shift
the economy into a no-growth equilibrium. A more intense mafia activity increases
the prospect of expropriation. This reduces the value of an innovation and discourages
research activity. For the economy to grow at a strictly positive rate, the strength of
the rule of law has to surpass a threshold level qmin. Thus, we can assert that a certain
strength of the rule of law is an underlying prerequisite for sustained growth. If q > qmin,
then raising q speeds up economic growth.
In turn, the threshold level qmin also depends on the environment of the economy. The
comparative statics of (3.8) reveal that qmin increases in α, ρ, and a, but declines in
L. Intuitively, the greater the degree of substitutability of intermediate goods, α, the
lower are the monopoly profits in the intermediate-good sector. The greater the discount
rate, ρ, the lower is the incentive to save and to acquire equity shares issued by research
firms. The higher a, the lower is the productivity in the research sector and the smaller
is the research output. Finally, the smaller the aggregate labor endowment, L, the less
labor is available for research. All these factors have negative effects on the incentives
to engage in research. The greater these countervailing forces on the invention of new
products, the stronger the rule of law has to be to ensure a strictly positive growth rate.
For instance, larger economies with very productive researchers can more easily afford
to have a weak rule of law, and will nevertheless grow.
By contrast, if the economy does not admit a strictly positive growth rate under a perfect
enforcement of the rule of law, improvements in q have no growth effects. However, even
in this case, q affects the equilibrium income distribution.
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Corollary 3.2. For all q ∈ [0, 1], mafia income accounts for the fraction µ = (1− q) (1−
α) of aggregate final-good output while legal income constitutes the fraction 1 − µ. For
any g∗A > 0, the distribution of labor and capital income is independent of q. If g
∗
A = 0,
a rise in q increases the share of capital income in legal household income.
Corollary 3.2 shows that a rise in q always increases the share of legal income that
accrues to households. By contrast, the effect of the rule of law on the distribution of
income between labor and capital depends on the level of q. If q < qmin, then no research
activity takes place and the total labor supply is employed in the manufacturing sector.
Consequently, the equilibrium wage rate is determined in this sector as w = α/L and is
independent of q. Thus, a rise in q has to increase the share of capital income relative
to labor income in legal household income. Intuitively, the greater q the greater is the
value of the household’s assets. By contrast, if q > qmin, then g
∗
A > 0 and labor is
allocated to the manufacturing as well as the research sector. As in the previous case, a
rise in q increases the value of the household’s assets. But additionally, a greater patent
value boosts the incentives to engage in research and thus the demand for labor in the
research sector. Consequently, the equilibrium wage rate as determined by (3.5) rises.
This in turn positively affects the household’s total labor income. Income from labor
and capital rise simultaneously so that the shares of capital and labor income in total
legal income remain unaffected by an increase in q.
3.3.2 Welfare Analysis
Consider a social planner who allocates the factors of production and outputs to house-
holds and firms. Naturally, this allocation is independent of the rule of law.
Due to the decreasing marginal product of the intermediate goods in the production
of the final good, the social planner chooses a symmetric configuration c = Aσ/(−1)Lx
at all t. The intertemporal optimization determines the allocation of labor between
manufacturing and research. Formally, the planner maximizes U of (3.1), invoking
full employment and the production function of the research sector. This problem has
previously been solved by Be´nassy (1998) and de Groot and Nahuis (1998). In our
notation their result appears in the following proposition.
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Proposition 3.2. The Pareto-efficient growth rate of intermediate goods is
gPA = max
{
0,
L
a
− (− 1)ρ
σ
}
. (3.9)
The economy immediately settles at this steady-state growth rate. For all gPA > 0 holds
that ∂gPA/∂σ > 0.
Corollary 3.3 compares the Pareto-efficient allocation to the equilibrium allocation for
all σ > 0 and q ∈ [0, 1].
Corollary 3.3. Let g∗A(1) > 0. Then, there are threshold values σ¯
and σ¯ with 0 <σ
¯
<
σ¯ < 1 such that
• if σ > σ¯, then gPA > g∗A for all q.
• if σ ∈ (σ
¯
,σ¯], then there is a unique qP ≡ qP (σ) ∈ (qmin, 1] such that g∗A(qP ) = gPA .
Moreover, qP (σ) is a function satisfying
dqP
dσ
> 0, lim
σ→σ
qP (σ) = qmin, and q
P (σ¯) = 1.
• if σ ≤σ
¯
, we have gPA = 0. It follows g
∗
A(q) = g
P
A for all q ≤ qmin.
Corollary 3.3 applies to economies with a strictly positive equilibrium growth rate under
a perfect enforcement of the rule of law. In these economies the Pareto-efficient growth
rate may be smaller than the equilibrium growth rate if the gains from specialization are
sufficiently small. This is the essence of Be´nassy (1998) and de Groot and Nahuis (1998).
Corollary 3.3 extends their findings to an economy with an imperfect enforcement of the
rule of law.
If σ > σ¯, then the gains from specialization imply too little equilibrium research for any
q. By contrast, if σ ≤ σ¯, then the level of q decides whether there is too much or too little
research in equilibrium. According to Corollary 3.3, if σ ∈ (σ
¯
,σ¯], then the equilibrium has
too much research when q = 1. Thus, there is a unique qP ∈ (qmin, 1) that implements
the Pareto-efficient allocation. Intuitively, since the mafia reduces research incentives
Pareto-efficiency can be established. Finally, if σ is so small that σ ≤σ
¯
, then the Pareto-
efficient growth rate is zero and coincides with the equilibrium growth rate for any
q ≤ qmin.
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In other words, some degree of mafia activity can be socially optimally if σ < σ¯. Intu-
itively, in this scenario mafia activity acts as a tax on intermediate-good firms, which
helps to internalize the externality due to the profit-destruction effect.
3.4 Endogenous Strength of the Rule of Law
From now on the government plays an active role. It uses tax resources to enforce
the rule of law. We consider two cases. First, we assume that the government invests
produced output in the enforcement of the rule of law. Second, we analyze the case
where the government has to hire a fraction of the workforce as policemen.
3.4.1 Final Output as an Investment in the Enforcement of the
Rule of Law
Consider a government that levies a tax τ ∈ [0, 1] on final-good output, y, and uses
these resources to invest in the enhancement of the rule of law. Denote G the amount
of government investment. Then, a balanced budget in all periods requires
G = τy. (3.10)
The strength of the rule of law will now depend on the share of total government ex-
penditure in final-good output,3 i. e.,
q = F
(
G
y
)
with F : [0, 1]→ [0, 1]. (3.11)
F is C2 with F (0) = q0 ∈ (0, qmin), F (1) = 1, F ′ > 0 > F ′′, and lim
G→0
F ′ =∞.
This reduced form relationship captures the idea that the government via increased
spending relative to the size of the economy can improve the rule of law, though at
a declining rate. Naturally, government expenditure is bounded by aggregate output.
Without government spending on the rule of law firms keep a fraction q0 of their profits.
3For a steady state to exist government spending has to be proportionate to the size of the economy,
at least asymptotically.
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The fraction q0 has an interpretation as the minimal strength of the rule of law that
norms of the society guarantee without any governmental enforcement. However, by
assumption q0 < qmin. Hence, such an economy does not grow. If the government spent
total aggregate output on the enforcement of the rule of law, property rights in the
intermediate-good sector would be fully secured. Moreover, the function F fulfills an
Inada-type condition. Note also that q is a flow variable, i. e., the enforcement level of
the rule of law has to be maintained constantly.
3.4.1.1 Dynamic General Equilibrium
The tax on final-good output acts as a tax on consumption. The final good y is man-
ufactured according to (3.3), but final-good producers have to pay the tax τ on their
total production. In other words, final-good producers are aware that they will only be
able to sell c = (1−τ)y as private consumption goods to the households. The remaining
fraction of output, G = τy, is claimed by the government and used for the enhancement
of the rule of law. In equilibrium, final-good producers pass on the tax to consumers via
a higher price pc.
Given τ , the equilibrium consists of an allocation {y(t), c(t),Ω(t),M(t), G(t), x(j, t), l(j, t),
Lx(t), LA(t), A(t)}t=∞t=0 and a price system {r(t), pc(t), w(t), p(j, t), v(j, t)}t=∞t=0 such that
(3.10) and (3.11) hold in addition to the equilibrium conditions of the DGE of Sec-
tion 3.3.1.
The same steps that led to Proposition 3.1 deliver now the steady-state growth rates as
a function of τ :
g∗A = max
{
0,
(1− α)F (τ)L− aαρ
a [F (τ)(1− α) + α]
}
≡ g∗A(F (τ)) (3.12)
and
g∗c =
σ
− 1 g
∗
A. (3.13)
Henceforth, we assume that the environment of our economy is such that there would
be positive growth if the rule of law were perfect, i. e., g∗A(F (1)) > 0.
4
4For a detailed derivation of Equation (3.12) see the Appendix A.
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Analogously to Corollary 3.1, there exists a τmin ∈ (0, 1) such that for all τ > τmin
the steady-state growth rates are positive. A strong government that spends sufficient
resources on the enforcement of the rule of law can increase the incentives to engage in
research such that the economy moves to an equilibrium with strictly positive growth
rates.
3.4.1.2 Welfare Analysis
From (3.12) and (3.13) it is clear that ∂g∗c/∂τ > 0 for any g
∗
c > 0 and τ ∈ (0, 1). However,
there is little reason why the tax rate should be arbitrarily large since a higher tax and
faster consumption growth have a cost in terms of foregone current consumption. In this
section, we study the tax rate the government should choose in order to maximize the
welfare of the representative household in equilibrium. By solving the integral of (3.1)
using c(t) = c0 e
g∗c t, household welfare in equilibrium obtains as
U =
1
ρ
(
ln c0 +
g∗c
ρ
)
, (3.14)
where c0 denotes the initial level of consumption at t = 0. By combining c = (1 − τ)y
with the equilibrium conditions y = Aσ/(−1)Ax and Lx = Ax we obtain c0, for a given
initial quantity of intermediates A0, as
c0 = (1− τ)A
σ
−1
0 Lx. (3.15)
Upon substitution of (3.15) into (3.14) we find5
U =

1
ρ
ln
[
(1− τ)A
σ
−1
0 L
]
if τ ∈ [0, τmin]
1
ρ
ln
[
(1−τ)α(L+aρ)A
σ
−1
0
[F (τ)(1−α)+α]
]
+ g
∗
c
ρ2
if τ ∈ [τmin, 1].
(3.16)
5For τ ∈ [τmin, 1], one obtains the first term of U in (3.16) by substituting Lx = α/w in (3.15).
The steady-state wage rate is determined by condition (3.5) which has to hold with equality in a
steady state with positive R&D activity, i. e., w = vA/a. The aggregate value of equities, Ω = vA,
is constant in the steady state. From A (s) = A0 e
gAs and v(t) =
∫∞
t
1−α
A(s)e
−ρ(s−t)ds one finds that
vA = F (τ)(1 − α)/(g∗A + ρ) and thus w = [F (τ)(1− α) + α] /(L + aρ). Note, that the former also
implies that the initial value A0 > 0 determines v (0) such that Ω0 = F (τ) (1− α) / (g∗A + ρ).
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Notice that U is piecewise-defined reflecting the regimes without and with growth.6
U
τmin τ∗ 1
U(0)
U(τ∗)
τ
Figure 3.1: Welfare U as a function of τ ∈ [0, 1].
For levels of τ smaller than τmin, there is no research. Hence, Lx = L, and g
∗
A = g
∗
c = 0.
Accordingly, on [0, τmin], a rise in τ reduces consumption in all periods and welfare
declines monotonically in τ (see Figure 3.1). Moreover, a higher τ affects the income
distribution by increasing capital income and reducing mafia income (see Corollary 3.2).
For levels of τ greater than τmin, there is research and growth. In this regime a rise in
τ has a level effect on current consumption and a growth effect. The level effect is due
to the consumption tax and the reallocation of labor from manufacturing to research.
The growth effect speeds up g∗A(F (τ)). If the positive growth effect of a higher tax rate
outweighs the negative effects on the level of initial consumption near τmin, then the
welfare function is inversely U-shaped on [τmin, 1]. Otherwise, U continues to decline in
τ (see Figure 3.1).
The following proposition establishes the welfare-maximizing tax rate.
6One readily verifies that U is continuous for all τ ∈ [0, 1].
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Proposition 3.3. Let g∗A(F (1)) > 0. Then, it holds that
1. on the interval [0, τmin], U is maximized at τ = 0.
2. if dU/dτ |τ=τmin > 0, then arg max
τ∈[τmin,1]
U = τ ∗ ∈ (τmin, 1). Otherwise τmin = arg max
τ∈[τmin,1]
U .
3. if τ ∗ ∈ (τmin, 1) exists and U(τ ∗) > U(0), then τ ∗ maximizes U on [0, 1]. Otherwise
τ = 0 maximizes U on [0, 1]. In the non-generic case where U(0) = U(τ ∗), the
solution of max
τ∈[0,1]
U is not unique.
If a positive globally welfare-maximizing tax rate exists, it is strictly smaller than one.
Thus, Proposition 3.3 implies that the optimal tax rate will never fully enforce the rule
of law which in turn means that there is a positive optimal level of mafia activity. At this
point we can draw a comparison to the literature on optimal law enforcement initiated
by the seminal paper of Becker (1968). Most of the models in this literature (see, e. g.,
Garoupa, 1997, for a survey) find that the optimal amount of crime deterrence does
not eliminate crime altogether. The principal reason for this is that eradicating crime is
costly and has a declining social benefit. In our framework, the enforcement of the rule of
law has a social cost in form of tax payments. Moreover, Statement 3 of Proposition 3.3
shows that in terms of welfare no growth can be better than some growth.7 Observe
that U(τ ∗) may not be a global maximum because U(0) > U(τ ∗). Then, it is preferable
to set τ = 0. This is the case if the negative static welfare effect of the consumption tax
is so large that it is optimal for the government not to levy any taxes, leave the rule of
law unchanged and remain in an equilibrium without growth.
Corollary 3.4. The lower τmin and the greater σ, the more likely it is that τ
∗ is the
global maximizer of U on [0,1]. Moreover, it holds that
∂τ ∗
∂a
< 0,
∂τ ∗
∂L
> 0,
∂τ ∗
∂ρ
< 0,
∂τ ∗
∂σ
> 0,
∂τ ∗
∂α
< 0. (3.17)
7Arnold and Bauer (2009) draw a similar conclusion in a Grossman-Helpman type variety expansion
growth model with erosion of monopoly power due to exogenous imitation and a non-innovative tradi-
tional sector. Similarly, Gonzalez (2007) finds in an AK growth model with an exogenous institutional
structure of property rights that increases in the security of property rights and growth might not be
in the interest of the society.
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Corollary 3.4 shows that government intervention that strengthens the rule of law is more
likely to be desirable if the economic environment is more prone to growth. The threshold
tax rate τmin, which describes the minimum government investment necessary to move
an economy onto a positive growth path, is determined by preferences, endowment,
and technology as described by the parameters α, a, ρ, and L. As discussed following
Corollary 3.1, these parameters determine how pronounced an economy’s incentives to
engage in research are. The stronger these incentives, the lower is τmin. Moreover, it
is straightforward to see from (3.16) that the lower τmin the lower is the instantaneous
welfare loss due to reduced current consumption at τmin and the more likely it is that
a welfare-maximizing tax rate τ ∗ ∈ (0, 1) exists. The same line of reasoning applies to
the condition U(τ ∗) > U(0). Similarly, for sufficiently large values of σ, the gains from
specialization are so strong that the welfare gain from additional varieties and increased
future consumption possibilities outweighs the static welfare loss.
Finally, the comparative statics of (3.17) reveal that if a positive globally welfare-
maximizing tax rate exists, it increases with the productivity in the research sector,
the aggregate labor endowment, the propensity to save as well as the gains from special-
ization, and decreases with the degree of competition in the intermediate-good sector.
Hence, we can assert: the more favorable an economy’s environment for research ac-
tivity and thus growth, the greater is its welfare-maximizing tax rate, and thus its
welfare-maximizing steady-state consumption growth rate. This may be interpreted as
a self-reinforcing feedback.
3.4.2 Policemen as an Investment in the Enforcement of the
Rule of Law
Consider a government that levies a lump-sum tax T on households and uses these tax
resources to hire a fraction δ ∈ [0, 1] of the total workforce as policemen, LP , to enforce
the rule of law. Hence, under a balanced budget we have for all t
T = wLP = wδL. (3.18)
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We stipulate that the strength of the rule of law, q, depends on the share of the policemen
in the total workforce, δ = LP/L, according to
q = F (δ) with F : [0, 1]→ [0, 1]. (3.19)
F is C2 with F (0) = q0 ∈ (0, qmin), F (1) = 1, F ′ > 0 > F ′′, and lim
δ→0
F ′ =∞.
3.4.2.1 Dynamic General Equilibrium
The representative household’s flow budget constraint is now Ω˙ = wL+Ω+M−pcc−T .
This modification leaves the Euler and the transversality condition of the household’s
problem unaffected. Since workers are also used as policemen, the labor market equilib-
rium condition is now Lx(t)+LA(t) = (1−δ)L. Then, given δ, the equilibrium consists of
an allocation {y(t), c(t),Ω(t),M(t), x(j, t), l(j, t), Lx(t), LA(t), LP (t), A(t), T (t)}t=∞t=0 and
a price system {r(t), pc(t), w(t), p(j, t), v(j, t)}t=∞t=0 such that (3.18), (3.19), the new labor
market equilibrium condition and the remaining conditions of the DGE of Section 3.3.1
hold.
Then, following the same steps that led to the steady-state growth rates in Section 3.4.1.1
we obtain the steady-state growth rates as
g∗A = max
{
0,
(1− α)(1− δ)F (δ)L− aαρ
a [F (δ)(1− α) + α]
}
≡ g∗A(δ) (3.20)
and
g∗c =
σ
− 1 g
∗
A. (3.21)
In contrast to Section 3.4.1.1, government activity as captured by δ has two opposing
effects on the steady-state growth rates of A and c. On the one hand, government
spending on the rule of law positively affects the equilibrium growth rates through its
effect on q. On the other hand, government activity reduces the labor supply available
for research and intermediate-good production to (1 − δ)L. The following proposition
establishes the growth-maximizing government policy.
Proposition 3.4. It holds that
1. if δˆ = arg max
δ∈[0,1]
(1 − δ)F (δ) is such that (1 − δˆ)F (δˆ) ≤ qmin, then g∗A = 0 for all
δ ∈ [0, 1].
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2. if (1− δˆ)F (δˆ) > qmin, then there are δmin and δmax with 0 < δmin < δmax < 1 such
that g∗A > 0 for all δ ∈ (δmin, δmax). In this case, there is a unique δ∗ ∈ (δmin, δmax)
that maximizes g∗A and g
∗
c .
The first statement of Proposition 3.4 reveals that the government’s ability to move the
economy to an equilibrium with strictly positive growth rates depends on the environ-
ment, in which the economy operates, i. e., qmin, and on the effectiveness of the police
as specified by the function F .8 If qmin is large and/or the police not very effective,
then the reduction of the workforce due to public employment of policemen outweighs
its benefits and the steady-state growth rate is zero, independent of the choice of δ. If
government intervention can trigger positive growth rates, then according to the second
statement of Proposition 3.4, there is a growth-maximizing share of government activity,
δ∗, which balances the two opposing effects of government activity.
3.4.2.2 Welfare Analysis
In this section, we derive the welfare-maximizing policy of the government and compare
it to the growth-maximizing policy. Following the same steps as in Section 3.4.1.2, we
obtain the following piecewise-defined welfare function:
U =

1
ρ
ln
[
A
σ
−1
0 (1− δ)L
]
if g∗A = 0
1
ρ
ln
[
α((1−δ)L+aρ)A
σ
−1
0
[F (δ)(1−α)+α]
]
+ g
∗
c
ρ2
if g∗A > 0.
(3.22)
The following proposition establishes the share of government employment that maxi-
mizes U and compares it to the growth-maximizing share discussed in Proposition 3.4.
Proposition 3.5. The following statements are true.
1. If Statement 1 of Proposition 3.4 holds, then U is maximized at δ = 0.
8As before, we assume that the environment of our economy is such that there would be positive
growth if the rule of law were perfect without any government intervention, i. e., qmin = aαρ/(1−α)L <
1.
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2. If Statement 2 of Proposition 3.4 holds, then
(a) on the interval [0, δmin], U is maximized at δ = 0, and on the interval [δmax, 1],
U is maximized at δmax.
(b) if dU/dτ |δ=δmin > 0, then arg max
δ∈[δmin,δmax]
U = δ∗∗ ∈ (δmin, δmax). Otherwise
δmin = arg max
δ∈[δmin,δmax]
U .
(c) if δ∗∗ ∈ (δmin, δmax) exists and U(δ∗∗) > U(0), then δ∗∗ maximizes U on [0, 1].
Otherwise τ = 0 maximizes U on [0, 1].9
(d) if δ∗∗ ∈ (δmin, δmax) exists and U(δ∗∗) > U(0), then δ∗∗ < δ∗.
Similarly to Proposition 3.3 , Proposition 3.5 reveals that in terms of welfare no growth
can be better than some growth. Moreover, if a positive welfare-maximizing public
employment share exists it will be strictly smaller than the growth-maximizing one, i. e.,
δ∗∗ < δ∗. To grasp the intuition for this, consider that
dU
dδ
=
1
ρ2
(
ρ
∂lnc0
∂δ
+
∂g∗c
∂δ
)
. (3.23)
The second term, i. e., the consumption growth rate is maximized at δ∗. By contrast,
the first term, which corresponds to the static welfare effect, is always negative because
a rise in δ reduces the resources available for final-good production. Thus, the public
employment share that maximizes U has to be smaller than the one that maximizes g∗c .
Hence, we conclude that our qualitative results regarding the welfare-maximizing gov-
ernment policy do not depend on whether the government uses final output or part of
the labor force to enforce the rule of law.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter studied the interdependence between innovation, economic growth, and
the rule of law in an economy where growth results from an expanding set of product
varieties. The strength of the rule of law determines the profit that firms expect from
an innovation investment. The results may be summarized as follows.
9In the non-generic case where U(0) = U(δ∗∗), the solution of max
δ∈[0,1]
U is not unique.
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First, on the positive side, we find that a weak rule of law may be the reason why an
economy is caught in a “no-growth trap”. In other words, a minimum strength of the
rule of law is a prerequisite for sustained growth. Second, on the normative side we
establish that a weaker rule of law may be Pareto-improving. This is the case when the
equilibrium growth rate exceeds the Pareto-efficient one. Then, the mafia acts like a
government charging a tax on monopoly profits, which reduces the incentive to innovate
in a desirable way.
Third, when government investment determines the rule of law endogenously, such an in-
vestment may shift the economy from a no-growth equilibrium onto a welfare-improving
equilibrium with strictly positive growth rates. This is always possible if the government
invests final output in the enforcement of the rule of law. By contrast, if policemen are
necessary to enforce the rule of law, this possibility arises only if the economic envi-
ronment is sufficiently favorable to research and/or policemen are sufficiently effective.
Finally, even if the government is ready to intervene, the price of fighting the mafia may
be too high. In this case, in terms of welfare no growth may be better than some growth.
Overall, however, the more favorable the economic environment is towards innovation
and growth, the more likely it is that the welfare-maximizing strength of the rule of law
requires taxes and government intervention.
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3.6 Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 3.1
We start the derivation of the steady-state growth rate by looking at the labor market.10
The linear production function of intermediates implies for a symmetric configuration
that the aggregate labor demand of this sector is Lx = Ax. Moreover, constant returns
to scale in the production of the final good, clearance of the final-good market (y = c),
and our normalization imply 1 = Apx. Thus, Lx = α/w. Aggregate labor demand in
the research sector obtains from the production function of research as LA = agA, where
gA ≡ A˙/A. Hence, the labor market is in equilibrium if and only if gA = L/a − α/wa.
When employment in research is positive, we need v = wa/A (see equation 3.5). Hence,
a necessary condition for positive steady-state growth of A is v ≥ αa/AL. Defining
V ≡ Ω−1 = 1/Av as the inverse of the economy’s equity value, we obtain
gA = max
{
0,
L
a
− αV
}
. (3.24)
For the capital market to be in equilibrium, the return that a shareholder can expect
must be equal to the return of a riskless loan. As the former is the sum of dividends
and capital gains and the latter is equal to ρ, we obtain as a no-arbitrage condition
ρ = (pi+ v˙)/v, where instantaneous net profits with 1 = Apx are pi = q(1−α)/A. Then,
observing that V˙ /V = −gA − v˙/v, we obtain
V˙
V
= −gA − ρ+ q(1− α)V. (3.25)
Equations (3.24) and (3.25) jointly describe the equilibrium paths of V and gA. Setting
V˙ = 0 in (3.25) and substituting V = gA+ρ
q(1−α) in (3.24) delivers equation (3.6).
As to the transitional dynamics consider the phase-diagram in the (gA, V )-plane depicted
in Figure 3.2. The kinked curve LL depicts the labor market equilibrium as expressed
by equation (3.24) and has to be satisfied at every moment in time. The lines V V1
and V Vq reflect the combinations of V and gA that imply V˙ = 0. While the V V1-locus
10This proof extends the one of Grossman and Helpman (1991, p. 57-62) to an environment with
σ 6= 1 and mafia activity.
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Figure 3.2: Equilibrium Growth Rate with Exogenous Strength of the Rule of Law
represents the case without mafia activity, the V Vq-locus corresponds to a situation with
an imperfect rule of law. The intersection of the LL-locus with the V V1 or the V Vq-locus,
respectively, determines the equilibrium growth rate of intermediate goods. Figure 3.2
has been drawn to depict the case in which the rule of law is so weak that there is
no growth in equilibrium. Moreover, from the phase diagram one sees that starting
the economy outside of the steady state leads either to V → ∞, gA = 0 or V → 0,
gA → L/a > 0. Both cases violate rational expectations.
Consider the first case. As V ≡ 1/Av → ∞ it must be that v → 0 since A cannot
decline. However, with gA = 0 and pi = q(1− α)/A the value of a patent v obtains as
v (t) =
∫ ∞
t
q(1− α)
A (t)
e−ρ(s−t)ds =
q(1− α)
ρA (t)
> 0,
i. e., without innovations the monopoly profits and their present value remain positive.
We arrive at a contradiction to v → 0.
The second case has gA > 0 which implies that A(s) > A(t) for all s > t, so that
v (t) =
∫ ∞
t
q(1− α)
A(s)
e−ρ(s−t)ds <
∫ ∞
t
q(1− α)
A (t)
e−ρ(s−t)ds =
q(1− α)
ρA (t)
,
or V > ρ/q(1− α) which contradicts V → 0.
To obtain the consumption growth rate, consider that for a symmetric configuration
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c = Aσ/(−1)Lx. Then, c˙/c = σ/( − 1)gA + L˙x/Lx. As LA and Lx have to be constant
in the steady state g∗c is given by (3.7).
Proof of Corollary 3.1
Starting with the first statement, note that g∗A(1) > 0 if and only if aρα/(1− α)L < 1.
Moreover, from (3.6) follows g∗A(q) > 0 if and only if q > aρα/(1 − α)L. Denote
qmin ≡ aρα/(1 − α)L. Then, g∗A > 0 if and only if q > qmin, where it is obvious that
qmin ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, ∀g∗A > 0 it follows from (3.6) that
∂g∗A(q)
∂q
=
(1− α)α(L+ aρ)
[q(1− α) + α]2 > 0.
The comparative statics of (3.8) obtain directly from differentiation of qmin with respect
to α, ρ, a and L.
As to the second statement, note that the second term in brackets of (3.6) positively
depends on q. Thus, if g∗A = 0 for a perfect rule of law, i. e., q = 1, then it also has to
be zero for all q < 1.
Proof of Corollary 3.2
The aggregate value of equities Ω is constant in the steady state. From A(s) = A0e
g∗As
and v(t) =
∫∞
t
1−α
A(s)
e−ρ(s−t)ds one finds that
v(t) =
q(1− α)
A0(g∗A + ρ)
e−g
∗
At so that Ω(t) = A(t)v(t) =
q(1− α)
g∗A + ρ
.
As 1 = Apx, the mafia expropriates (1− q)(1− α)/A from each of the A intermediate-
good firms. Thus, total mafia income is given by M = (1−q)(1−α). As we have chosen
consumption expenditure as the nume´raire, µ ≡ (1 − q)(1 − α) represents a fraction
of aggregate output. Moreover, as legal and mafia income sum up to unity, total legal
income corresponds to 1− µ = q(1− α) + α.
In a steady state with positive R&D activity (g∗A > 0) condition (3.5) has to hold with
equality such that w = vA/a. Thus, wL/(wL+ rΩ) = L/(L+ aρ) and rΩ/(wL+ rΩ) =
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aρ/(L + aρ). Thus, a change in q does not affect the distribution between these two
types of income. However, if g∗A = 0, then Lx = α/w with Lx = L implies wL = α.
Moreover, rΩ = q(1−α). Then, wL/(wL+rΩ) = α/(q(1−α)+α) and rΩ/(wL+rΩ) =
q(1 − α)/(q(1 − α) + α). Thus, in this case an increase in q raises the share of capital
income in legal household income at the cost of a decline in the share of labor income.
Proof of Proposition 3.2
The program of the social planner is
max
gA,A
∫ ∞
0
ln c e−ρtdt, where c = Aσ/(−1) (L− agA)
s.t. A˙ = AgA.
The current-value Hamiltonian of this problem is
H ≡ σ/(− 1) lnA+ ln (L− agA) + λAgA.
The necessary and sufficient conditions for an optimum are
∂H
∂gA
=
−a
L− agA + λA ≤ 0, with “=” if gA > 0, (3.26)
.
λ = ρλ− σ
− 1
1
A
− λgA, (3.27)
0 = lim
t→∞
e−ρtλA. (3.28)
Denote S ≡ 1/ (λA). Then, the first-order conditions (3.26) - (3.28) become
gA = max
{
0,
L
a
− S
}
(3.29)
.
S
S
=
σ
− 1S − ρ (3.30)
0 = lim
t→∞
e−ρt
S
. (3.31)
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In a steady state
.
S = 0 has to hold. From (3.30) one has S = (− 1)ρ/σ so that (3.29)
becomes (3.9). There are no transitional dynamics. The proof of this mirrors Arnold
(1997, p. 132-134) for σ 6= 1.
Proof of Corollary 3.3
While the Pareto-efficient growth rate (3.9) is monotonically increasing in σ, the equilib-
rium growth rate (3.6) is independent of σ and increasing in q. Then, there must exist
a σ¯ such that ∀σ > σ¯ holds gPA > g∗A(1) > g∗A(q < 1). From (3.9) and (3.6) with q = 1
follows
gPA > g
∗
A(1) ⇔ σ >
aρ
(1− α)(L+ aρ) .
Denote σ¯ ≡ aρ
(1−α)(L+aρ) . Observe that σ¯ < 1 if g
∗
A(1) > 0 holds (remember that g
∗
A(1) > 0
implies qmin = aαρ/(1− α)L < 1). Thus, the first statement has been proven.
For small σ, gPA drops to zero. More specifically, g
P
A = 0 for all σ < aαρ/(1 − α)L.
Denote σ
¯
≡ aαρ
(1−α)L = qmin. As aαρ/(1 − α)L < 1, one readily verifies that σ¯< σ¯. Thus,
in the interval (σ
¯
,σ¯], gPA > 0. Moreover, as dg
∗
A/dq > 0, g
∗
A(qmin) = 0 and g
∗
A(1) = g
P
A(σ¯),
for each σ ∈(σ
¯
,σ¯] must exist a qP ∈ (qmin, 1) such that g∗A(qP ) = gPA . Equalizing (3.9)
and (3.6) and solving for q delivers
qP (σ) =
σ(L+ aρ)(1− α)− aαρ
(1− α)aρ . (3.32)
From (3.32) one may verify that qP is increasing in σ, qP (σ
¯
) = aαρ/(1 − α)L = qmin
and qP (σ¯) = 1. Then, the second statement follows directly.
As to the third statement, remember that gPA = 0 for all σ <σ¯
. Thus, for g∗A = g
P
A to
hold g∗A has to be zero. This is the case for all q < qmin (see Corollary 3.1).
Detailed Derivation of Equation (3.12)
The household optimizes over his consumption expenditure such that his maximization
problem remains unchanged.
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The final good continues to be produced according to (3.3), but final-good producers
have to pay a tax τ on output such that they maximize
max
{x(j)}Aj=0
pc(1− τ)y −
∫ A
0
pjxjdj.
The demand function of intermediate-good producers that follows from this optimization
problem continues to be given by x(j) = yp(j)−/P .
For a symmetric configuration, final-good producers make zero profits such that pc(1−
τ)y = Apx. As pc(1− τ)y = pcc = 1, we obtain 1 = Apx.
When maximizing their profits, pi(j) = F (τ) [p(j)− w]x(j), intermediate-good firms
treat government expenditure and hence the strength of the rule of law, q = F (τ), as
given. Then, the intermediate-good firms still charge p = w/α and instantaneous profits
in the intermediate-good sector obtain as pi = F (τ)(1− α)/A.
The labor market equilibrium is still described by condition (3.24) and the evolution of
the inverse of the economy’s legal equity value is governed by
V˙
V
= −gA − ρ+ F (τ)(1− α)V. (3.33)
Similarly to Section 3.3.1, equations (3.24) and (3.33) jointly describe the equilibrium
paths of V and gA. The steady-state level is obtained from setting V˙ = 0 in (3.33) and
substituting V = (gA + ρ) / [F (τ)(1− α)] in (3.24) yields g∗A of Equation (3.12).
Proof of Proposition 3.3
We proof each statement of the Proposition separately, starting with Statement 1.
1. On the interval [0, τmin], U is a monotonically declining function in τ . Thus, on
this interval U has its global maximum at τ = 0.
2. On the interval [τmin, 1], increasing τ has two opposing effects on U . A higher τ
negatively impinges on welfare by lowering initial consumption c0 and positively
affects welfare by enabling a higher consumption growth rate g∗c . For large values
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of τ , the former effect dominates the latter and lim
τ→1
U → −∞. For values of τ
close to τmin it is not clear a priori which effect dominates. In the following we
demonstrate that the maximization of U in [τmin, 1] has a corner (unique interior)
solution if a marginal increase in τ at τ = τmin has a negative (positive) effect on
utility, i. e., dU/dτ |τ=τmin < 0 (> 0).
Let dU/dτ |τ=τmin < 0. In this case U is a monotonically declining function in
[τmin, 1] and U is maximized at τmin.
dU
dτ
∣∣∣∣
τ=τmin
< 0 ⇔
∣∣∣∣∂ ln c0∂τ
∣∣∣∣
τ=τmin
>
1
ρ
∂g∗c
∂τ
∣∣∣∣
τ=τmin
⇔ aα
2ρ(L+ aρ)
F ′(τmin)(1− τmin) > σ(1− α)
2L2 − (1− α)aραL, (3.34)
where we have substituted F (τmin) =
aαρ
(1−α)L . For future reference, note that
σ < F (τmin) is a sufficient but not necessary condition for (3.34) to hold.
Inversely,
dU
dτ
∣∣∣∣
τ=τmin
> 0 ⇔ 1
ρ
∂g∗c
∂τ
∣∣∣∣
τ=τmin
>
∣∣∣∣∂ ln c0∂τ
∣∣∣∣
τ=τmin
⇔ aα
2ρ(L+ aρ)
F ′(τmin)(1− τmin) < σ(1− α)
2L2 − (1− α)aραL. (3.35)
In what follows we show that a unique interior local extremum in [τmin, 1] exists if
(3.35) holds. In [τmin, 1],
dU
dτ
= 0 ⇔
F ′(τ)(1− τ)
[F (τ)(1− α) + α]2 =
aρ
σ(1− α)2(L+ aρ)− (1− α)aρ [F (τ)(1− α) + α] .(3.36)
Define the left-hand side of (3.36) as LHS(τ) and the right-hand side of (3.36) as
RHS(τ). A unique solution to (3.36), τ ∗ ∈ (τmin, 1), exists if LHS(τ) and RHS(τ)
intersect exactly once in [τmin, 1]. While LHS(τ) monotonically decreases in τ ,
RHS(τ) is a monotonically increasing function in τ . Moreover,
LHS(τmin) > RHS(τmin)
as
F ′(τmin)(1− τmin)L2
α2(L+ aρ)2
>
aρL2
(L+ aρ) [σ(1− α)2L2 − (1− α)aαρL] .(3.37)
Condition (3.37) is equivalent to condition (3.35) if the right-hand side of (3.37)
is positive which is true for all σ > F (τmin) = aαρ/(1 − α)L. The latter has to
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hold because σ < F (τmin) would imply dU/dτ |τ=τmin < 0, which is a contradiction.
σ > F (τmin) also implies that RHS(1) > 0. Thus, LHS(τ) and RHS(τ) intersect
exactly once in (τmin, 1). As U is a continuous function in [τmin, 1] with lim
τ→1
U →
−∞ and dU/dτ |τ=τmin > 0, the unique local extremum at τ ∗ has to be a global
maximum on [τmin, 1].
3. Statements 1 and 2 determine the welfare-maximizing tax rates on the intervals
[0, τmin] and [τmin, 1], respectively. To find the globally welfare-maximizing tax
rate in [0, 1] we have to compare the welfare associated with these two optimal
rates. On the interval [0, τmin], welfare is always maximized at τ = 0. On the
interval [τmin, 1], welfare is either maximized at τmin or at τ
∗. Thus, if τ ∗ exists, it
is the globally welfare-maximizing tax rate on the whole interval [0, 1] if and only
if U(τ ∗) > U(0). This is fulfilled if
g∗c (τ
∗)
ρ
> −ln(1− τ ∗)− ln
[
α(L+ aρ)
L (F (τ ∗)(1− α) + α)
]
. (3.38)
Note that the right-hand side of (3.38) is positive as τ ∗ < 1 and aαρ/(1− α)L <
F (τ ∗). If τ ∗ exists and U(τ ∗) < U(0), then τ = 0 is globally welfare-maximizing. If
τmin = arg max
τ∗∈[τmin,1]
U , τ = 0 is again globally welfare-maximizing as U(0) > U(τmin).
Proof of Corollary 3.4
From F (τmin) = aαρ/(1− α)L follows
τmin = F
−1
(
aαρ
(1− α)L
)
,
where F−1 is an increasing function. Then,
∂τmin
∂α
> 0,
∂τmin
∂a
> 0,
∂τmin
∂ρ
> 0,
∂τmin
∂L
< 0.
Condition (3.35), which guarantees the existence of an interior welfare maximum on the
interval [τmin, 1], can be rearranged to
aα2ρ(1 + aρ
L
)
F ′(τmin)(1− τmin) < (1− α) [σ(1− α)L− aρα] . (3.39)
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One readily verifies that the left-hand side of (3.39) increases in α, a, ρ, and decreases
in L whereas the right-hand side of (3.39) decreases in α, a, ρ and increases in L and σ.
Thus, the smaller τmin, i. e., the smaller α, a, ρ, and the greater L and σ, the more likely
it is that condition (3.39) is fulfilled and an interior maximum exists. A similar argument
applies for condition (3.38), which assures that U(τ ∗) > U(0). As the right-hand side
of (3.38) increases in a, α, ρ, and decreases in L, it is more likely that this condition is
satisfied the smaller a, α, ρ, and the greater L.
If τ ∗ ∈ (τmin, 1) exists, it is determined by condition (3.36) (see proof of Proposition 3.3).
Then, the comparative statics results follow from implicit differentiation of (3.36).
Proof of Proposition 3.4
The equilibrium growth rate (3.20) is equal to zero if
F (δ)(1− δ) ≤ αρa
(1− α)L = qmin. (3.40)
Define the left-hand side of (3.40) as LHS(δ). LHS(δ) is greater or equal than zero for
all δ ∈ [0, 1] with LHS(0) = q0 and LHS(1) = 0. Moreover, ∂LHS/∂δ = −F +(1−δ)F ′
is positive for values of δ close to zero and negative for values of δ close to one. Finally,
∂2LHS/∂δ2 < 0. Thus, there exists a unique δˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that ∂LHS/∂δ = 0. If
δˆ = arg max[(1 − δ)F (δ)] is such that (1 − δˆ)F (δˆ) ≤ qmin, then g∗A = 0 for any δ. This
proves Statement 1.
For g∗A to become positive in (3.20) the government has to set δ such that
F (δ)(1− δ) > αρa
(1− α)L = qmin. (3.41)
If δˆ = arg max[(1 − δ)F (δ)] is such that (1 − δˆ)F (δˆ) > qmin, then there exist δmin and
δmax with 0 < δmin < δmax < 1 such that (1− δmin)F (δmin) = qmin = (1− δmax)F (δmax).
Then, for all δ ∈ (δmin, δmax) holds g∗A > 0. This proves the first part of Statement 2.
Moreover, for all δ ∈ (δmin, δmax) g∗A is a positive function with ∂2g∗A/∂δ2 < 0 such that
g∗A has to have a unique maximum. Denote δ
∗ = arg max
δ∈(δmin,δmax)
g∗A. As g
∗
c = σ/( − 1) g∗A,
g∗c is also maximized at δ
∗. This proves the second part of Statement 2.
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Proof of Proposition 3.5
We proof each statement of the Proposition separately, starting with Statement 1.
1. If g∗A = 0, then U is a monotonically declining function in δ. Thus, in this case U
has its global maximum at δ = 0.
2. If Statement 2 of Proposition 3.4 holds, then g∗A > 0 for δ ∈ (δmin, δmax) and g∗A = 0
otherwise. Thus,
(a) on the intervals [0, δmin] and [δmax, 1], U is a monotonically declining function
in δ. Thus, on these intervals U has its global maximum at δ = 0 and at
δmax, respectively.
(b) At δmin, increasing δ has two opposing effects on U . A higher δ negatively
impinges on welfare by lowering initial consumption c0 and positively affects
welfare by enabling a higher consumption growth rate g∗c . If the latter effect
dominates the former, i. e., if dU/dτ |δ=δmin > 0, then the maximization of U
on [δmin, δmax] has a unique interior solution δ
∗∗. If this is not the case, then
welfare monotonically declines on the interval [δmin, δmax] and U is maximized
at δmin.
(c) Statements 2a and 2b determine the welfare-maximizing government activity
on the intervals [0, δmin], [δmax, 1] and [δmin, δmax], respectively. To find the
globally welfare-maximizing government share on [0, 1] we have to compare
the welfare associated with these optimal shares. First note that U(0) >
U(δmax). Moreover, on the interval [δmin, δmax], welfare is either maximized
at δmin or at δ
∗∗. Thus, if δ∗∗ exists, it is the globally welfare-maximizing
share on the whole interval [0, 1] if and only if U(δ∗∗) > U(0).
(d) As ∂ ln c0/∂δ < 0 at any point, the welfare-maximizing share has to be smaller
than the growth-maximizing one, i. e., δ∗∗ < δ∗.
CHAPTER 3. RULE OF LAW 93
3.7 Appendix B
Innovation, Growth, and the Optimal Enforcement of
the Rule of Law in the Lab-Equipment Specification
of the Variety Expansion Growth Model
To study the relationship between innovation, growth, and the optimal enforcement of
the rule of law in a variety expansion model with a research sector using the final good
as an input several modifications are in order.11 To justify them, we start with a proof
that the lab-equipment specification in the variety expansion model of Grossman and
Helpman (1991) that we used in the main text is generically inconsistent with a steady
state involving a strictly positive growth rate. Then, we establish the robustness of our
qualitative results derived in Section 3.4 in a lab-equipment specification that allows for
steady-state growth.
The Model of Section 3.2 with a Lab-Equipment Specification
of the Research Technology
In the lab-equipment specification of the variety expansion model the research sector
uses final output instead of labor as a productive input, i. e., the research technology is
A˙ =
z
a
, (3.42)
where z is the final output used in research at t.
Proposition 3.6. Consider the variety expansion growth model of Section 3.2 and re-
place the research technology of (3.4) by the one of (3.42). With this modification the
variety expansion growth model generically does not admit a steady-state growth path
with gA > 0.
11Following Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991), this specification of the research technology is often
referred to as the lab-equipment model.
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Proof Suppose to the contrary that a steady state with gA > 0 exists. Along such a
trajectory all variables must grow at a constant rate. Denote gx ≡ x˙/x the growth rate
of any variable x at t. From the research equation (3.42) we have
gz = gA. (3.43)
Since final output is used as a research input, the market clearing condition for the final
good is
y = c+ z for all t. (3.44)
Differentiating (3.44) with respect to time and dividing the resulting condition by (3.44)
gives
gy
(
1 +
z
c
)
= gc + gz
z
c
for all t. (3.45)
Now, differentiate (3.45) with respect to time and find
g˙y
(
1 +
z
c
)
+ gy
(
z˙c− c˙z
c2
)
= g˙c + g˙z
z
c
+ gz
(
z˙c− c˙z
c2
)
for all t. (3.46)
The steady state requires g˙c = g˙z = g˙y = 0, hence, (3.46) collapses to gy = gz. Combining
the latter with (3.43) gives
gy = gA for all t. (3.47)
The labor market clears if L = Ax. Hence, the CES aggregator (3.3) under symmetry
implies that y = Aσ(1−α)/αL. Hence,
gy = σ
1− α
α
gA for all t. (3.48)
Generically, equations (3.47) and (3.48) are inconsistent. Except in the non-generic
case where σ = α/(1− α), we arrive at a contradiction.
Endogenous Strength of the Rule of Law in a Lab-Equipment
Model
The purpose of this section is to establish the robustness of our qualitative results of
Section 3.4 in a lab-equipment specification.
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The Basic Setup
As in Section 3.4.1, the government transforms tax resources into expenditure on the
rule of law and the strength of the rule of law is endogenously determined by (3.11).
Again, the assumption is that the government finances its expenditure by levying a tax
τ ≥ 0 on consumption c. Then, a balanced budget in all periods requires
G = θy = τc, (3.49)
where θ = G/y measures the share of total government expenditure in final-good output.
For convenience, we choose the price of the final good as nume´raire.
The representative household maximizes (3.1) subject to her flow budget constraint
Ω˙ = rΩ + wL+M − (1 + τ)c, (3.50)
with Ω(0) > 0 and a No-Ponzi game condition. The household’s consumption plan
then satisfies a standard Euler equation, gc = r − ρ, and the transversality condition is
lim
t→∞
e−ρtλ(t)Ω(t) = 0.
We consider a variant of the lab-equipment model in which research and intermediate-
good firms use final output instead of labor as a productive input. The aggregate labor
endowment L is now employed besides the set of all existing intermediate goods to
produce the final-good output y according to
y =
1
α
L1−α
∫ A
0
x(j)αdj, (3.51)
where the term α in the denominator in the front of the integral is included for nota-
tional simplicity. Final-good producers choose L and {x (j)}Aj=0 to maximize y − wL−∫ A
0
p(j)x(j)dj. The first-order conditions of this maximization problem yield the final-
good sector’s demand for labor and for intermediate goods, respectively,
w =
1− α
α
L−α
∫ A
0
x(j)αdj (3.52)
x(j) = p(j)−
1
1−αL. (3.53)
In the intermediate-good sector, each firm produces one unit of its variety at a marginal
cost equal to µ > 0 units of the final good. Then, the price p(j) charged by the
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intermediate-good firm j maximizes his profits
pi(j) = F (θ) (p(j)− µ) p(j)−1/(1−α)L. (3.54)
Normalizing µ ≡ α, the resulting monopoly price satisfies p(j) = p = 1 such that
x(j) = x = L, pi(j) = pi = F (θ)(1− α)L, and y = AL/α. Then, aggregate spending on
intermediates denoted by X obtains as X = Aµx = α2y.
The research sector invents new intermediates according to (3.42). The price of a patent
is
v(t) =
∫ ∞
t
pi exp
(
−
∫ s
t
r(s′)ds′
)
ds. (3.55)
Then, the profit-maximization problem of the research firm yields the first-order condi-
tion
v ≤ a with “ = ”, if A˙ > 0. (3.56)
Dynamic General Equilibrium
Given θ, the equilibrium consists of an allocation {c(t),Ω(t),M(t), y(t), x(j, t), z(t), X(t),
A(t), G(t)}t=∞t=0 and a price system {r(t), w(t), p(j, t), v(j, t)}t=∞t=0 such that households,
final-good, intermediate-good and research firms behave optimally at all t, the capital
market values firms according to fundamentals, for all t the value of households’ assets is
Ω(t) = A(t)v(t), and total mafia income is M(t) = (1−F (θ))A
(
pi(t)
F (θ)
)
. All other markets
clear as well such that the economy’s resource constraint, c(t)+X(t)+z(t)+G(t) = y(t),
holds at all t.
The following proposition establishes the existence of a steady-state equilibrium with
strictly positive levels of consumption.
Proposition 3.7. There exists θmax ∈ (0, 1) such that for all θ < θmax the steady-state
growth rate of c, y, and A is
g∗ = max
{
0,
F (θ)(1− α)L
a
− ρ
}
≡ g∗(F (θ)) (3.57)
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and the steady-state level of consumption is strictly positive and given by
c =

1−α2−θ
α
AL if g∗ = 0
A
[
1−α2−θ−F (θ)(1−α)α
α
L+ aρ
]
if g∗ > 0.
(3.58)
For θ > θmax no steady state with strictly positive consumption levels exists.
The economy immediately jumps to the steady state for any admissible set of initial
conditions.
Proof
A steady-state growth path requires that consumption grows at a constant rate g∗c . This is
possible from the Euler equation if and only if the interest rate is constant, i. e., r(t) = r∗.
Then, it follows from (3.55) that v = pi/r∗ = F (θ)(1−α)L/r∗, i. e., v is constant. Then,
the equilibrium condition Ω = vA implies Ω˙ = vA˙. The wage rate is given from equation
(3.52) by w = (1− α)A/α and total mafia income by M = (1− F (θ))(1− α)A. Hence,
aggregate income, wL+ rΩ +M , equals y − α2y. It follows that the household’s budget
constraint in equation (3.50) becomes
vA˙ = (1− θ)y −X − c, (3.59)
where we used X = α2y and condition (3.49). From y = AL/α and (3.42) we know that
output as well as z have to grow at the same rate as the number of intermediates. Then,
one readily verifies from (3.59) that in a steady state also consumption has to grow at this
rate. Thus, in a steady state it has to hold that g∗ = g∗c = g
∗
y = g
∗
A. A steady state with
a strictly positive growth rate of intermediates requires v = a. Thus, substituting for r∗
in the Euler equation delivers the steady-state growth rate (3.57). Note that vA˙ = vAgA
corresponds to research spending equal to z = aAg∗, if A˙ > 0, and z = 0, if A˙ = 0.
Thus, the economy’s resource constraint is fulfilled at all t. The steady-state level of
consumption obtains from (3.59) as
c =

1−α2−θ
α
AL if g∗ = 0
A
[
1−α2−θ−F (θ)(1−α)α
α
L+ aρ
]
if g∗ > 0.
(3.60)
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One readily verifies that c > 0 for all θ < θmax, where θmax is such that θmax =
(1 − α) [1 + α(1− F (θmax))]. For values of θ > θmax no steady state with positive con-
sumption levels exists.
It is straightforward to see that there are no transitional dynamics. For a proof see, e. g.,
Acemoglu (2009, Chapter 13).
Assume as in the main text that the environment of the economy is such that there would
be positive growth if the rule of law were perfect, i. e., g∗(F (1)) > 0. Then, analogously
to our main model, there exists a θmin ∈ (0, θmax) such that the steady-state growth rate
is positive for all θ > θmin. For future reference, note that F (θmin) =
aρ
(1−α)L .
Welfare Analysis
From Proposition 3.7 one immediately verifies that ∂g∗/∂θ > 0 for any θ ∈ [θmin, θmax].
However, as government expenditure is financed by levying a tax on consumption, an
increase in θ has a cost in terms of foregone current consumption. Thus, in the following,
we determine the value of θ ∈ [θmin, θmax] that maximizes the representative household’s
welfare in the steady state as given by (3.14). Upon substitution of (3.58) for t = 0 in
(3.14) we obtain the following piecewise-defined welfare function:
U =

1
ρ
ln
[
1−α2−θ
α
A0L
]
if θ ∈ [0, θmin]
1
ρ
ln
[
A0
(
1−α2−θ−F (θ)(1−α)α
α
L+ aρ
)]
+ g
∗
ρ2
if θ ∈ [θmin, θmax].
(3.61)
For values of θ smaller than θmin, there is no research and the economy does not grow.
Thus, on the interval [0, θmin], a rise in θ just reduces consumption at all t and welfare
declines monotonically in θ. For values of θ ∈ [θmin, θmax] there is research and growth.
A rise in θ then has two effects on welfare. On the one hand, the steady-state growth
rate increases; on the other hand, as a fraction of final output is spent on research, less
resources are available for current consumption. If the positive growth effect of a higher
expenditure share θ outweighs the negative effects on the level of initial consumption
near θmin, then the welfare function is inversely U-shaped on [θmin, θmax]. Otherwise, U
continues to decline in θ.
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The following proposition establishes the welfare-maximizing government policy.
Proposition 3.8. It holds that
1. on the interval [0, θmin], U is maximized at θ = 0.
2. if dU/dθ|θ=θmin > 0, then arg max
θ∈[θmin,θmax]
U = θ∗ ∈ (θmin, θmax). Otherwise θmin =
arg max
θ∈[θmin,θmax]
U .
3. if θ∗ ∈ (θmin, θmax) exists and U(θ∗) > U(0), then θ∗ maximizes U on [0, θmax].
Otherwise θ = 0 maximizes U on [0, θmax].
12
Proof
We proof each statement of the proposition separately, starting with Statement 1.
1. On the interval [0, θmin], U is a monotonically declining function in θ. Thus, on
this interval U has its global maximum at θ = 0.
2. On the interval [θmin, θmax], increasing θ has two opposing effects on U . A higher
θ negatively impinges on welfare by lowering initial consumption c0 and positively
affects welfare by enabling a higher steady-state growth rate g∗. For large values
of θ, the former effect dominates the latter and lim
θ→θmax
U → −∞. For values of
θ close to θmin it is not clear a priori which effect dominates. In the following
we demonstrate that the maximization of U in [θmin, θmax] has a corner (unique
interior) solution if a marginal increase in θ at θ = θmin has a negative (positive)
effect on utility, i. e., dU/dθ|θ=θmin < 0 (> 0).
If dU/dθ|θ=θmin < 0, then U is a monotonically declining function on [θmin, θmax]
and U is maximized at θmin. By contrast, if dU/dθ|θ=θmin > 0, then holds
1 + F ′(θmin)(1− α)α < (1− α
2 − θ)F ′(θmin)(1− α)L
aρ
. (3.62)
In what follows we show that a unique interior local extremum on [θmin, θmax] exists
if (3.62) holds. On [θmin, θmax], dU/dθ = 0⇔
1
α
= F ′(θ)
[
c0
aρA0
− 1
]
. (3.63)
12There is a non-generic case where U(0) = U(θ∗). Then, the solution of max
θ∈[0,θmax]
U is not unique.
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Define the right-hand side of (3.63) as RHS(θ). RHS(θ) is a monotonically declin-
ing function in θ. Moreover, RHS(θmax) < 0 and RHS(θmin) > 1/α if condition
(3.62) holds. Thus, RHS(θ) intersects exactly once with 1/α in (θmin, θmax), i. e.,
there is a unique θ∗ ∈ (θmin, θmax) such that RHS(θ∗) = 1/α. As U is a continuous
function on [θmin, θmax] with lim
θ→θmax
U → −∞ and dU/dθ|θ=θmin > 0, the unique
local extremum at θ∗ has to be a global maximum on [θmin, θmax].
3. Statements 1 and 2 determine the welfare-maximizing government policy on the in-
tervals [0, θmin] and [θmin, θmax], respectively. To find the globally welfare-maximizing
government policy on [0, θmax] we have to compare the welfare associated with these
two optimal rates. On the interval [0, θmin], welfare is always maximized at θ = 0.
On the interval [θmin, θmax], welfare is either maximized at θmin or at θ
∗. Thus,
if θ∗ exists, it is the globally welfare-maximizing government policy on the whole
interval [0, θmax] if and only if U(θ
∗) > U(0).
Equivalently to Proposition 3.3, Proposition 3.8 reveals that no growth might be better
than some growth. Moreover, if a positive globally welfare-maximizing share of govern-
ment expenditure exists, it will never fully enforce the rule of law. Thus, the qualitative
results of the main text hold true under the lab-equipment specification of the expanding
variety model.
Chapter 4
Population Aging, Endogenous
Government Spending, and
Economic Growth in a
Heterogeneous Infinitely-Lived
Agent Framework
4.1 Introduction
It is widely recognized that most economies in the 21st century will experience population
aging. This demographic shift involves a change in the relative size of the self-supporting
(working) population compared to the number of economically-dependent old. This
change is reflected in an economy’s old-age support ratio, which measures the workers’
share in total adult population. Table 4.1 presents actual data and forecasts of the
old-age support ratio for selected countries and regions based on data from the United
Nations.1 Between 2005 and 2050, this ratio is forecasted to decline substantially, e. g.,
1Table 4.1 is based on the data that appear as the ‘medium variant’ prediction in United Nations
(2008). The old-age support ratio is the ratio of the population aged 15− 64 over the population aged
15 or over.
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in Europe from 81% to 68%.2
Table 4.1: Old-Age Support Ratio in Selected Countries and Regions
Year Europe Northern Japan South Brazil Chile
America Korea
2005 0.81 0.84 0.77 0.88 0.91 0.89
2050 0.68 0.74 0.57 0.61 0.74 0.74
Population aging is likely to alter the distribution of preferences and the support for
different types of government spending, thereby affecting economic growth. A typical
concern expressed in the public debate is that falling old-age support ratios and an in-
creasing political weight of the elderly lead to a growing overall tax burden, and thus
slow down economic growth. Moreover, it is feared that increased spending for the el-
derly, e. g., on health and care service, crowds out public investment spending, thus again
lowering economic growth. Recent experience suggests that the concerns with respect to
public spending may be (at least partly) warranted. For instance, in the United States,
the allocation of public spending expenditure is highly skewed towards older members
(see, e. g., Iqbal and Turnovsky, 2008) and public spending for the elderly has grown
much faster during the second half of the twentieth century than other categories of
public expenditure (see Mulligan and Sala-´ı-Martin, 1999). A similar pattern holds in
other OECD countries (see Poterba, 1997). Moreover, from 1960 to the mid-1990’s, U.S.
federal public spending on infrastructure declined from 5% to 2.5% of GDP. However,
over the same time period, total productive government spending on infrastructure,
educational institutions, and R&D remained stable at 10% of GDP (CBO, 1998).
This chapter incorporates heterogeneity and a demographic structure into a simple
2Note that the total support ratio defined as the ratio between working-age and total population
(including children) displays the same negative trend. However, the magnitude of the decline is a
bit smaller. This is not surprising as population aging is usually due to a combination of increased
life-expectancy and lower fertility rates.
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infinite-horizon, endogenous growth model a` la Barro (1990). It then shows how this het-
erogeneous infinitely-lived agent (ILA) framework can be used to analyze how population
aging via a democratic voting process endogenously changes the level and composition
of government budgets and to derive the ensuing consequences for long-run economic
growth.
Specifically, we assume that their is a continuum of infinitely-lived households, each
of them comprising not only working young but also economically-dependent elderly
members. The age composition of a household is captured by her support ratio, i. e., the
ratio of working members to total household members.3 Households are heterogeneous
with respect to their support ratio. Then, population aging corresponds to a shift in
the distribution of households such that there are more households with a small support
ratio. Moreover, we focus on two public spending categories - productive government
expenditure (e. g., on infrastructure, education, or law and order) that increases private
production possibilities and public consumption spending that satisfies the preferences
of the elderly (e. g., on health and care services). Both types of public spending are fully
financed via income taxes. By majority voting, the households determine the policy
mix that will be implemented by the government with full commitment. More precisely,
voting takes place over two separate income tax rates, which correspond to the share of
each spending component in aggregate output.
This framework yields the following results. In a first step, we show that for a given time-
invariant public policy mix there exists a unique decentralized competitive equilibrium
in which all households (independent of their support ratio) accumulate at the same
rate. However, the age composition of each household determines her level of aggregate
household income and consumption per household member. Moreover, the economy
immediately settles on its balanced growth path. In a second step, we endogenize gov-
ernment policy. To derive the political equilibrium, we first show that each household
has a unique most preferred policy mix that indeed does not depend on time. All house-
holds want the same share of output to be invested in productive purposes. However,
they prefer different shares of output to be spent on the public consumption good that
benefits their elderly members. Household preferences can be ranked according to their
idiosyncratic support ratio: households with a smaller support ratio prefer higher spend-
3Cutler et al. (1990) have introduced such a support ratio in a representative agent, neoclassical
growth model.
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ing for the elderly. The equilibrium policy mix then coincides with the one preferred
by the median voter. It results that the equilibrium policy mix is time-consistent, but
not necessarily growth-maximizing. Finally, a comparative static analysis suggests that
population aging (i) increases public spending on the elderly (as a share of output), (ii)
does not affect productive government expenditure (as a share of output), (iii) raises the
total tax burden, and (iv) lowers the growth rate of per capita variables.
Following the seminal paper by Barro (1990), a large literature has discussed the pos-
sible links between government expenditure and long-run economic growth. Papers in
this strand of the literature usually analyze the growth-and welfare-maximizing size and
composition of different types of government expenditure, predominantly in an infinite-
horizon, representative agent framework.4 Thus, in these papers the shares of govern-
ment expenditure are either exogenous or chosen optimally by a social planner and do
not reflect the fundamental characteristics of collective decision-making and the distri-
bution of preferences.5 Moreover, due to the choice of the infinite-horizon representative
agent framework these papers are not concerned with the role of population aging.
By contrast, the standard approach to model population aging is to consider a de-
cline in the population growth rate or an increase in life expectancy in a model with
overlapping generations. For instance, Razin et al. (2002), Holtz-Eakin et al. (2004),
Bassetto (2008), Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2008), and Song et al. (2009) study how
demographic change endogenously affects fiscal policy via a democratic political process.
Hitherto, this literature has not considered a public policy mix that involves productive
expenditure as well as spending for a consumption-type public good whose valuation
depends on the household’s age structure. Moreover, the above mentioned papers do
not consider an endogenous economic growth framework such that the link from govern-
ment expenditure to long-run economic growth is absent. To the best of our knowledge,
the only exception is Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2007) who quantitatively analyze the
effect of population aging on public spending for education, public transfers between
4See, e.g., Fisher and Turnovsky (1995), Park and Philippopoulos (2002), Kalaitzidakis and Kalyvitis
(2004), Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008), or the second chapter of this dissertation for a survey of this
literature.
5A notable exception is Darby et al. (2004) who examine how random voter turnout, when voters
are heterogeneous in their discount rates, affects the actual composition of government expenditure and
growth.
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workers and retirees, and endogenous productivity growth in a three-period overlapping
generations model with human and physical capital accumulation.
The present chapter deliberately follows a different approach to model population aging.
The aim is to see whether and how the link between population aging, endogenous
government spending, and endogenous economic growth can be analyzed in an infinite-
horizon framework directly comparable to the Barro (1990) literature. The qualitative
results of this approach are in line with notions voiced in the public debate.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the eco-
nomic framework and determines the economic equilibrium, which is the decentralized
competitive equilibrium of the economy for an exogenously given, time-invariant gov-
ernment policy. Section 4.3 establishes the political equilibrium. While Section 4.3.1
derives each household’s most preferred policy mix, Section 4.3.2 determines the actual
policy mix that will be chosen under pure majority rule. Section 4.4 analyzes the impli-
cations of population aging. Section 4.5 concludes. Proofs are relegated to Appendix A.
Appendix B contains additional material. It establishes the robustness of the quali-
tative results for a different initial capital distribution and for a utility function with
non-separable preferences between private and public consumption.
4.2 The Economic Environment
Consider a closed economy in continuous time that is populated by a continuum of
infinitely-lived household-producers of mass 1, i. e., each household is represented by
a unique real number i that belongs to the unit interval [0, 1], and a government.
Household-producers differ in their composition between working young and economically-
dependent elderly members. A household’s age structure is captured by her respective
support ratio that we denote by φi = Li/N i ∈ (0, 1]. Here, N i represents household i’s
total “number of members” and Li her working “members”, where we assume that both
do not change over time.6 This seems particularly acceptable in our setup as we are not
interested in the demographic evolution of each single household over time but rather
6This assumption simplifies aggregation over households and assures the existence of a unique bal-
anced growth path.
CHAPTER 4. POPULATION AGING: ILA MODEL 106
in the composition of the population, i. e., in the distribution of households. Household-
producers behave competitively and produce one good that can be consumed or invested.
At all t, prices are expressed in units of the contemporaneous output of this good. While
all household members derive utility from private consumption, the elderly additionally
benefit from public spending, e. g., on health care. The government taxes household
income to finance the utility-enhancing public good as well as productive government
expenditure.
4.2.1 Technology
Household-producer i produces her output Y i(t) each period t according to
Y i(t) = A
[
Ki(t)
]α [
Gi(t)
]1−α [
Li(t)
]1−α
, 0 < α < 1, (4.1)
where A > 0 denotes the time-invariant total factor productivity, Ki(t) producer i’s
private capital stock at t and Gi(t) the flow of services derived by firm i from total pro-
ductive government expenditure at t. Each firm faces positive, but diminishing marginal
products in all factors, constant returns to scale in the private factors capital and labor
and constant returns to scale in private capital and public productive services. Thus, if
Gi rises with Ki the diminishing returns to the accumulation of private capital do not
set in. For this reason, the economy will exhibit endogenous steady-state growth. Note
also that private capital for simplicity does not depreciate. The economy’s total output
at t, denoted by Y (t), obtains from aggregation over all firms, i.e., Y (t) =
∫ 1
0
Y i(t)di.
Moreover, equation (4.1) yields household-producer i’s output per worker in t as
yi(t) ≡ Y
i(t)
Li
= A
[
ki(t)
]α [
Gi(t)
]1−α
, (4.2)
where ki(t) ≡ Ki(t)/Li denotes household-producer i’s capital stock per worker. We
assume that all households have the same initial capital stock per worker, i.e., ki(0) =
k0 > 0.
7
7This assumption implies that households with fewer working members have a lower initial capi-
tal holding. Alternatively, one could suppose that the economy starts off with an equal distribution
of capital. This assumption does not affect the qualitative results. For details see the first part of
Appendix B.
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The level of productive services that producer i in t enjoys from aggregate productive
government expenditure G(t) is given by
Gi(t) = G(t)
yi(t)
y(t)
, (4.3)
where y(t) ≡ Y (t)/L is the economy’s aggregate output per worker and L ≡ ∫ 1
0
Lidi
the economy’s aggregate labor supply. Equation (4.3) describes a situation of relative
congestion (see, e. g., Barro and Sala-´ı-Martin, 1992, or Turnovsky, 1996c), in which
the level of services producer i derives from the public good G at t depends upon her
own usage, as represented by her own output per worker, relative to aggregate usage, as
represented by economy’s aggregate output per worker.8
Combining (4.3) and (4.1) producer i’s output per worker can be expressed as
yi(t) = A
1
α
(
G(t)
y(t)
) 1−α
α
ki(t). (4.4)
Equation (4.4) says that each household’s production per worker has constant returns
to the private input ki as long as the government maintains a given state of congestion,
i. e., as the long as the ratio G/y is constant.
4.2.2 Preferences
Each household i seeks to maximize her overall intertemporal utility which is given by
U i(t) =
∞∫
0
[
N i ln c˜i(t) + (N i − Li)b lnH(t)] e−ρt dt
= N i
∞∫
0
[
ln c˜i(t) + (1− φi)b lnH(t)] e−ρt dt, (4.5)
where c˜i(t) denotes private consumption per household member at date t, H(t) aggregate
public spending on the elderly at date t, b > 0 measures the weight the elderly assign to
8Note that this specification of congestion in per worker terms eliminates an undesirable scale effect in
the accumulation path of households. If the level of services derived by an individual household-producer
depended on her own total output relative to the economy’s aggregate output, i. e., if Gi = GY i/Y ,
then households with more workers would accumulate at a faster rate.
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public relative to private consumption goods, and ρ > 0 is the constant instantaneous
rate of time preference.9 Note that if all members of household i work, i. e., if φi = 1, then
(4.5) reduces to the standard utility function U i(t) =
∞∫
0
N i e−ρt ln c˜i(t) dt. Henceforth,
we suppress time arguments whenever this does not cause confusion.
As usual, each household i may use her after-tax income either for consumption or
investment in private capital. However, when there are more household members than
workers, i. e., when φi < 1, then consumption per household member at each t is only a
fraction of after-tax output per worker net of investment per worker:
c˜i = φi
[
(1− τ)yi − k˙i
]
, (4.6)
where τ ≥ 0 denotes a non-discriminatory income tax rate.
4.2.3 Government Policy
The government in each period t taxes household income at rate τ = τG + τH . Rev-
enues collected from household-producers fund productive government expenditure (the
component corresponding to τG) as well as spending on the elderly (the component
corresponding to τH). Thus, a balanced government budget requires
τY = G+H = τGY + τHY. (4.7)
Note that τG = G/Y ∈ [0, 1] and τH = H/Y ∈ [0, 1] also represent the ratio of the
respective spending component to aggregate output. In Section 4.3, when we turn to
the determination of government policy, voting will take over the policy mix (τG, τH).
This policy mix then automatically yields the overall income tax rate τ .
9Two remarks are in order. First, note that in the above utility specification the working members
do not derive any utility from the public consumption good. This assumption is used to highlight
the intergenerational conflict. The key point here is that the old derive considerably greater benefit
from spending on health and care services than the young. Second, we have chosen an additively
separable utility specification. However, our results do not change if we use a similar utility function
with non-separable preferences between private and public consumption. For details see the second part
of Appendix B.
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4.2.4 Economic Equilibrium
This section derives the economic equilibrium, which is the decentralized competitive
equilibrium of our economy for an exogenously given, time-invariant government policy.
The optimization problem for each household-producer i is to choose c˜i(t) and ki(t) to
maximize (4.5), subject to (4.6), (4.4), and an initial capital stock per worker k0 >
0. When making her consumption-savings decision each household-producer takes the
paths of G, H, y, and τ as given and disregards the possible impact of her investment
decision on the amount of public services provided. Then, the intertemporal optimization
problem leads to the following Euler condition
˙˜ci(t)
c˜i(t)
= (1− τ)A 1α
(
G
y
) 1−α
α
− ρ, for all i. (4.8)
In addition, the equilibrium requires the following transversality condition to be met
lim
t→∞
[
λi(t)ki(t)
]
= 0, (4.9)
where λi denotes the present-value shadow price of household-producer i’s capital stock.
The ratio of productive government spending per unit of the economy’s output per
worker consistent with condition (4.7) and the fact that y = Y/L is
G
y
= τGL. (4.10)
Upon substitution of (4.10) in (4.8) and taking into account the government’s budget
constraint (4.7) we obtain
˙˜ci(t)
c˜i(t)
= (1− τG − τH)A 1α (τGL)
1−α
α − ρ, for all i. (4.11)
Thus, the per capita consumption growth path chosen by household i is independent of
her support ratio φi. Now assume that τG and τH remain unchanged over time. (We
will show in Section 4.3 that this will be the case in the political equilibrium). Then, we
can establish the following proposition, which characterizes the economic equilibrium.
Proposition 4.1. For given, time-invariant τG and τH , there exists a unique steady-
state growth path along which all variables at the household and the economy-wide level
as well as government expenditure grow at the same constant rate
γ(τG, τH) ≡
˙˜ci
c˜i
= (1− τG − τH)A 1α (τGL)
1−α
α − ρ. (4.12)
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The economy immediately jumps to this steady-state growth path for any admissible set
of initial conditions.
Proposition 4.1 reveals that all household-producers, independent of their support ratio,
accumulate at the same rate. As they all have the same initial capital stock per worker,
this in turn implies that all i have the same capital stock per worker and output per
worker at all t. However, each household’s demographic composition determines her
instantaneous level of total income
Y i(t) = yi(0)Lieγ(·)t = A
1
α (τGL)
1−α
α k0L
ieγ(·)t (4.13)
[from (4.4) and (4.10)], and of consumption per capita
c˜i(t) = c˜i(0)eγ(·)t = φiρk0eγ(·)t, (4.14)
[from (4.6) and (4.12)]. The argument of γ is (τG, τH) if not mentioned otherwise.
Intuitively, the smaller a household’s labor force, the smaller is her aggregate income at
each t. Similarly, the smaller the share of workers among the total number of household
members, i. e., the smaller the support ratio, the lower is the level of consumption per
capita at each t.
As all households accumulate at the same rate and the labor supply of each household
is constant, it is not surprising that the growth rate γ(·) also applies to the economy’s
aggregate variables, which obtain from aggregation over all households. For instance,
the economy’s aggregate output is given by
Y (t) =
∫ 1
0
Y i(t)di = A
1
α (τGL)
1−α
α k0Le
γ(·)t. (4.15)
Finally, as G and H are proportional to aggregate income, they also have to grow at the
rate γ(·).
The steady-state growth rate depends on the public policy parameters τG and τH . There
is a negative relationship between the government’s expenditure ratio for services that
benefit the elderly and the steady-state growth rate, i. e., ∂γ(·)/∂τH < 0. The reason
for this is that each household-producer in her optimization problem disregards that her
choice of ki via aggregate output, Y , affects the aggregate amount of public spending for
the elderly, H, and thus the household’s overall per-period utility. Thus, τH only affects
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the steady-state growth rate by reducing each household’s net income. By contrast, a
rise in τG has two opposing effects on γ(·). A rise in τG increases the provision of G, and
thus the private marginal product of private capital, but at the same time reduces its
after-tax value due to the distortionary tax financing of government expenditure. For
a given τH , the steady-state growth rate γ(·) is maximized at τG = (1 − α)(1 − τH).
Overall, maximum growth is obtained for τH = 0 and τG = 1 − α. Finally, the steady-
state growth rate depends on the economy’s aggregate labor supply, L, i. e., there is a
scale effect. The latter occurs since a greater aggregate labor supply increases aggregate
household income, and thus the tax base from which productive government expenditure
is financed.
4.3 The Political Equilibrium
So far we have analyzed each household’s accumulation path for a given public policy
mix (τG, τH). Now we proceed to endogenize government policy. For this purpose, we
first characterize each household’s policy preferences and then determine the policy mix
that will be implemented by the government under pure majority voting.
4.3.1 Policy Preferences
This section derives the ith household’s most preferred policy mix. Each household i
considers the economic equilibrium effects of each policy mix and calculates the associ-
ated utility level. Household i’s most preferred policy mix then is the combination of τG
and τH that delivers the highest utility level. The relevant optimization problem thus is
max
τG,τH
U i = N i
∞∫
0
[
ln c˜i(t) + (1− φi)b lnH(t)] e−ρt dt
s.t.
c˜i(t) = φiρk0e
γ(τG,τH)t
H(t) = τHA
1
α (τGL)
1−α
α k0Le
γ(τG,τH)t
γ(τG, τH) = (1− τG − τH)A 1α (τGL)
1−α
α − ρ,
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where H(t) follows from (4.7) and (4.15). The constraints make clear how the choice of
policy affects household i’s indirect utility. First, a rise in τG has two effects on U
i. On
the one hand, a higher τG increases utility by raising aggregate production today and
thus today’s provision of H. On the other hand, a change in τG affects U
i by altering the
steady-state growth rate. The direction of this effect depends on the size of τG compared
to its growth-maximizing size (1−α)(1−τH). A greater growth rate is utility-enhancing
because it increases future private as well as public consumption possibilities. Second,
a rise in τH positively affects households’ well-being by directly increasing the provision
of H but impinges on U i by reducing the steady-state growth rate.
Henceforth, we assume that the following assumption, which will be motivated below,
holds:
Assumption 4.1. ρ ≤ 1+b
b
A
1
α [(1− α)L] 1−αα .
Then, the solution to the above optimization problem yields household i’s unique most
preferred policy mix as10
τ iG = 1− α (4.16)
and
τ iH =
(1− φi)bρ
[1 + (1− φi)b]A 1α [(1− α)L] 1−αα
. (4.17)
Since time does not enter these expressions, they confirm our conjecture that the actual
policy mix, which will be implemented by the government (see Section 4.3.2), will involve
constant tax rates. Thus, household behavior based on time-invariant τG and τH is fully
consistent with the actual equilibrium outcome.
Assumption 4.1, which is easily met for a small ρ or a large A, assures that τ iH ≤ 1
for any φi. Note that the equilibrium growth rate associated with household i’s most
preferred policy mix can be negative if τ iH is sufficiently large.
According to equation (4.16), the ideal share of productive government expenditure,
τ iG, for all households corresponds to 1 − α. The latter is the output elasticity of pro-
ductive expenditure, which is the same for all households. As productive government
10For a detailed derivation see Appendix A.
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expenditure affects all household-producers in the same way, it is intuitive that the pre-
ferred expenditure ratio is independent of the households’ demographic composition, i. e.,
∂τ iG/∂φ
i = 0. It is noteworthy that at τ iG productive government expenditure satisfies
the so-called natural condition of productive efficiency, i. e., the marginal contribution
of government expenditure to aggregate output is one (see, e.g., Barro, 1990). In the
present context, as aggregate output in equilibrium can be written as Y = AKα(GL)1−α,
we have dY/dG = (1− α)(Y/G) = (1− α)/τ iG = 1.
By contrast, equation (4.17) reveals that household i’s preferred spending ratio for ser-
vices that benefit the elderly, τ iH , depends on φ
i. Thus, households with different support
ratios prefer different tax rates. Since τ iH affects the steady-state growth rate, this dif-
ference also translates into the preferred growth rate. Assuming that i’s most preferred
policy mix is the one implemented by the government, one readily establishes that
dτ iH
dφi
< 0 and
dγ(τ iG, τ
i
H)
dφi
> 0. (4.18)
Intuitively, households with a greater share of elderly members (i. e., a lower φi) are
willing to pay higher taxes for the provision of public services that benefit these members
and to accept lower growth rates of private consumption.
4.3.2 Policy Choice under Majority Voting
Let’s turn to the policy mix that will be implemented by the government under pure
majority rule. In particular, we will show that the median voter theorem can be applied
to this voting problem.
For all household-producers the optimal policy mix involves τG = 1 − α. Thus, voters
only differ in their preferences for τH and the voting problem becomes one-dimensional.
Moreover, each voter’s preferences for τH are single-peaked because the indirect utility
function U i is strictly concave in τ iH for τG = 1−α. In addition, there exists a monotonic
relationship between household i’s ideal tax rate τ iH and her support ratio φ
i. Thus,
the median voter theorem can be applied to this voting problem and the share of public
spending for the elderly that the government implements coincides with the one preferred
by the median voter. The following proposition summarizes the political equilibrium,
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i.e., the actual choice of policy under majority rule, and the resulting economic growth
rate.
Proposition 4.2. The actual policy mix involves
τ ∗G = 1− α and τ ∗H =
(1− φm)bρ
[1 + (1− φm)b]A 1α [(1− α)L] 1−αα
, (4.19)
where φm denotes the support ratio of the median household. The corresponding steady-
state growth rate of household and economy-wide variables is
γ∗ = αA
1
α [(1− α)L] 1−αα − (1− φ
m)bρ
1 + (1− φm)b − ρ. (4.20)
Implicitly, we have assumed that taxes are voted on and implemented with full commit-
ment at time zero. However, due to the infinite time horizon and exponential discounting,
this policy choice is time-consistent (see Laibson, 2003). Thus, it has to coincide with
the solution that would be obtained if the government could not commit itself to future
policies. Intuitively, as households only differ in their support ratio (which does not
affect the accumulation path) and as the identity of the median voter does not change
over time, strategic intertemporal voting cannot occur.
Equation (4.19) reveals that τ ∗H > 0 for any φ
m < 1. Thus, as long as the median
household is not solely composed of working members, majority voting cannot yield the
economy’s maximum growth rate (which requires τH = 0).
4.4 Implications of Population Aging
How does population aging in this framework affect actual government spending and
long-run economic growth? Population aging here corresponds to an (exogenous) change
in the distribution of households such that there are more households with a large fraction
of elderly members and the median household has a lower support ratio.11 This process
may entail a decline in the total labor force. The implications of population aging are
11As the economy in equilibrium immediately settles on its steady-state growth path, i. e., does not
feature any transitional dynamics, the present framework does not permit to study a demographic
transition.
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summarized in the following corollary, which immediately follows from Proposition 4.2
and equation (4.18).
Corollary 4.1.
1. It holds that
dτ ∗H
dφm
< 0,
dτ ∗G
dφm
= 0, and
dγ∗
dφm
> 0. (4.21)
2. It holds that
dτ ∗H
dL
< 0,
dτ ∗G
dL
= 0, and
dγ∗
dL
> 0. (4.22)
The first statement of Corollary 4.1 reveals that a fall in the median voter’s support
ratio, φm, involves a higher τ ∗H , an unchanged τ
∗
G, and a lower γ
∗. Thus, the framework
of this chapter predicts that demographic aging increases public spending on the elderly
(as a share of output), does not affect productive government expenditure (as a share
of output), increases the overall tax burden (because τ = τG + τH), and lowers the
economy’s growth rate. This is consistent with the concerns raised in the public debate.
Statement 2 reveals that the steady-state effects of a fall in L have the same sign, and
thus potentially reinforce the effects of a decline in φm. This result is due to the scale
effect of aggregate labor supply in aggregate production.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has shown how a simple infinite-horizon, endogenous growth model a` la
Barro (1990) with households that are heterogeneous in their age composition can be
used to analyze how population aging, via a democratic voting process, endogenously
affects government spending for productive purposes and for a public consumption good
that benefits the elderly, and how a change in the level and composition of the govern-
ment budget impinges on long-run economic growth.
The results can be summarized as follows. While all households prefer the same share of
output to be used for productive public expenditure, the age pattern of each household
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determines which share of output they want the government to spend on the needs
of the elderly. Consequently, the policy mix that will be implemented under majority
voting depends on the age distribution of the economy. Population aging is predicted
to increase public spending on the elderly (as a share of output) as well as the overall
tax burden, and thus to lower the economy’s growth rate. However, it does not affect
public productive expenditure (as a share of output). Thus, the present framework yields
results that are consistent with recent evidence (see Section 4.1).
The next chapter compares these results to those obtained in a comparable model of
overlapping generations in which agents live for two periods and vote each period. It can
be expected that the results for τH will not differ qualitatively. However, the solution
under repeated voting then does not necessarily have to coincide with the one under
full commitment. This is due to the finite lifetime of individuals in this type of model.
Moreover, to achieve tractability in the present framework, the size of the population has
been stationary and we have focused on changes in the composition of the population.
In an overlapping generations model, if population aging occurs due to a slowdown in
population growth, then this does not only affect the composition, but also the size of
the population. The latter in turn reduces the usual capital dilution effect and has an
opposing, positive effect on the growth rate of per capita variables.
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4.6 Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 4.1
Household-producer i’s intertemporal optimization problem gives rise to the following
present-value Hamiltonian
Hi ≡ N i [ln c˜i + (1− φi)b lnH] e−ρt + λi [(1− τ)A 1α (G
y
) 1−α
α
ki − c˜
i
φi
.
]
, (4.23)
where λi denotes the present-value shadow price of household-producer i’s capital stock.
In performing the optimization, the individual household-producer takes τ , y, G, and H
as given. Then, the necessary and sufficient optimality conditions are12
1
c˜i
e−ρt =
λi
Li
(4.24)
λ˙i = −λi
[
(1− τ)A 1α
(
G
y
) 1−α
α
]
(4.25)
0 = lim
t→∞
[
λiki
]
. (4.26)
As Li is constant, combining (4.24) and (4.25) and taking into account G/y = τGL and
τ = τG + τH yields
˙˜ci
c˜i
= (1− τG − τH)A 1α (τGL)
1−α
α − ρ. (4.27)
From the flow budget constraint (4.6) we know that
c˜i
φiki
= (1− τ)A 1α (τGL)
1−α
α − k˙
i
ki
. (4.28)
In a steady state the growth rate of the household’s capital stock per worker per definition
has to be constant. Therefore, for constant expenditure shares τG and τH the right-hand
side of (4.28) is constant. Consequently, c˜i/(φiki) is constant and for a constant φi the
12The Hamiltonian Hi is the sum of a concave function of c˜i and a linear function of (ki, c˜i). Therefore,
it is concave in (ki, c˜i). Moreover, it is strictly concave in c˜i. Thus, the paths of c˜i and ki implied by
(4.24)-(4.26) achieve a unique global maximum.
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growth rate of the household’s capital stock per worker has to equal the growth rate of
consumption per household member. As yi from (4.4) with G/y = τGL obtains as
yi(t) = A
1
α (τGL)
1−α
α ki(t), (4.29)
output per worker in the steady state also grows at the same rate as ki and c˜i. Moreover,
as all households have the same initial capital-labor share ki(0) = k0 equation (4.29)
implies that all households at all t have the same output and capital per worker such
that in equilibrium individual and economy-wide variables per worker coincide, i. e.,
k =
∫ 1
0
kidi = ki and y =
∫ 1
0
yidi = yi. Each household’s instantaneous level of aggregate
capital, output, and consumption depends on her respective (but constant) labor supply,
but is proportional to ki:
Ki(t) = ki(t)Li (4.30)
Y i(t) = A
1
α (τGL)
1−α
α ki(t)Li (4.31)
Ci(t) = ρki(t)Li. (4.32)
Thus, these aggregate household variables in a steady state grow at the same rate as ki.
Finally, the economy-wide aggregate variables are given by
K(t) =
∫ 1
0
Ki(t)di = ki(t)
∫ 1
0
Lidi = ki(t)L (4.33)
Y (t) =
∫ 1
0
Y i(t)di = A
1
α (τGL)
1−α
α ki(t)L (4.34)
C(t) =
∫ 1
0
Ci(t)di = ρki(t)L. (4.35)
Hence, for a constant aggregate labor supply (L), K, Y , and C have to grow at the same
rate as ki. Finally, as G and H are proportional to aggregate output, these variables
also have to grow at this rate. Thus, we have established the existence of a steady-state
growth path at which all variables at household and economy level as well as the level
of public services grow the same constant rate
γ(τG, τh) ≡
˙˜ci
c˜i
=
k˙i
ki
. (4.36)
Moreover, using (4.24) and (4.25) to evaluate (4.26) one readily verifies that the transver-
sality condition holds for any parameter constellation.
Finally, it is straightforward to show that the economy immediately jumps onto this
steady-state path. The proof of this mirrors the one of a standard AK model.
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Derivation of Household i’s Most Preferred Policy Mix
Substituting for ci(t) and H(t) in household i’s utility function (4.5) and solving the
integral we obtain the steady-state utility of household i as
U i (τG, τH) =
N i
ρ
[
ln(φiρk0) + (1− φi)b ln
(
τH (τG)
1−α
α k0 (AL)
1
α
)]
+
N i(1 + (1− φi)b)γ(·)
ρ2
. (4.37)
Then, the optimization problem of household i reduces to choosing τG ∈ [0, 1] and
τH ∈ [0, 1] to maximize (4.37) with γ(·) given by (4.12). To determine the global
maximum of U i in the square 0 ≤ τG ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ τH ≤ 1 we proceed in two steps.
First, we show that there exists a unique local maximum in the interior of the square.
Second, we verify that this policy mix represents the global maximum in the square by
comparing its implied utility level with the utility obtained at the local extrema on the
boundary of the square and at corner points.
1. Derivation of the unique local maximum in the interior of the square:
The above optimization problem delivers the following pair of necessary first-order
conditions for an interior optimum
∂U i
∂τG
=
(1− φi)b(1− α)
ατG
+
1 + (1− φi)b
ρ
∂γ(·)
∂τG
= 0 (4.38)
∂U i
∂τH
=
(1− φi)b
τH
+
1 + (1− φi)b
ρ
∂γ(·)
∂τH
= 0, (4.39)
where
∂γ(·)
∂τG
=
A
1
α (τGL)
1−α
α
ατG
[(1− α)(1− τH)− τG] (4.40)
∂γ(·)
∂τH
= −A 1α (τGL)
1−α
α < 0. (4.41)
Rewriting conditions (4.38) and (4.39), household i’s most preferred expenditure
shares τ iG and τ
i
H are implicitly determined by
1 + (1− φi)b
(1− φi)bρ = −
(1− α)
ατ iG
(
∂γ(·)
∂τG
)∣∣∣
τ iG,τ
i
H
(4.42)
1 + (1− φi)b
(1− φi)bρ = −
1
τ iH
(
∂γ(·)
∂τH
)∣∣∣
τ iG,τ
i
H
, (4.43)
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respectively. Then, combining (4.42) and (4.43) and taking into account (4.40)
and (4.41) yields
− 1− α
(1− τ iH)(1− α)− τ iG
=
1
τ iH
and thus τ iG = 1− α.
Then, substituting τ iG = 1− α and (4.41) in (4.39) and rearranging yields
τ iH =
(1− φi)bρ
[1 + (1− φi)b]A 1α [(1− α)L] 1−αα
, (4.44)
which is equation (4.17).
The sufficient condition for (τ iG, τ
i
H) to be a local maximum is
D
(
τ iG, τ
i
H
) ≡ ∂2U i
∂τ 2G
∣∣∣∣
τ iG,τ
i
H
× ∂
2U i
∂τ 2H
∣∣∣∣
τ iG,τ
i
H
−
(
∂2U i
∂τG∂τH
∣∣∣∣
τ iG,τ
i
H
)2
> 0, (4.45)
where
∂2U i
∂τ 2H
= −N
i
ρ
(1− φi)b
(τH)
2 , (4.46)
∂2U i
∂τG∂τH
= −N
i
ρ
1− α
α
1 + (1− φi)b
ρ
(
AL1−α
) 1
α (τG)
1−α
α
−1 , (4.47)
∂2U i
∂τ 2G
=
N i
ρ
[
−(1− φ
i)b (1− α)
α (τG)
2 +
1 + (1− φi)b
ρ
∂2γ
∂τ 2G
]
with (4.48)
∂2γ
∂τ 2G
= −1− α
α
(
AL1−α
) 1
α (τG)
1−α
α
−2
[
τG
α
+
(
1− 1− α
α
)
(1− τH)
]
.
Evaluating equations (4.46)-(4.48) at τ iG = 1 − α and at τ iH as given by (4.44),
substituting the resulting expressions in (4.45) and rearranging yields
D
(
τ iG, τ
i
H
)
=
[1 + (1− φi)b] (AL1−α) 3α (1− α) 3(1−α)α
(1− φi)bρ3 > 0.
Thus, the policy mix (τ iG, τ
i
H) represents a local maximum in the interior of the
square. The utility level associated with this policy mix is
U i
(
τ iG, τ
i
H
)
=
N i
ρ
[
ln(φiρk0) + (1− φi)b ln
(
(1− φi)bρ
1 + (1− φi)bk0L
)]
+
N i(1 + (1− φi)b)
ρ2
α
(
A(1− α)1−αL1−α) 1α
− N
i
ρ
[
(1− φi)b+ (1 + (1− φi)b)] . (4.49)
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2. Comparison to local maxima on the boundary of the square and to corner points:
The boundary of the square consists of 4 parts. On the first two sides with either
τG = 0 or τH = 0 no relative maximum exists as U
i tends to −∞ if one of the tax
rates approaches zero. Side 3 is τG = 1 and τH ∈ [0, 1]. On this side, we have
U i (1, τH) =
N i
ρ
[
ln(φiρk0) + (1− φi)b ln
(
τHk0 (AL)
1
α
)]
+
N i(1 + (1− φi)b)
ρ2
(
−τH
(
AL1−α
) 1
α − ρ
)
and ∂U
i(1,τH)
∂τH
= 0 delivers the relative extremum
τˆH =
(1− φi)bρ
[1 + (1− φi)b] (AL1−α) 1α
.
Evaluating U i at this critical point gives
U i (1, τˆH) =
N i
ρ
[
ln(φiρk0) + (1− φi)b ln
(
(1− φi)bρ
1 + (1− φi)bk0L
)]
− N
i
ρ
[
(1− φi)b+ (1 + (1− φi)b)] ,
which is strictly smaller than U i (τ iG, τ
i
H) given by (4.49).
Side 4 is τH = 1 and τG ∈ [0, 1]. On this side, we have
U i (τG, 1) =
N i
ρ
[
ln(φiρk0) + (1− φi)b ln
(
(τG)
1−α
α k0 (AL)
1
α
)]
− N
i(1 + (1− φi)b) (τGAL1−α)
1
α
ρ2
and ∂U
i(1,τH)
∂τG
= 0 delivers the relative extremum
τ¯G =
[
(1− φi)ρb (1− α)
[1 + (1− φi)b] (AL1−α) 1α
]α
.
Evaluating U i at this critical point then gives
U i (τ¯G, 1) =
N i
ρ
[
ln(φiρk0)−
[
(1− φi)b (1− α) + (1 + (1− φi)b)]]
+
N i
ρ
(1− φi)b ln
[ (1− φi)ρb (1− α)
[1 + (1− φi)b] (AL1−α) 1α
]1−α
k0 (AL)
1
α
 ,
which under Assumption 1 can be shown to be strictly smaller than (4.49).
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The only candidate for a corner solution is τG = τH = 1. In this case we obtain
U i (1, 1) =
N i
ρ
[
ln(φiρk0) + (1− φi)b ln
(
k0 (AL)
1
α
)
− (1 + (1− φ
i)b) (AL1−α)
1
α
ρ
]
− N
i
ρ
(1 + (1− φi)b),
which is strictly smaller than (4.49) because[
1 + ln
(
[1 + (1− φi)b] (AL1−α) 1α
(1− φi)bρ
)]
<
(1 + (1− φi)b) (AL1−α) 1α
(1− φi)bρ
[
1 + α (1− α) 1−αα
]
.
Thus, we have shown that all corner points and local extrema on the boundary of the
square yield a lower utility than the interior local maximum at (τ iG, τ
i
H). Thus, this
policy mix is the global maximum in the square.
4.7 Appendix B
4.7.1 Economic Equilibrium with an Equal Initial Capital Dis-
tribution
This section analyzes the economic equilibrium for an equal initial capital distribution,
i. e., for Ki(0) = K0 > 0 for all i.
The optimization problem for each household-producer i is
max
{c˜i(t),ki(t)}∞t=0
U i s.t. (4.6), (4.4), and Ki(0) = K0 > 0,
taking τ , G, H, and y as given (4.50)
which gives rise to the same necessary and sufficient optimality conditions as in the
proof of Proposition 4.1, namely equations (4.24) - (4.26). Thus, it is straightforward to
show that (equivalent to Proposition 4.1) along the steady-state growth path for given
time-invariant expenditure ratios τG and τH all variables will grow at the same constant
rate γ(τG, τH) given by (4.12).
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The main difference with an equal initial capital distribution occurs at the level of per-
period household variables. With the same initial capital stock all households have the
same initial income and produce the same output at all t. To see this, note that
Y i(t) = Y i(0)eγ(·)t, (4.51)
where Y i(0) = A
1
α (τGL)
1−α
α K0. (4.52)
The argument of γ is (τG, τH). Thus, all households independent of the size of their
labor force produce the same output but differ in their output per worker
yi(t) =
Y i(t)
Li
= A
1
α (τGL)
1−α
α
K0
Li
eγ(·)t. (4.53)
This is possible because firms in this setting asymmetrically benefit from productive
government expenditure at each t
Gi = G
yi
y
= G
L
Li
, (4.54)
where we have used that in equilibrium at each t
y =
∫ 1
0
yidi =
∫ 1
0
Y i
Li
di = Y i
∫ 1
0
1
Li
di =
Y i
L
. (4.55)
Intuitively, equation (4.54) implies that the government via the provision of public pro-
ductive services subsidizes the production of household-producers with a smaller labor
force. By contrast, when households have the same initial capital stock per worker as
assumed in the main text they all produce the same output per worker at each t but
differ in their aggregate output according to the size of their labor force.
4.7.2 Non-Separable Preferences
To gauge the sensitivity of our results, this section considers an alternative specifica-
tion of the utility function with non-separable preferences between private and public
consumption.
In particular, we assume that household i’s intertemporal utility is given by
U i(t) =
∫ ∞
0
(
(Ci(t))
φi
H(t)1−φ
i
)1−σ
− 1
1− σ e
−ρtdt, (4.56)
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where Ci(t) = c˜i(t)N i denotes household i’s aggregate private consumption and σ is the
reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption. We assume
1−σ < 1 such that the instantaneous utility function is strictly concave in its arguments.
The share of private consumption in household i’s utility relative to public consumption
is given by the support ratio φi. The greater the share of elderly members, i. e., the
smaller φi, the more important is the public consumption good for overall household
utility. For simplicity, we normalize each households labor supply to unity, i. e., Li = 1,
such that in equilibrium L = 1. As the size of the household and her labor supply
are assumed to be constant, this assumption does not affect our qualitative results, but
simply eliminates the scale effect in the steady-state growth rate.
Economic Equilibrium
In this case, the optimization problem for each household i is to choose c˜i(t) and ki(t) to
maximize (4.56), subject to (4.6), (4.4), and an initial capital stock per worker ki(0) =
k0 > 0, taking G, H, and τ = τG + τH as given. The corresponding present-value
Hamiltonian is
Hi ≡
(
(c˜i/φi)
φi
H1−φ
i
)1−σ
− 1
1− σ e
−ρt + λi
[
(1− τG − τH)A 1α
(
G
y
) 1−α
α
ki − c˜
i
φi
.
]
, (4.57)
where λi denotes the present-value shadow price of household-producer i’s capital stock.
The necessary and sufficient first-order conditions of this optimization problem yield
[
(1− σ)φi − 1] ˙˜ci
c˜i
+ (1− φi)(1− σ)H˙
H
− ρ = λ˙
i
λi
, (4.58)
[
(1− τG − τH)A 1α
(
G
y
) 1−α
α
]
= − λ˙
i
λi
, (4.59)
lim
t→∞
[
λiki
]
= 0. (4.60)
The government’s budget constraint (see equation 4.7) implies for a time-invariant τH
that H˙/H = Y˙ /Y . Moreover, on a balanced growth path with a stationary population
all variables have to grow at the same rate, i. e., γ ≡ ˙˜ci/c˜i = H˙/H. Taking this into
account and combining (4.58) - (4.59) with (4.10) for L = 1 yields the steady-state
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growth rate as
γ(τG, τH) =
.
c˜i
c˜i
=
1
σ
[
(1− τG − τH)A 1α (τG)
1−α
α − ρ
]
, (4.61)
which generalizes equation (4.12) to σ 6= 1. As before, the economy has no transitional
dynamics and is always in a position at which all variables at the household and the
economy-wide level as well as government expenditure grow at the rate γ(·). For utility
to be bounded ρ > γ(·)(1− σ) has to hold.
Given a starting amount of capital, ki(0), the levels of all variables are again determined.
In particular, the initial quantity of consumption is
c˜i(0) = φi
[
(1− τG − τH)A 1α (τG)
1−α
α − γ(·)
]
ki(0) (4.62)
and the initial level of the public consumption good is
H (0) = τHA
1
α (τG)
1−α
α ki (0) . (4.63)
Also note that equations (4.61) and (4.62) imply that c˜i(0) can be written as
c˜i (0) = φi [ρ− γ(·) (1− σ)] ki (0) . (4.64)
Political Equilibrium
In the following we use the above results to determine household i’s most preferred policy
mix. The relevant optimization problem is
max
τG,τH
∫ ∞
0
(
(c˜i(t)/φi)
φi
H(t)1−φ
i
)1−σ
− 1
1− σ e
−ρt dt s.t.
c˜i(t) = c˜i(0)eγ(τG,τH)t and H(t) = H(0)eγ(τG,τH)t.
For a constant γ(·) the integral in the above equation can be simplified to yield (aside
from a constant)
U i(τG, τH) =
(c˜i (0) /φi)
φi(1−σ)
H (0)(1−φ
i)(1−σ)
(1− σ) [ρ− γ(·) (1− σ)] . (4.65)
Then, using equations (4.63) - (4.64) in (4.65) gives i’s indirect utility function as
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U i =
ki (0)1−σ
1− σ (ρ− γ(·) (1− σ))
φi(1−σ)−1
(
τHA
1
α (τG)
1−α
α
)(1−φi)(1−σ)
. (4.66)
Maximizing (4.66) with respect to τG and τH yields the following pair of first-order
conditions
(1− α) (1− φi)
α∂γ(·)
∂τG
([ρ− γ(·) (1− σ)])φi(1−σ)−1
(
τHA
1
α
)(1−φi)(1−σ)
(τG)
(1−α)(1−σ)(1−φi)
α
−1
= − (1− φi (1− σ)) ([ρ− γ(·) (1− σ)])φi(1−σ)−2 (τHA 1α (τG) 1−αα )(1−φi)(1−σ) , (4.67)
and
1− φi
∂γ(·)
∂τH
([ρ− γ(·) (1− σ)])φi(1−σ)−1 (τH)(1−φ
i)(1−σ)−1 (A (τG)1−α) (1−σ)(1−φi)α
= − (1− φi (1− σ)) ([ρ− γ(·) (1− σ)])φi(1−σ)−2 (τHA 1α (τG) 1−αα )(1−φi)(1−σ) , (4.68)
where
∂γ(·)
∂τG
=
A
1
α (τG)
1−α
α
σατG
[(1− α)(1− τH)− τG] , (4.69)
∂γ(·)
∂τH
= − 1
σ
A
1
α (τG)
1−α
α < 0. (4.70)
Combining conditions (4.67) and (4.68) and taking into account equations (4.69) and
(4.70) yields
− 1− α
(1− τ iH)(1− α)− τ iG
=
1
τ iH
and thus τ iG = 1− α.
Then, substituting τ iG = 1− α and (4.70) in (4.68) and rearranging delivers(
1− φi) [ρ− γ(·) (1− σ)] = 1
σ
A
1
α (1− α) 1−αα (1− φi (1− σ)) τ iH . (4.71)
Then, using (4.61) in (4.71) yields
τ iH =
(1− φi)
[
ρ− αA 1α (1− α) 1−αα
]
A
1
α (1− α) 1−αα φiσ
.
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As τ iH cannot be negative, household i’s most preferred spending share is given by
τ iH = max
0, (1− φ
i)
[
ρ− αA 1α (1− α) 1−αα
]
A
1
α (1− α) 1−αα φiσ
 . (4.72)
Intuitively, if ρ is sufficiently small, i. e., if households care a lot about the future,
then i prefers a high growth rate and thus τ iH = 0. Henceforth, we assume that ρ >
αA
1
α (1− α) 1−αα .
Equivalently to the main text, the voting problem has become one-dimensional. More-
over, preferences are single-peaked as U i is strictly concave in τ iH for τG = 1−α.13 Thus,
the median voter theorem can be applied and the actual policy mix involves
τ ∗G = 1− α and τ ∗H =
(1− φm)
[
ρ− αA 1α (1− α) 1−αα
]
A
1
α (1− α) 1−αα φmσ
, (4.73)
where φm denotes the support ratio of the median household. The corresponding steady-
state growth rate of household and economy-wide variables is γ∗ ≡ γ(τ ∗G, τ ∗H).
Finally, it is straightforward to verify that population aging, i. e., a decline in the median
voter’s support ratio has the following steady-state effects
dτ ∗H
dφm
< 0,
dτ ∗G
dφm
= 0, and
dγ∗
dφm
> 0,
thereby confirming the results of Corollary 4.1.
13A proof of this is available upon request.
Chapter 5
Population Aging, the Composition
of Government Spending,
and Economic Growth in the
Politico-Economic Equilibrium
of a Simple OLG Economy
5.1 Introduction
Population aging, i. e., the shift in the distribution of a country’s population towards
older ages, is one of the most important demographic phenomena of our time. It will
neither be confined to the West nor to industrialized economies. Table 5.1 presents
actual data and forecasts of the old-age dependency ratio for selected countries and
regions based on data from the United Nations.1 Roughly speaking, between 2005 and
2050 this ratio is forecasted to double in Europe and Northern America. In Japan, India,
Brazil, and Chile its estimated increase is even greater.
1Table 5.1 is based on the data that appear as the ‘medium variant’ prediction in United Nations
(2008). The old-age dependency ratio is the ratio of the population aged 65 or over to the population
aged 15−64. The ratio is stated as the number of dependents per 100 persons of working age (15−64).
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Table 5.1: Old-Age Dependency Ratios in Selected Countries and Regions.
Year Europe Northern Japan India Brazil Chile
America
2005 23 19 30 7 9 12
2050 47 36 74 20 36 36
Population aging is likely to alter the distribution of preferences and the support for
different types of government spending, thereby affecting economic growth. A typical
concern raised in the public debate is that rising old-age dependency ratios lead to
growing tax burdens and increased spending on the elderly, e. g., on health and care ser-
vice, which crowds out public investment spending and has negative effects on economic
growth. Recent evidence suggests that the concerns with respect to public spending are
partly justified. In the United States, for example, the allocation of expenditure is highly
skewed towards older members (see, e. g., Rogers et al., 2000; Iqbal and Turnovsky, 2008)
and since 1959 public spending on the elderly has grown much faster than other cate-
gories of public expenditure (Mulligan and Sala-´ı-Martin, 1999). Poterba (1997) finds
that a similar pattern holds in other OECD countries. Moreover, U.S. federal public
spending on infrastructure declined from 5% to 2.5% of GDP over the time period from
1960 to the mid-1990’s. However, total productive government spending on infrastruc-
ture, educational institutions, and R&D remained stable at 10% of GDP over the same
time period (CBO, 1998).
In this chapter, we introduce a democratic voting process into a simple two-period over-
lapping generations model with endogenous growth a` la Barro (1990) in order to analyze
how population aging, i. e., an increase in the old-age dependency ratio, endogenously
changes the composition of government spending and long-term economic growth.
We focus on two public spending categories: productive government expenditure (e. g.,
on infrastructure, education, or law and order) that increases private production possi-
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bilities and (unproductive) public consumption spending that only benefits the elderly
(e. g., on health and care services or public infrastructure for the elderly). To finance
its expenditure the government levies a uniform, proportional tax on labor and capital
income. We solve for the politico-economic equilibrium in which government policy is
set each period through voting by rational, forward-looking agents. In particular, voters
take into account that current policy choices influence the evolution of the economy and
future policies.
As government policy choices are of differing concern to the young and the old, they
disagree on which policy mix they prefer to be implemented. We model the resolution of
the resulting political conflict under the assumption of probabilistic voting. In contrast
to the median voter model, the probabilistic voting model assures that policy propos-
als represent the interests of both groups of society, reflecting the political process in
representative democracies more realistically.
Since elections take place each period, policy makers cannot commit to future policy
choices. Therefore, voters have to form expectations about future policy outcomes. We
focus on Markov perfect equilibria, i. e., equilibria in which the policy choices expected
for a certain period depend only on the value of the fundamental state variable at that
time.2
Under standard functional form assumptions, we are able to determine the politico-
economic equilibrium and the implications of population aging in closed form. (This is in
contrast to most of the literature that has to resort to numerical methods to characterize
the politico-economic equilibrium. When we relax the functional form assumptions, and
thus have to use numerical examples, the qualitative results turn out to be robust.)
We find that in the politico-economic equilibrium both types of government expenditure
are chosen as constant shares of output and all variables in per capita terms grow at the
same constant rate. The equilibrium share of output devoted to productive purposes
corresponds to the exogenous output elasticity of productive public expenditure. In
other words, it does not depend on preferences or demographic parameters, and thus
is not affected by any form of population aging. By contrast, the equilibrium share of
2For a discussion of Markov perfect equilibria in the context of endogenous dynamic fiscal policy
see, for instance, Krusell et al. (1997).
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public spending on the elderly balances the interests of the old who support this type of
spending as long as its benefits outweigh its tax costs and those of the young taxpayers
who as net contributors oppose this form of public spending.
Voters internalize only those effects of government policy that materialize during their
lifetimes; negative consequences borne by subsequent cohorts (due to higher overall taxes
and lower capital accumulation) are not taken into account. By contrast, a benevolent
planner with “dynastic” welfare weights (i. e., with welfare weights reflecting the house-
holds’ discount factor and cohort sizes) also considers the effects on future households.
Therefore, the share of public consumption spending on the elderly implemented by such
a planner tends to be smaller than the corresponding share in the politico-economic equi-
librium.
Population aging in our framework occurs either due to a decline in the population
growth rate or due to an increase in life expectancy. Both phenomena increase the old-
age dependency ratio and the relative weight that the political process attaches to the
interests of the old relative to the young voters. The model predicts an increase in the
old-age dependency ratio to be associated with (i) higher public consumption spending
on the elderly (as a share of output), (ii) unchanged public productive expenditure (as
a share of output), and (iii) a higher distortionary income tax rate. The latter has a
negative effect on the economy’s growth rate of per capita variables.
However, population aging not only affects economic growth indirectly via the compo-
sition and financing of government spending, but also has a direct effect on economic
growth. For a given policy mix, an increase in the old-age dependency ratio accelerates
economic growth. If the increase in the old-age dependency ratio follows a slowdown in
the population growth rate this result is due to reduced capital dilution. In the case of
a higher life expectancy the positive growth effect results from an increase in precau-
tionary savings. The same channels are at work in any AK-type OLG growth model.
In this chapter, we evaluate whether a positive growth bias of population aging persists
when an increasing fraction of elderly prefers higher public consumption spending and
less economic growth. We find that in both scenarios the direct effect dominates the
indirect effect such that population aging overall increases the economy’s growth rate of
per capita variables.
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This chapter relates and contributes to at least two strands of the literature. First, it
makes a contribution to the recent politico-economic literature on dynamic fiscal policy
where rational, forward-looking agents vote repeatedly on the level and financing of dif-
ferent types of government spending. Recent contributions that analyze how population
aging endogenously affects government spending include Bassetto (2008), Gonzalez-Eiras
and Niepelt (2008), and Song et al. (2009).3 Hitherto, this literature has not considered
a public policy mix that involves productive government expenditure and public con-
sumption spending that only benefits the elderly. Moreover, the above mentioned papers
do not consider an endogenous economic growth framework such that they cannot study
the effect of demographic change on long-term economic growth. To the best of our
knowledge, the only exception is Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2007) who quantitatively
analyze the effect of population aging on public spending for education, public transfers
between workers and retirees, and endogenous productivity growth in a three-period
overlapping generations model with human and physical capital accumulation. In their
framework, population aging induces a reallocation of public resources from education
spending to retirement benefits, which has a negative growth effect. Similar to our re-
sults, they also find that reduced capital dilution more than outweighs this effect and
that the long-term growth rate overall increases.
Second, this chapter complements the theoretical literature on the causal effect of popu-
lation aging on long-term economic growth in models with overlapping generations and
endogenous economic growth. Most contributions in this strand of the literature find this
effect to be positive.4 It results, for instance, from the following channels: (i) reduced
capital dilution due to a slowdown in population growth (see, e. g., Gonzalez-Eiras and
Niepelt, 2007), (ii) changes in individual saving behavior because of a longer expected
lifetime (see, e. g., Futagami and Nakajima, 2001), (iii) more investment in innovations
that increase labor productivity because a smaller labor force makes the input factor
labor more expensive (see, e. g., Heer and Irmen, 2008), (iv) more private investments
into new technologies as they are more likely to pay off when the individual time horizon
3See, e. g., Hassler et al. (2007, 2005) or Krusell and R´ıos-Rull (1999) for insights about the politico-
economic determination of taxes, transfers, and/or public consumption spending in environments where
agents are heterogeneous in human capital and earnings. However, these papers do not consider the
role of population aging.
4By contrast, Irmen (2009) finds that in the presence of capital-saving technical change population
aging does not affect the economy’s steady-state growth rate.
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expands (see, e. g., Prettner, 2009). In the present chapter, either channel (i) or (ii) is at
work. Additionally, a new channel operates in the opposite direction: population aging
by shifting political power from the young to the old leads to an increased demand for
public consumption spending and a slowdown of economic growth.5
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 describes the model
and characterizes the allocation conditional on policy. Section 5.3 describes the political
decision-making process and establishes the politico-economic equilibrium. The alloca-
tion chosen by a Ramsey planner, who cares about all future generations, is studied
in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 analyzes how an increase in the old-age dependency ratio
affects the composition of government expenditure and economic growth in the politico-
economic equilibrium. While Section 5.5.1 considers a decline in the population growth
rate, Section 5.5.2 studies the case where the old-age dependency ratio increases because
of a higher life expectancy. Section 5.6 discusses and extends the analysis in two direc-
tions. First, in Section 5.6.1 the Markov perfect equilibrium of Section 5.3 is compared
to two other voting equilibria. Second, numerical examples in Section 5.6.2 suggest that
our main findings are robust to the use of two alternative utility functions. Section 5.7
concludes. Proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
5.2 The Economic Environment
Consider an overlapping generations economy in which non-altruistic agents live for two
periods: a working period and a retirement period.6 Individual labor supply when young
is inelastic and normalized to one. The size of generation t is denoted by Lt and grows at
the exogenous rate n > (−1). The population at any t thus consists of Lt young and Lt−1
5There are a few papers (see, e. g., Yakita, 2008; Dioikitopoulos, 2009) that examine the effect of
population aging on the growth-maximizing composition of government expenditure. However, in these
papers policy is not determined endogenously via a political process and thus does not reflect the
distribution of preferences.
6This can be considered the most conservative scenario. A setup with agents that are altruistic
towards future generations would represent an intermediate case between the framework presented in
this section and the Ramsey planner of Section 5.4. Thus, it can be expected that altruistic agents
would vote for a lower share of public consumption spending and a higher equilibrium growth rate than
in the politico-economic equilibrium of Proposition 5.1.
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old individuals.7 Note that n corresponds to the growth rate of the total population and
determines the old-age dependency ratio defined as Lt−1/Lt = (1 + n)−1. The economy
starts at time 0 with L−1 = 1.
5.2.1 Preferences
In the economy at each t there is one private good and one public (consumption) good.
The private good delivers utility to the agents when young and when old, whereas
the public consumption good only benefits the old agents. For concreteness, one may
think of this public good involving publicly-provided health and care services or public
infrastructure for the elderly.
The preferences of an individual born at t are described by the following log-linear utility
function8
ln cyt + β
(
ln cot+1 + b ln h˜t+1
)
, (5.1)
where cyt and c
o
t+1 are consumption of the private good of a member of generation t when
young and old, respectively, and h˜t+1 is the level of provision of the public good per old
agent at t+1, i. e., h˜t+1 ≡ Ht+1/Lt, where Ht+1 denotes aggregate spending on the public
consumption good at t+ 1. The fact that h˜t+1 and not Ht+1 enters the utility function
implies that there is congestion in the public consumption good.9 Moreover, β ∈ (0, 1)
denotes the discount factor and b > 0 measures the weight an old agent assigns to the
public relative to the private consumption good.
7In the following sections we focus on a deterministic life time. Only in Section 5.5.2 we reinter-
pret and extend the setup of Section 5.2 to incorporate an uncertain life time and the concept of life
expectancy.
8The choice of logarithmic utility guarantees analytical tractability, but does not affect the qualitative
findings. We return to this point in Section 5.6.2, where the results from the logarithmic utility case
are compared to those of (i) a utility function with a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution
different from unity and (ii) non-separable preferences.
9In other words, this type of government activity has the character of a utility-enhancing transfer
to the old that is not excludable, but rival. Alternatively, we could assume that public consumption
spending enters the utility function as a pure public good. The main difference of this modeling approach
concerns the long-term effect of population aging on the level of services derived by each old agent from
public consumption spending. See Section 5.5.1, for a more detailed discussion.
CHAPTER 5. POPULATION AGING: OLG MODEL 135
5.2.2 Technology
At each t, the private good is produced by competitive firms operating a technology
that uses capital Kt procured by the old, labor Lt supplied by the young, as well as
a productivity-enhancing input Gt provided by the government. One may think of
G as government expenditure on infrastructure, education, or law and order. More
specifically, we assume that total output of the private good at t, Yt, is manufactured
according to
Yt = AK
α
t (gtLt)
1−α , 0 < α < 1, (5.2)
where A > 0 denotes the time-invariant total factor productivity and gt ≡ Gt/Lt is the
productive public input per worker at t. Thus, there is also congestion in the productive
public input.10 Given the length of the considered period (one generation) it is assumed
that capital fully depreciates after each use.
Let yt ≡ Yt/Lt and kt ≡ Kt/Lt denote output and capital per worker, respectively.
Then, we obtain output per worker from (5.2) as
yt = Ak
α
t g
1−α
t . (5.3)
The initial capital stock per worker is given by k0 > 0.
Note that the technology displays diminishing returns in private capital, but constant
returns to scale in private capital and the productive public input. Thus, if g rises with
k the diminishing returns to the accumulation of capital do not set in. For this reason,
the economy will exhibit endogenous steady-state growth.
At any time t, the private good can either be consumed, saved as capital for the next
period, or be converted one-to-one into units of Ht and Gt. We take the private good
produced at each period t as the numeraire.
10The congestion specification assures the existence of a politico-economic equilibrium and a balanced
growth path. By contrast, if G were a pure public good, then the interest rate in the politico-economic
equilibrium would depend on the aggregate labor supply (see Section 2.3.1 of this dissertation for a more
detailed discussion), which in our framework grows over time. However, for an endogenous balanced
growth path to exist, the equilibrium interest rate has to be constant. The Barro (1990) literature that
uses a pure public good specification avoids this problem by assuming a stationary population.
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5.2.3 Government Policy
In each period, the government raises tax revenues and uses the proceeds to purchase
private consumption goods to be converted into the public consumption good and the
public productive input. Specifically, the government at each t levies a proportional tax
τt ∈ [0, 1] on labor income of the young and capital income of the old. The government
cannot issue age-dependent taxes and the government’s budget is assumed to balance
in each period t, i. e., Gt + Ht = τt (wtLt +RtKt), where wt is the pre-tax wage rate at
time t and Rt is the rental rate of capital at time t.
Then, the government’s budget constraint in per worker terms is given by
gt + ht = τt (wt +Rtkt) , (5.4)
where ht ≡ Ht/Lt = h˜t/(1 + n) is the level of the public consumption good per worker
at t. As ht is proportional to h˜t and n is exogenous, we focus - for notational simplicity
- on the policy mix (gt, ht).
Then, a feasible government policy at t is a vector (gt, ht) ∈ R2+ such that (5.4) holds
and τt ∈ [0, 1].
5.2.4 Timing
Within each period t the timing of events is as follows: At the beginning of the period,
after a new generation of young people has been born, all individuals (the young and the
old) democratically elect a political candidate who chooses current policy. When decid-
ing which candidate to support, voters anticipate how each candidate’s policy platform
would affect subsequent economic and political decisions. Then, firms hire workers and
rent capital to produce. The policy vector and the resulting income tax rate together
with the wage rate and the rental rate of capital determine the consumption of the old
and the disposable income of the young. The young then choose how much to consume
and how much to save as capital for the next period. Finally, the old generation dies,
while the young generation ages and becomes old in the next period.
In order to solve for the equilibrium we proceed by backward induction. We start
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in Section 5.2.5 by analyzing the economic choices of households and firms subject to
exogenously given (prices and) government policy. We refer to the allocation that results
at time t for a given policy mix as the economic equilibrium.11 Section 5.3 then considers
the political determination of policy.
5.2.5 Economic Equilibrium
In an economic equilibrium, each household maximizes her lifetime utility given by
(5.1) taking factor prices and the benefits from the public consumption good as given.
Each individual that is born at time t ≥ 0 faces the per-period budget constraints
cyt + st ≤ (1− τt)wt and cot+1 ≤ st (1− τt+1)Rt+1, where st denotes savings at t.
The optimal choices of a member of cohort t are then given by
cyt =
1
1 + β
(1− τt)wt, (5.5)
cot+1 =
β
1 + β
(1− τt)wt (1− τt+1)Rt+1, (5.6)
st =
β
1 + β
(1− τt)wt. (5.7)
Note that optimal saving of a young agent at t, given by (5.7), does neither depend on
the population growth rate nor on future fiscal policy.12
Moreover, in an economic equilibrium each firm maximizes its profits taking factor prices
and the level of provision of the productive public input as given. Thus, the firms’ profit
maximization problem determines the rental rate of capital and the pre-tax wage rate
as
Rt = α
yt
kt
and wt = (1− α) yt, (5.8)
respectively, where yt is given by (5.3). Due to constant returns to scale in private inputs
the firm sector makes zero profits, i. e., Yt = wtLt +RtKt. This in turn implies that the
11This is the term used in the politico-economic literature, see, e. g., Persson and Tabellini (2000,
p.271). The economic equilibrium corresponds to what the growth literature calls a “temporary equi-
librium”, see, e. g., de la Croix and Michel (2002, p. 16).
12The latter independence is a direct consequence of the logarithmic utility and greatly simplifies the
analysis. We relax this restriction in the numerical sensitivity analysis of Section 5.6.2.
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government budget constraint (5.4) may be written as
gt + ht = τtyt. (5.9)
For the capital market to clear it has to hold at all t that
Kt+1 = stLt, (5.10)
i. e., the aggregate capital stock in period t+1 corresponds to aggregate saving in period t.
Combining conditions (5.5) - (5.10), the equilibrium allocation in t can be expressed in
terms of government policy and the capital stock per worker
cyt =
1− α
1 + β
(
Akαt g
1−α
t − gt − ht
)
, (5.11)
cot = α(1 + n)
(
Akαt g
1−α
t − gt − ht
)
, (5.12)
kt+1 =
st
1 + n
=
B˜
1 + n
(
Akαt g
1−α
t − gt − ht
) ≡ pik(gt, ht, kt), (5.13)
where B˜ ≡ β (1− α) /(1 + β).13
The function pik(·) is the economic equilibrium condition that describes how young agents
optimally choose their savings and thus determine the next period’s capital stock per
worker for given gt, ht, and kt. Equation (5.13) also reveals how the composition and
financing of government spending affects capital accumulation. First, the income tax
financing of both types of public expenditure has a negative effect on the accumulation
of capital (negative terms in brackets). Second, gt has an additional positive effect on
the accumulation of capital by raising the productivity of private capital.
In an economic equilibrium, the indirect utility of a young and an old agent alive at t,
respectively, can be expressed as functions of government policy and the capital stock
per worker:
UYt = ln c
y
t + β
(
ln cot+1 + b ln h˜t+1
)
= ln
(
Akαt g
1−α
t − gt − ht
)
+β ln
(
Akαt+1g
1−α
t+1 − gt+1 − ht+1
)
+ βb lnht+1 + t.i.p., (5.14)
UOt = ln c
o
t + b ln h˜t = ln
(
Akαt g
1−α
t − gt − ht
)
+ b lnht + t.i.p., (5.15)
s.t. kt+1 = pi
k(gt, ht, kt). Here, t.i.p. denotes terms independent of the policy choice.
13Note that the above equilibrium conditions imply that the market for the private good clears at all
t, i. e., Ltc
y
t + Lt−1c
o
t +Kt+1 +Gt +Ht = Yt.
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5.3 Politico-Economic Equilibrium
In the politico-economic equilibrium, the government policy mix (gt, ht) is chosen through
voting at the beginning of each period t. Electoral competition is modeled under the
assumption of probabilistic voting. As elections take place each period, policy makers
cannot commit to future policy choices. Therefore, voters have to form expectations
about future policy outcomes. In order to limit the set of potential equilibria, we re-
strict attention to Markov perfect equilibria, i. e., equilibria in which the policy choices
expected for a certain period depend only on the value of the fundamental state variables
expected at that time, and not on the past history of policies or artificial state variables
sustaining trigger strategy equilibria.14 In the present setup, the only state variable is
the level of the private capital stock per worker; it affects future wages and returns, and
therefore income of future voters.15
5.3.1 Probabilistic Voting
The political process is represented via a two-candidate probabilistic voting model. In
this model agents cast their votes on one of two candidates, who maximize their proba-
bility of becoming elected. Voters support a candidate not only for her policy platform,
but also for other characteristics like “ideology” that are orthogonal to the fundamen-
tal policy dimensions of interest. The evaluation of these features differs across voters
and is subject to random aggregate shocks, realized after candidates have chosen their
platforms.16
In a probabilistic-voting Nash equilibrium, two candidates maximizing their respective
vote shares both propose the same policy platform and each of them has a 50 % probabil-
14This assumption rules out equilibria that rely on reputation mechanisms, see, e. g., Chari and Kehoe
(1990), Kotlikoff et al. (1988), or for a concise discussion Persson and Tabellini (2000, p.314-317), and
allows to identify the fundamental forces that shape the policy mix of interest.
15Note that the population growth rate n as well as life expectancy in Section 5.5.2, i. e., the variables
that determine the old-age dependency ratio, will affect the actual policy choice. However, in their
decision-making process all agents treat these variables as exogenous.
16For a more detailed discussion of the probabilistic voting model, see Lindbeck and Weibull (1987)
or Persson and Tabellini (2000).
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ity of winning. The proposed policy platform maximizes a “political objective function”
which is a weighted average utility of all voters, with the weights reflecting the group size
and the sensitivity of voting behavior to policy changes. Groups that have a low concern
for the orthogonal policy dimension have more political influence since they are more
likely to alter their support in response to small changes in the proposed platform. In
other words, these groups of “swing voters” are more attractive to power-seeking candi-
dates and exert a stronger influence on the equilibrium policy outcome. Formalizing the
foregoing discussion, we assume that the “political” aggregation of different preferences
is summarized by the following political objective function
Ut = (1 + n)U
Y
t + ωU
O
t , (5.16)
where UYt and U
O
t are given by (5.14) and (5.15), respectively, ω > 0 represents the per-
capita political weight of the old relative to the young, and (1 + n) the relative group
size of the young compared to the old. Thus, the political objective function (5.16) to be
maximized in the political process attaches a positive weight to the welfare of the elderly,
even if the median voter is a young agent. This appears to be a realistic implication. In
fact, it is often argued that the old are more policy-focused, i. e., care less about ideology
and have more swing voters, and thus even exert a stronger political influence per capita
than the young (see e. g., Rhodebeck (1993, p.357), Dixit and Londregan (1996, p.1144)
or Grossman and Helpman (1998, p.1309)). This case would correspond to an ω > 1.
Using the expressions for UYt and U
O
t , the political objective function obtains as
U (gt, ht, kt, gt+1, ht+1, kt+1) = (1 + n+ ω) ln
(
Akαt g
1−α
t − gt − ht
)
+ ωb lnht
+ (1 + n) β ln
(
Akαt+1g
1−α
t+1 − gt+1 − ht+1
)
+ (1 + n) βb lnht+1
subject to kt+1 = pi
k(gt, ht, kt).
5.3.2 Definition of the Politico-Economic Equilibrium
As mentioned above, we look for Markov perfect equilibria, i. e., for equilibria in which
the policy choices are functions only of the level of private capital per worker in the
economy. The dynamic aspect of the voting game stems from the fact that current
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policy affects capital accumulation, and thus income and the strategic position of the
currently young in the next period. Agents are assumed to be fully forward-looking.
Thus, when voting over today’s policy, young agents correctly anticipate how future
policy will depend on current policy via the state of the economy.
Definition 5.1. The Politico-Economic Equilibrium is defined as a pair of functions〈
pig, pih
〉
, where pig and pih are public policy rules, gt = pi
g (kt) and ht = pi
h (kt), such
that the following functional equation holds:
〈
pig (kt) , pi
h (kt)
〉
= arg max{gt,ht} U (gt, ht, kt, gt+1, ht+1, kt+1), subject to
kt given,
kt+1 = pi
k (gt,ht, kt) ,
gt+1 = pi
g (kt+1) = pi
g
(
pik (gt,ht, kt)
)
,
ht+1 = pi
h (kt+1) = pi
h
(
pik (gt,ht, kt)
)
.
The equilibrium condition requires the political mechanism in t to choose gt and ht to
maximize the political objective function U , for a given kt, taking into account that
future government policies, gt+1 and ht+1, depend on the current policy mix (gt, ht) via
the state of economy, kt+1, as described by the economic equilibrium decision rule pi
k.
Moreover, the above definition of the politico-economic equilibrium has the usual fixed
point structure induced by a rational expectations equilibrium: the anticipated policy
functions coincide with the optimal ones. In other words, suppose that agents believe
future government policy to be set according to gt+1 = pi
g (kt+1) and ht+1 = pi
h (kt+1).
Then, we require that the same functions gt = pi
g (kt) and ht = pi
h (kt) define optimal
spending today.
5.3.3 Solving for the Politico-Economic Equilibrium
To solve for the politico-economic equilibrium we need to find two functions pig and pih
satisfying Definition 5.1. Guided by the fact that government expenditure is financed
by a proportional tax on income, we conjecture that pig and pih are linear functions in
the capital stock. Specifically, we make the following guess for future policy variables:
pig (kt+1) = η
gkt+1 and pi
h (kt+1) = η
hkt+1, with some yet undetermined coefficients η
g
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and ηh.17 We derive the equilibrium choice of government policy in period t under this
conjecture and show that the spending shares in t are indeed linear in the capital stock,
thereby verifying the conjecture.
First of all, note that with this guess the production function (5.3) at t+1 becomes linear
in the capital stock yt+1 = A (η
g)1−α kt+1 and we can write Akαt+1g
1−α
t+1 − gt+1 − ht+1 =(
A(ηg)1−α − ηg − ηh) kt+1.
Using these results and omitting terms independent of the policy choice, the program
characterizing equilibrium policy choices in period t can be expressed as
max
{gt,ht}
U¯(gt, ht, kt) s.t. kt given, where
U¯(gt, ht, kt) ≡ [(1 + n) (1 + β (1 + b)) + ω] ln
(
Akαt g
1−α
t − gt − ht
)
+ ωb lnht.
(5.17)
After some algebra, the first-order conditions of the program (5.17) with respect to gt
and ht yield
gt = (1− α)yt and ht = αωb
(1 + n) (1 + β (1 + b)) + ω (1 + b)
yt, (5.18)
where yt = A (η
g)1−α kt. (5.19)
Equations (5.18) and (5.19) verify the tentative guess as a fixed point of the functional
equation of Definition 5.1 if ηg = (A (1− α))1/α and
ηh = αωb [(1 + n) (1 + β (1 + b)) + ω (1 + b)]−1A1/α (1− α)(1−α)/α, which allow us to es-
tablish the following proposition.
Proposition 5.1. The politico-economic equilibrium is characterized as follows:
pig (kt) = (1− α) yt and pih (kt) = τPh yt,
with yt = A
1
α (1− α) 1−αα kt
and α > τPh ≡ αωb [(1 + n) (1 + β (1 + b)) + ω (1 + b)]−1 > 0 such that 0 < τ = 1− α +
τPh < 1 for all t.
17Note that the above decision problem is a stationary Markov decision problem because the problem
facing voters looks the same (contingent on the state) at each t. Moreover, note that guessing a policy
function that does not depend on time per se is not the same as imposing ex-ante that the expenditure
has to be a constant fraction of the capital stock. For details on this see Section 5.6.1.1.
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Moreover, the equilibrium growth factor of the capital stock per worker, γt+1 ≡ kt+1/kt,
is constant and given by
γt+1 =
B
1 + n
(
α− τPh
) ≡ γ, (5.20)
with B ≡ A 1α (1− α) 1−αα B˜. The economy immediately settles on its steady-state path
on which the economy’s relevant variables such as per capita consumption, per capita
output, the per capita capital stock, government spending as well as wages all grow at
the same constant rate γ − 1.
According to Proposition 5.1, under rational voting both types of government expendi-
ture are chosen as constant shares of output. The equilibrium share of output devoted
to the productive public input corresponds to 1−α, which is the output elasticity of the
productive public input. Thus, productive government expenditure satisfies the so-called
natural condition of productive efficiency, i. e., the marginal contribution of government
expenditure to aggregate output is one (see, e.g., Barro, 1990). In the present context, as
aggregate output is Y = AKαG1−α, we have dY/dG = (1−α)(Y/G) = (1−α)(y/g) = 1.
This also implies that the young and the old prefer the same share of output devoted
to productive purposes. In other words, there is no conflict about this type of public
spending. The reason for this is that gt symmetrically affects the labor income of the
young and the capital income of the old.
The equilibrium share of output spent on the public consumption good benefiting the
old is given by τPh and depends on preferences, technology, and demographic parame-
ters. Intuitively, it balances the interests of the elderly who support public consumption
spending as long as the related benefits outweigh the tax costs and those of the young
taxpayers who oppose this form of spending as they are net contributors to the system.
This reflects the intergenerational conflict more realistically than what would be observed
under simple majority voting. For instance, assume that the median voter is a young
agent.18 Then, if we anticipate that all agents will prefer the same share of productive
government spending such that the voting problem becomes one-dimensional, we find
that the median voter would set public consumption spending on the old equal to zero.
In our probabilistic voting setup, τPh = 0 could only occur if the old had no political
18In a two-period OLG model there are always more young people than old as long as n > 0.
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influence at all (i. e., if ω = 0) or if they did not care about the public consumption good
(i. e., if b = 0).19
The equilibrium income tax rate corresponds to the sum of the two public expenditure
shares and turns out to be strictly smaller than one such that the equilibrium policy
mix is feasible. Moreover, note that the income tax rate in equilibrium is time-invariant.
In other words, it is independent of the economy’s endogenous state variable, i. e., the
capital stock per worker. Nevertheless, the equilibrium tax rate will be affected by
population aging because it depends on demographic parameters.
Finally, Proposition 5.1 reveals that in the politico-economic equilibrium the economy’s
relevant variables in per capita terms grow at the same constant rate given by γ − 1.
There is no guarantee that this rate is positive for all parameter combinations. However,
a positive steady-state growth rate can be assured if we assume that the economy is
sufficiently productive, i. e., if A is large enough.
The following corollary verifies that the Markov perfect equilibrium derived above is the
limit of a unique finite-horizon equilibrium.20
Corollary 5.1. The equilibrium policy functions gt = (1−α)yt and ht = τPh yt of Propo-
sition 5.1 represent the unique equilibrium policy mix in (the limit of) the corresponding
finite-horizon economy. In the last period, the policy function for ht is different, but also
unique.
5.4 The Ramsey Allocation
This section compares the politico-economic equilibrium with the Ramsey allocation
chosen by a benevolent planner who has the ability to commit to all its future policy
choices at the beginning of time, but is constrained by the same economic equilibrium
conditions.
Specifically, we consider the Ramsey solution in the case where the planner’s weight on
19In this chapter we abstract from these polar cases.
20This allows us to rule out potential reputation-like equilibria that can only be supported if the
horizon is infinite.
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generation t ≥ 0 is βt+1(1+n)t+1, i. e., the planner’s weights on future generations reflect
the discount factor of households as well as the cohort size (“dynastic discounting”).21
The planner’s decision problem is therefore to choose the sequence {gt, ht}∞t=0 in order
to maximize
W (k0, {gt, ht}∞t=0) ≡ βUO0 +
∞∑
t=0
(β (1 + n))t+1 UYt
subject to (5.13)− (5.15) and k0 given. (5.21)
In the following we assume that β(1 + n) < 1 such that the planner’s objective function
W is finite.
The main difference to the program solved by the political candidates is that the Ramsey
program (5.21) involves the choice of an entire sequence of policy mixes. Moreover, the
Ramsey planner values the welfare of all households, not only of those currently alive
and voting.
In order to solve for the Ramsey allocation it is helpful to first establish the following
lemma.
Lemma 5.1. The Ramsey program (5.21) is equivalent to the following recursive pro-
gram:
V (kt) = max{gt,ht,kt+1}
{Tt (gt, ht, kt) + (1 + n) βV (kt+1)} for t ≥ 0, (5.22)
subject to (5.13), where Tt (gt, ht, kt) ≡ β (2 + n) ln
(
Akαt g
1−α
t − gt − ht
)
+ βb lnht.
The fact that the planner’s problem admits the standard recursive formulation of Lemma
5.1 reveals that its solution is time consistent. Intuitively, the generational weights (in
the case of dynastic discounting) are such that the Ramsey plan is dynamically consistent
(see, e. g., Heijdra, 2009, p.656-658).
The following proposition summarizes the solution of the Ramsey problem.
Proposition 5.2. Let β(1 + n) < 1. Then, the solution of the Ramsey program (5.21)
involves for t ≥ 0
gt = (1− α) yt and ht = τRh yt,
21See, e. g., Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2008) for a discussion.
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where yt = A
1/α (1− α)(1−α)/α kt and 0 < τRh ≡ αb (1− (1 + n)β) (2 + n+ b)−1 < α.
Moreover, gt, ht, yt and kt grow at the same constant rate determined by (5.13).
Proposition 5.2 reveals that the Ramsey planner sets the levels of both types of govern-
ment expenditure proportional to output. He chooses the same share of output, namely
1 − α, to be devoted to the productive public input as in the politico-economic equi-
librium. The optimal share of output spent on the public consumption good benefiting
the old is given by τRh and depends again on preferences, technology, and demographic
parameters. The following corollary compares τRh to τ
P
h of the politico-economic equi-
librium.
Corollary 5.2. It holds that
τRh ≤ τPh ⇔ ω ≥ 1− β(1 + n).
Corollary 5.2 shows that the share of public spending on the elderly chosen by the Ram-
sey planner falls short of the corresponding share in the politico-economic equilibrium
whenever ω or β (1 + n) are sufficiently large. For instance, this is the case for any
ω ≥ 1, i. e., if the old have at least the same per capita political weight as the young.
The intuition for τRh < τ
P
h is that voters in their optimization problem only consider
the effects of their policy choice that materialize during their lifetimes. Negative conse-
quences borne by subsequent generations due higher taxes and lower capital accumula-
tion are not taken into account. By contrast, the Ramsey planner internalizes the effects
of policy on all current and future households.
5.5 Implications of Population Aging
5.5.1 Declining Population Growth
This section studies the effect of a permanent decline in the population growth rate n on
government policy and economic growth in the politico-economic equilibrium. A decline
in n causes a rise in the old-age dependency ratio (1 + n)−1. Increases in the latter are
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meant to capture the tendencies shown in Table 5.1. The decline in n materializes at
the beginning of the period (see Section 5.2.4) and is then taken into account by all
agents alive in that period. Note that it does not affect the results whether or not the
decline in n is anticipated by the generation born in the previous period as their savings
decision is independent of n (see equation 5.7).
In the politico-economic equilibrium of Proposition 5.1 the economy at all t grows at
the constant rate γ − 1 given by (5.20). Recall that there are no transitional dynamics
in the economy. Denote τg the fraction of current output devoted to productive public
services, i. e., τg = gt/yt = 1 − α. Then, the results of the comparative static analysis
described above can be summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 5.3.
1. If ω 6= (1 + n), then it holds that
dτPh
dn
< 0,
dτg
dn
= 0, and
dτ
dn
< 0.
2. It holds that
dγ
dn
< 0.
The first statement of Corollary 5.3 reveals that an increase in the old-age dependency
ratio (due to a decline in n) raises τPh , i. e., the fraction of output used for the provision
of public services that benefit the old. The reason is that a decline in n reduces the
share of young agents relative to old agents in the population, and thus their weight in
the political objective function (5.16). Intuitively, the old prefer greater spending on the
public consumption good than the young. In the non-generic case ω = 1 + n, i. e., when
both groups have exactly the same weight in the political objective function, τPh does not
depend on n. The share of output devoted to the productive public input corresponds to
1−α, and is thus always independent of the population growth rate. Overall, the income
tax rate, τ , which is levied on households to finance government expenditure, has to
increase in the politico-economic equilibrium. Statement 1 of Corollary 5.3 also implies
that population aging increases the share of public consumptive expenditure in total
government expenditure, i. e., τPh /τ , and decreases the share of productive government
expenditure in total government expenditure given by (1− α)/τ .
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According to the second statement of Corollary 5.3, an increase in the old-age depen-
dency ratio leads to a higher equilibrium growth rate of per capita variables. This is the
result of two opposing forces. On the one hand, reduced labor force growth weakens the
effect of capital dilution, i. e., a given amount of capital implies a higher capital stock per
worker at each t and a rise in the equilibrium growth rate of per capita variables. Intu-
itively, a lower n reduces the break-even investment, the amount of investment necessary
for k to grow at a constant rate, without affecting saving at any given level of capital.22
On the other hand, there is a negative, indirect tax effect via τPh . As discussed in the
previous paragraph, an increase in the old-age dependency ratio raises spending for the
public consumption good, and thus taxes. Since taxes are levied on capital and labor
income, they reduce the incentive to save and to accumulate capital, and hence have a
negative effect on the steady-state growth rate. The point of the second statement of
Corollary 5.3 is that the former effect dominates the latter. Therefore, population aging
accelerates the economy’s growth rate of per capita variables.
Finally, Corollary 5.3 implies that an increase in the old-age dependency ratio in the
long run raises the benefits derived by each old agent from aggregate public consumption
spending. To see this note that h˜t is given by
h˜t = (1 + n)ht = (1 + n)τ
P
h yt = (1 + n)τ
P
h y0e
(γ−1)t. (5.23)
From the definition of τPh in Proposition 5.1 one readily verifies that (1+n)τ
P
h y0 declines
if n decreases. Thus, the level of benefits per old initially falls, but then grows at a higher
rate (as dγ/dn < 0) and at some point reaches a higher level than what would have be
attainable without a change in n.23 The initial decline is due to congestion effects;
intuitively, the benefits of the public consumption good have to be spread over more old
people.
22In the context of a conventional neoclassical growth model, Cutler et al. (1990) refer to this channel
as the “Solow effect”.
23By contrast, if aggregate public consumption spending H entered the utility function (5.1) as a
pure public good, then an increase in the old-age dependency ratio would lower the level of H in the
long run. To see this note that in this case the level of public consumption services would be given
by Ht = τ
P
h Yt = τ
P
h Y0e
gKt, where gK = B(α − τPh ) − 1 corresponds to the growth rate of aggregate
variables. As dτPh /dn < 0 and dgK/dτ
P
h < 0, a decline in n thus implies that Ht initially increases, but
then grows at a lower rate. Therefore, population aging here leads to an increase in taxes and at the
same time to a decline in the long-term provision of H. The reason for this is that the tax base is lower
at all t.
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5.5.2 Increasing Life Expectancy
In the previous section, we studied population aging as a decline in the population
growth rate. With a slight reinterpretation of the analytical framework, we can also
analyze the effect of an increasing life expectancy on government policy and economic
growth.
For this purpose, suppose that each individual faces an exogenous probability of dying
at the end of its first period of life equal to (1−v) ∈ (0, 1). This implies that the old-age
dependency ratio at t becomes vLt−1/Lt and increases in v.
Let βv ∈ (0, 1) denote the pure discount factor, i. e., the discount factor that the individ-
ual would apply if he or she were sure to reach the retirement age. Moreover, normalize
the utility after death to zero. Then, we may interpret the utility function of (5.1) as
the expected utility of a member of generation t with β ≡ βvv as the effective discount
factor of the agent and with h˜t+1 ≡ Ht+1/vLt as the provision of the public consumption
good per surviving old agent.
Against the survival risk individuals may buy annuity assets with which they receive
insurance payments if they are alive and nothing if dead in the retirement period. As-
suming that the private annuity markets are perfectly competitive, insurance payments
are actuarially fair.
Finally, let ωv denote the pure per capita political weight of the old, i. e., the political
power the old would exert if all individuals survived. Then, the political objective
function remains given by (5.16) with ω ≡ ωvv as the effective political weight of the old
and the economy inherits the properties established in Proposition 5.1 and Corollary 5.1.
A permanent increase in life expectancy due to a permanent rise in the survival prob-
ability, v, increases the effective discount factor, β, and the effective political weight
of the old, ω. The following proposition summarizes the effects of such an increase on
government policy and the equilibrium growth rate.
Proposition 5.3. Consider an economy that at t = 1 experiences a small but permanent
increase in its life expectancy, i. e., vˆ > v for all generations t = 1, 2, 3, ...,∞. Assume
that this change is unexpected, i. e., it is anticipated by all generations t = 2, 3, ...,∞,
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but not by generation 1. Denote variables associated with an evolution under vˆ by a hat
such that the politico-economic equilibrium at t is characterized by τˆPht and γˆt+1.
Then, it holds that
τˆPh1 = τ
P
h , γˆ2 = γ, and
τˆPht = τˆ
P
h > τ
P
h , γˆt+1 = γˆ > γ for t = 2, 3, ...,∞.
Proposition 5.3 reveals that an increase in life expectancy increases the share of public
consumption spending and the equilibrium growth rate. Intuitively, a higher life ex-
pectancy increases savings per next period’s worker since the weight on the expected
old-age utility increases. This has a positive effect on capital accumulation and domi-
nates the negative tax effect that results from a greater political weight of the old.
However, contrary to the case of a permanent decline in the population growth rate,
this effect is delayed by one generation. The reason for this is that the increase in life
expectancy is unexpected, i. e., generation 1 makes its consumption and savings plan
anticipating an effective discount factor of β instead of βˆ.24
Arguably, this is a realistic assumption as expectations of one’s own life expectancy are
usually myopic, i. e., coincide with the actual life expectancy of the previous generation.
Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that the choice of s1 is made by the young agents
before the change in the survival probability is experienced.
Consequently, a permanent increase in life expectancy affects public spending and eco-
nomic growth in the same direction as a decline in the population growth rate, but with
a period delay.
24If the increase in life expectancy were anticipated by generation 1, then savings would already
increase in t = 1. However, the effective political weight of the elderly (ωvv) and the public policy
choice in t = 1 are not affected by an anticipated change in life expectancy. In t = 1, the young of
generation 1 and the old of generation 0, whose size is determined by the initial life expectancy v, vote
on government policy. Therefore, the equilibrium growth rate would first jump to a level γˆ2 > γˆ and
then from t = 2 onwards correspond to γˆ. For a more detailed discussion see the proof of Proposition 5.3
in the Appendix.
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5.6 Discussion and Extensions
This section discusses and extends the analysis in two directions. First, Section 5.6.1
compares the politico-economic equilibrium to two other voting equilibria. Second, Sec-
tion 5.6.2 presents numerical examples for two alternative preference specifications.
5.6.1 Other Voting Equilibria
In this section we compare the politico-economic equilibrium of Section 5.3 to (i) the
voting equilibrium that results when voters ex-ante are restricted to choose constant
policy paths and (ii) the myopic voting equilibrium.
5.6.1.1 Voting Equilibrium under Commitment to Constant Policy Paths
This section analyzes a voting equilibrium in which taxes and expenditure shares are
ex-ante restricted to a constant path. In other words, we assume that the political can-
didates in period t propose and fully commit to policies that set government expenditure
as the same constant fraction of output.
For this purpose, suppose that a feasible government policy is a vector (τ cg , τ
c
h) ∈ [0, 1]×
[0, 1] such that gt = τ
c
gyt, ht = τ
c
hyt and τ
c = (τ cg + τ
c
h) ∈ [0, 1]. Otherwise the economic
environment is identical to that of Section 5.2.
Then, following the same steps as in Section 5.2.5 the economic equilibrium in period t,
i. e., the allocation conditional on the policy mix (τ cg , τ
c
h) and for a given kt is characterized
by
cyt =
1− α
1 + β
(
1− τ cg − τ ch
)
yt, (5.24)
cot = α(1 + n)
(
1− τ cg − τ ch
)
yt, (5.25)
kt+1 =
B˜
1 + n
(
1− τ cg − τ ch
)
yt, (5.26)
with yt = A
1/α
(
τ cg
)(1−α)/α
kt.
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Using equations (5.24) - (5.26) and dropping terms independent of policy yields the
indirect utilities of a young and an old agent at t as
UYt ' [1 + β (2 + b)] ln
(
1− τ cg − τ ch
)
+ [1 + 2β (1 + b)]
1− α
α
ln τ cg
+ βb ln τ ch, (5.27)
and
UOt ' ln
(
1− τ cg − τ ch
)
+ (1 + b)
1− α
α
ln τ cg + b ln τ
c
h, (5.28)
respectively.
The political candidates in period t then choose (τ cg , τ
c
h) to maximize the political ob-
jective function (5.16) with UYt and U
O
t given by (5.27) and (5.28). The following
proposition establishes the equilibrium policy mix and the resulting economic growth
rate.
Proposition 5.4. The equilibrium policy mix under commitment to constant policy paths
is given by
τ cg = 1− α and τ ch =
((1 + n) β + ω)αb
(1 + n) (1 + 2β (1 + b)) + ω (1 + b)
< α. (5.29)
Under this policy mix, the economy’s growth factor of all per capita variables, government
spending and wages is given by
γc =
B
1 + n
(α− τ ch). (5.30)
Proposition 5.4 reveals that policy makers in this voting equilibrium also set the share of
output devoted to the productive public input equal to 1− α.25 The following corollary
concerns public consumption spending on the elderly.
Corollary 5.4. Comparing the share of output spent on the public consumption good for
the elderly, τ ch of (5.29), to the corresponding expenditure share in the politico-economic
equilibrium of Proposition 5.1 yields
τ ch > τ
P
h .
25In other words, they choose the same share as in the politico-economic equilibrium and as a Ramsey
planner.
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Thus, policy makers that commit to a constant tax path will opt for a higher share
of public consumption spending in output than in the politico-economic equilibrium
without commitment. Intuitively, when voting on government policy today the current
young are aware that they decide about the expenditure share for public good provision
that benefits them tomorrow. Hence, they choose a higher share of output to be spent
on these services than in the politico-economic equilibrium.
The implications of population aging on the voting equilibrium of Proposition 5.4 are
summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 5.5. An increase in the old-age dependency ratio - either due to a permanent
decline in the population growth rate or due to a permanent, but unexpected increase in
life expectancy - does not affect τ cg , but increases τ
c
h and γ
c. In the case of an increase
in life expectancy the latter effects are delayed by one period.
Thus, we can conclude that qualitatively the effects of population aging on government
spending and economic growth in this voting equilibrium are the same as in the politico-
economic equilibrium (see Corollary 5.3 and Proposition 5.3).
5.6.1.2 Myopic Voting Equilibrium
This section derives the equilibrium policy mix when agents vote myopically, i. e., when
they ignore the effect of the current political decision on future political outcomes, and
then compares it to the politico-economic equilibrium of Section 5.3.
More specifically, in a myopic voting equilibrium agents at t treat future policy variables,
i. e., gt+1, ht+1, and τt+1, as given. However, they are aware that their policy choice today
affects tomorrow’s capital stock and output per worker. Then, the economic equilibrium
at t continues to be characterized by equations (5.11) - (5.13). Moreover, using (5.13)
we obtain consumption of an agent that is old in period t+ 1 as
cot+1 = (1 + n)α (1− τt+1)Akαt+1g1−αt+1
= (1 + n)1−ααAB˜α
(
Akαt g
1−α
t − gt − ht
)a
g1−αt+1 (1− τt+1) .
Omitting all terms independent of policy and those that involve future policy variables
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(as they are treated as exogenous), the relevant indirect utilities of a young and an old
agent at t are
UYt ' (1 + aβ) ln
(
Akαt g
1−α
t − gt − ht
)
(5.31)
and
UOt ' ln
(
Akαt g
1−α
t − gt − ht
)
+ b lnht, (5.32)
respectively. The political candidates at t then choose (gt, ht) to maximize the political
objective function (5.16) with UYt and U
O
t given by (5.31) and (5.32). The following
proposition provides the equilibrium policy mix and the resulting economic growth rate.
Proposition 5.5. The equilibrium policy mix under myopic voting for all t is given by
gt = (1− α)yt (5.33)
and
ht = τ
m
h yt, where τ
m
h =
αωb
(1 + n) (1 + αβ) + ω (1 + b)
< α (5.34)
and yt = A
1/α(1− α)(1−α)/αkt.
Under this policy mix, the economy’s growth factor of all per capita variables, government
spending and wages is given by
γm =
B
1 + n
(α− τmh ). (5.35)
Proposition 5.5 reveals that policy makers in this voting equilibrium again choose the
same share of output to be devoted to the productive public input, namely 1−α. With
respect to the equilibrium share of public consumption spending, we can establish the
following corollary.
Corollary 5.6. Comparing the share of output spent on the public consumption good for
the elderly given by (5.34) to the corresponding expenditure share in the politico-economic
equilibrium of Proposition 5.1 yields
τmh > τ
P
h .
Thus, if agents vote myopically the equilibrium share of government expenditure for
the public consumption good exceeds the one of the politico-economic equilibrium. The
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reason for this is that the young agents at t neglect that the choice of ht via savings and
the accumulation of capital affects tomorrow’s provision, ht+1. Therefore, they agree to
a too high spending level today.
The implications of population aging on the myopic voting equilibrium of Proposition 5.5
are summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 5.7. An increase in the old-age dependency ratio - either due to a permanent
decline in the population growth rate or due to a permanent, but unexpected increase in
life expectancy - does not affect τmg , but increases τ
m
h and γ
m. In the case of an increase
in life expectancy the latter effects are delayed by one period.
Thus, we can conclude that qualitatively the effects of population aging on government
spending and economic growth in a myopic voting equilibrium are the same as in the
politico-economic equilibrium (see Corollary 5.3 and Proposition 5.3).
5.6.2 Alternative Utility Functions
This section presents several numerical examples to gauge the sensitivity of the com-
parative static effects of population aging to the specification of the utility function. In
particular, we consider two alternative specifications: one with a constant intertemporal
elasticity of substitution and the other with non-separable preferences between private
and public consumption when old. Both specifications encompass the benchmark sepa-
rable, log utility function of (5.1) as a special case. Otherwise the economic framework
is as described in Section 5.2.
A necessary price of this sensitivity analysis is that (at some point) we must adopt
specific parameters for the model. For this purpose, let a period represent 30 years.
Then, set β = 0.55, implying a 2% annual discount rate. The parameter that measures
the weight of public relative to private consumption in the utility function is b = 0.1. As
there is no strong prior on ω, we simply assume equal political weights on the young and
the old (ω = 1).26 Moreover, a parameter value for the output elasticity of productive
26However, we have solved for a range of economies with ω different from unity and holding constant
the other parameters. The comparative static results are qualitatively unchanged. Moreover and
CHAPTER 5. POPULATION AGING: OLG MODEL 156
government expenditure, 1 − α, is needed. As one period represents 30 years, it seems
acceptable to suppose that an estimate of the output elasticity of public capital is a good
proxy for 1 − α. Glomm and Ravikumar (1997) review the empirical results related to
the output elasticity of public capital and find estimates in the range of zero to 0.39.
Therefore, we choose 1 − α = 0.2 as an intermediate value. This implies that the
elasticity of output with respect to private capital corresponds to α = 0.8. This appears
reasonable if we consider that private capital encompasses physical as well as human
capital.
We start with the assumption that the population growth rate is 2% annually. This
annual rate corresponds to growth of 81% over a model period (n = 1.0230 − 1 ' 0.81).
This in turn implies an old-age dependency ratio of (1 + n)−1 = 0.55. Note that in a
model where agents live for two periods, it is impossible to match the actual population
growth rate and the old-age dependency ratio of a country. The above choice reflects
this trade-off, with both the population growth rate and the dependency ratio being
somewhat higher than currently in Europe or in the US.27 Then, we investigate the
comparative static effect resulting from a shift in the population growth rate from 2.0%
to 1.0%. In other words, n declines to 0.35 and the dependency ratio rises to 0.74.
Finally, the productivity parameter A is set such that the annual growth rate of per
capita variables is 1.8% for the benchmark utility (5.1) when n = 0.81.
5.6.2.1 Constant Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution Utility Function
This section generalizes the analysis to a more general constant intertemporal elasticity
of substitution utility function. Assume that the preferences of an individual born at t
are described by
(cyt )
1−σ − 1
1− σ + β
(cot+1)1−σ − 1
1− σ + b
(
h˜t+1
)1−σ
− 1
1− σ
 , (5.36)
where σ > 0 and 1/σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. This specification
includes the benchmark log utility for σ → 1.
equivalently to the log utility case, the results suggest that dτPh /dω > 0.
27Introducing a survival probability v 6= 1 as in Section 5.5.2 allows - conditional on n - to calibrate
the ratio of retirees to workers.
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One aim of this generalization is to analyze whether there is a third channel (besides
the two discussed in Section 5.5.1 ) by which a decline in the population growth rate
potentially affects the steady-state growth rate. In a standard two-period OLG model
under (5.36) with b = 0 and a neoclassical production function Yt = K
α
t L
1−α
t an increase
in the capital stock per worker (e. g. due to decline in n) lowers the rental rate of capital.
If the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is different from unity this in turn affects
savings, and thus the accumulation of capital. However, in the present framework the
interest rate (independent of the utility specification) turns out to be constant in the
politico-economic equilibrium. Hence, this third channel is mute and we will see that
the qualitative comparative static results are unchanged.
To see this, we first derive the economic equilibrium at t and then define the politico-
economic equilibrium. Finally, numerical results for the equilibrium policy mix are
presented. We consider the three cases: σ = 0.5, σ = 1, and σ = 2, with the other
parameters as described above.
The Economic Equilibrium
Maximizing the lifetime utility of an individual born at t given by (5.36) subject to her
per-period budget constraints, and then taking into account the remaining equilibrium
conditions of Section 5.2.5, i. e., equations (5.8) - (5.10), yields the equilibrium allocation
at t as
cyt =
(1− τt)wt
1 + β
1
σ [(1− τt+1)Rt+1]
1−σ
σ
=
(1− α) (yt − gt − ht)
1 + β
1
σ
[
α(yt+1−gt+1−ht+1)
kt+1
] 1−σ
σ
, (5.37)
cot = kt(1 + n) (1− τt)Rt = α (1 + n) (yt − gt − ht) , (5.38)
kt+1 =
(1 + n)−1 (1− τt)wt
1 + β−
1
σ [(1− τt+1)Rt+1]
σ−1
σ
=
(1 + n)−1 (1− α) (yt − gt − ht)
1 + β−
1
σ
[
α(yt+1−gt+1−ht+1)
kt+1
]σ−1
σ
. (5.39)
The Politico-Economic Equilibrium
In a politico-economic equilibrium the public policy rules
〈
pig, pih
〉
have to maximize the
political objective function Ut = (1 + n)U
Y
t + ωU
O
t with
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UYt =
(cyt )
1−σ − 1
1− σ + β
(
cot+1
)1−σ − 1
1− σ + βb
(ht+1(1 + n))
1−σ − 1
1− σ
and
UOt =
(cot )
1−σ − 1
1− σ + b
(ht(1 + n))
1−σ − 1
1− σ ,
subject to (5.37) - (5.39).
Making the same policy guess as in Section 5.3.3, i. e., pig (kt+1) = η
gkt+1 and pi
h (kt+1) =
ηhkt+1, the economic equilibrium conditions (5.37) - (5.39) yield
cyt = Y (yt − gt − ht) , Y ≡
1− α
1 + β
1
σ
[
α
(
A (ηg)1−α − ηg − ηh)] 1−σσ ,
cot+1 = Z (yt − gt − ht) , Z ≡
(1− α)α (A (ηg)1−α − ηg − ηh)
1 + β−
1
σ
[
α
(
A (ηg)1−α − ηg − ηh)]σ−1σ ,
kt+1 =
X (yt − gt − ht)
1 + n
, X ≡ 1− α
1 + β−
1
σ
[
α
(
A (ηg)1−α − ηg − ηh)]σ−1σ .
Using the latter conditions and omitting additive constant terms, the political objective
function simplifies to
Ut =
(
(1 + n)
(
Y 1−σ + βZ1−σ + βb
(
ηhX
)1−σ)
+ ω (α (1 + n))1−σ
) (yt − gt − ht)1−σ
1− σ
+ ωb (1 + n)1−σ
(ht)
1−σ
1− σ , (5.40)
and the equilibrium policy mix (gt, ht) has to maximize (5.40). The first-order conditions
of this optimization problem with respect to gt and ht are
(
(1 + n)
(
Y 1−σ + βZ1−σ + βb
(
ηhX
)1−σ)
+ ω (α (1 + n))1−σ
)(
(1− α) yt
gt
− 1
)
(yt − gt − ht)σ = 0
and
−
(
(1 + n)
(
Y 1−σ + βZ1−σ + βb
(
ηhX
)1−σ)
+ ω (α (1 + n))1−σ
)
(yt − gt − ht)σ +
ωb (1 + n)1−σ
(ht)
σ = 0,
respectively.
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The former condition is fulfilled if and only if gt = (1− α) yt which verifies our guess for
ηg = A1/α (1− α)1/α. If a political equilibrium exists, i. e., if the guess for ht can also be
verified, then the above result implies that the equilibrium interest rate is constant and
given by R = αA1/α(1− α)(1−α)/α.28
Using gt = A
1/α (1− α)1/α kt and the guess ht = ηhkt in the second first-order condition
then yields
ηh =
αD
1 +
(
ωb (1 + n)1−σ
)− 1
σ
(
(1 + n)
(
Y 1−σ + β
(
Z1−σ + b (ηhX)1−σ
))
+ ω (α (1 + n))1−σ
) 1
σ
(5.41)
where D ≡ A1/α (1− α)(1−α)/α = (A (ηg)1−α − ηg) /α. For the guess to be correct
condition (5.41) needs to have a unique solution for ηh in the interval (0, αD). As
this problem cannot be solved analytically, the following section considers numerical
examples for σ = 0.5 and σ = 2 and compares them to the benchmark case of σ = 1.
Numerical Results
In this section, we set A = 34.5, implying an annual growth rate of per capita variables
of 1.8% if σ = 1. For both choices of σ exists a unique ηh ∈ (0, αD) that solves (5.41).
The results are summarized in Table 5.2. Note that τPh ≡ ηh/D denotes the share of
public consumption spending that benefits the elderly in aggregate output.29
Table 5.2 suggests that an intertemporal elasticity of substitution different from unity
does not alter the qualitative comparative static results of Section 5.5.1, i. e., dτPh /dn < 0
and dγ/dn < 0. Nevertheless, the equilibrium ratio of public spending on the elderly
and the equilibrium growth rate depend on σ. The numerical examples reveal that
dτPh /dσ > 0 and dγ/dσ < 0. Intuitively, a greater intertemporal elasticity of substitution
(i. e., a smaller σ) implies a stronger negative substitution effect of a higher tax rate on
28For this reason, the savings decision even in the CIES case with σ 6= 1 is independent of n and it
does not matter whether the change in n is anticipated or not.
29All examples were computed using Maple. All files are available upon request.
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Table 5.2: Comparative Static Analysis of Demographic Change: CIES Utility
σ n = 0.81 n = 0.35
0.5 τPh (public consumption spending / GDP) 0.0009 0.0011
annual p.c. growth rate 5.16% 6.19%
1 τPh (public consumption spending / GDP) 0.0200 0.0245
annual p.c. growth rate 1.80% 2.78%
2 τPh (public consumption spending / GDP) 0.0475 0.0621
annual p.c. growth rate −2.11% −1.19%
savings such that households prefer a lower tax rate, which in turn involves a higher
growth rate.
5.6.2.2 Non-Separable Preferences
This section generalizes the analysis to non-separable preferences between private and
public consumption when old. Assume that the preferences of an individual born at t
are given by
ln cyt + β ln
([
1
1 + b
(
cot+1
)ρ
+
b
1 + b
(
h˜t+1
)ρ] 1ρ)
, (5.42)
where ρ < 1. This specification encompasses the benchmark separable log utility as
ρ→ 0.30 Private and public consumption when old are substitutes if ρ > 0 and comple-
ments if ρ < 0. This generalization has interesting implications: for instance, if agents
can substitute private for public health services when old they will be less concerned
for public good provision and vote for a lower tax rate. Nevertheless, the qualitative
comparative static results with respect to population aging will not be affected by this
generalization.
30Note that for ρ → 0 (5.42) reduces to ln cyt + β/(1 + b)
(
ln cot+1 + b ln h˜t+1
)
. This specification
only differs from the benchmark utility (5.1) by a constant factor which does not affect the qualitative
results.
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Equivalently to Section 5.6.2.1, we first determine the economic equilibrium and then
analyze the politico-economic equilibrium analytically. To analyze the comparative static
effects of a decline in the population growth rate we consider three numerical examples
for ρ = −0.1, ρ = 0, and ρ = 0.1, with the other parameters as before.
The Economic Equilibrium
Maximizing the lifetime utility (5.42) with respect to an individual’s per-period budget
constraints delivers the following implicit characterization of optimal savings at t
β (1− τt)wt = st
[
1 + β + b
(
h˜t+1
st (1− τt+1)Rt+1
)ρ]
. (5.43)
Optimal consumption of a young and an old agent at t then follow from the respective
per-period budget constraints.
Taking into account the equilibrium conditions (5.8) - (5.10), equation (5.43) becomes
β (1− α) (yt − gt − ht) = kt+1 (1 + n)
[
1 + β + b
(
ht+1
α (yt+1 − gt+1 − ht+1)
)ρ]
. (5.44)
The Politico-Economic Equilibrium
In a politico-economic equilibrium the public policy rules
〈
pig, pih
〉
have to maximize
the political objective function Ut = (1 + n)U
Y
t + ωU
O
t with the indirect utilities of the
young and the old at t (disregarding terms independent of policy) given by
UYt ' ln cyt +
β
ρ
ln
[(
cot+1
)ρ
+ b (ht+1)
ρ (1 + n)ρ
]
and
UOt '
1
ρ
ln [(cot )
ρ + b (ht)
ρ (1 + n)ρ] .
With the linear policy guess, pig (kt+1) = η
gkt+1 and pi
h (kt+1) = η
hkt+1, condition (5.44)
can be written as
kt+1 (1 + n) =
β (1− α) (yt − gt − ht)
1 + β + b
(
ηh
α(A(ηg)1−α−ηg−ηh)
)ρ . (5.45)
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Moreover, using st = kt+1(1 + n) and (5.44) in the per-period budget constraints yields
consumption of a young and an old agent at t as
cyt = X (yt − gt − ht) , where X ≡
(1− α)
(
1 + b
(
ηh
α(A(ηg)1−α−ηg−ηh)
)ρ)
1 + β + b
(
ηh
α(A(ηg)1−α−ηg−ηh)
)ρ (5.46)
and
cot = (1 + n)α (yt − gt − ht) , (5.47)
respectively. Additionally, we obtain the levels of private and public consumption of an
old agent at t+ 1 as
cot+1 = Y (yt − gt − ht) , where Y ≡
β (1− α)α (A (ηg)1−α − ηg − ηh)
1 + β + b
(
ηh
α(A(ηg)1−α−ηg−ηh)
)ρ (5.48)
and
h˜t+1 = Z (yt − gt − ht) , where Z ≡ η
hβ (1− α)
1 + β + b
(
ηh
α(A(ηg)1−α−ηg−ηh)
)ρ , (5.49)
respectively. Using conditions (5.46) - (5.49) in the indirect utility functions and omitting
terms independent of policy variables, the political objective function simplifies to
Ut = (1 + n) (1 + β) ln (yt − gt − ht) + ω
ρ
ln [αρ (yt − gt − ht)ρ + b (ht)ρ] (5.50)
and the equilibrium policy mix (gt, ht) has to maximize (5.50). The first-order conditions
of this optimization problem with respect to gt and ht are
[
(1− α) yt
gt
− 1
][
(1 + n) (1 + β)
yt − gt − ht +
ωαρ (yt − gt − ht)ρ−1
αρ (yt − gt − ht)ρ + b (ht)ρ
]
= 0
and
− (1 + n) (1 + β)
yt − gt − ht + ω
−αρ (yt − gt − ht)ρ−1 + b (ht)ρ−1
αρ (yt − gt − ht)ρ + b (ht)ρ = 0,
respectively.
The first condition is fulfilled if and only if gt = (1− α) yt which verifies our guess for
ηg = A1/α (1− α)1/α. If a political equilibrium exists, i. e., if the guess for ht can also be
verified, then the above result again implies that the equilibrium interest rate is constant
and given by R = αD, where D ≡ A1/α(1− α)(1−α)/α.
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Then, using gt = A
1/α (1− α)1/α kt and the guess ht = τPh yt, where τPh ≡ ηh/D, in the
second first-order condition and rearranging yields
(1 + n) (1 + β) = ω
−1 + α−ρb (τPh )ρ−1 (α− τPh )1−ρ
1 + α−ρb (τPh )
ρ
(α− τPh )−ρ
. (5.51)
For the guess to be correct, condition (5.51) needs to have a unique solution τPh in the
interval (0, α). This is the case for not too large values of ρ. For a proof of this see the
Appendix.
Numerical Results
To analyze the comparative static effect of a decline in the population growth rate, this
section considers numerical examples for ρ = −0.1 and ρ = 0.1 and compares them to
the benchmark case of ρ = 0.
In the examples of this section, we set A = 36.198 in order to again obtain an annual
growth rate of per capita variables of 1.80% if ρ = 0. For both choices of ρ, there exists
a unique τPh ∈ (0, α) that solves (5.51). The results are summarized in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3: Comparative Static Analysis of Demographic Change: Non-Separable Pref-
erences
ρ n = 0.81 n = 0.35
−0.1 τPh (public consumption spending / GDP) 0.0254 0.0308
annual p.c. growth rate 1.70% 2.68%
0 τPh (public consumption spending / GDP) 0.0191 0.0235
annual p.c. growth rate 1.80% 2.78%
0.1 τPh (public consumption spending / GDP) 0.0134 0.0168
annual p.c. growth rate 1.89% 2.87%
Table 5.3 suggests that allowing for non-separable preferences between private and public
consumption when old does not change the qualitative comparative static results of
Section 5.5.1, i. e., dτPh /dn < 0 and dγ/dn < 0.
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Moreover, the numerical examples reveal that the equilibrium ratio of public spending on
the elderly declines in ρ, i. e., dτPh /dρ < 0. Intuitively, a higher degree of substitutability
between private and public consumption goods makes the old less concerned for the
public consumption good and induces them to vote for a lower spending ratio.
5.7 Concluding Remarks
What is the role of population aging for the composition of government spending and
long-term economic growth? This chapter addressed this question in an overlapping
generations model in which economic growth is endogenous and agents each period
vote on the composition of government spending between productive public expenditure
and public consumption spending on the elderly. Population aging corresponds either
to a decline in the population growth rate or to an increase in life expectancy. Both
phenomena increase the economy’s old-age dependency ratio.
The model predicts that population aging, by increasing the relative weight of the old in
the political process, leads to an increase in public spending on the elderly (as a share of
output), but does not affect the share of public productive expenditure in output. This
is in line with recent evidence (see Section 5.1). To finance the additional government
spending, the income tax rate has to increase, which in turn has a negative effect on the
economy’s growth rate of per capita variables. However, the model also suggests that
population aging overall accelerates the economy’s growth rate. If the increase in the
old-age dependency ratio is due to a decline in the population growth rate, then reduced
capital dilution is at the source of this acceleration of growth. By contrast, an increase
in life expectancy generates higher long-term growth by strengthening the incentives to
save.
The present analysis leaves scope for future research. For instance, for analytical
tractability this chapter introduced the productive public input as a flow into produc-
tion. Considering that the length of a model period corresponds to one generation, this
appears to be a good benchmark. Alternatively, one could treat the publicly-provided
productive input as a stock rather than as a flow, thereby introducing public as well
as private capital. In this case the advantages of a larger public investment today only
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materialize tomorrow whereas the tax costs have to be borne today. Then, the young
and the old are no longer symmetrically affected by current public productive spending.
Additionally, the stock approach introduces transitional equilibrium dynamics into the
analysis. This would allow us to study the effects of the projected demographic transi-
tion not only on the steady state but also on the dynamics of transition between steady
states. A second suggestion for future research is to disentangle the uniform income
tax rate into a separate labor and capital income tax rate. This introduces another
dimension of policy choice and a further source of potential conflict between the young
and the old. It would be interesting to see whether in this case the public consumption
good that benefits the elderly will be entirely financed via capital income taxes and the
productive public input via both types of taxes.
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5.8 Appendix
Detailed Derivation of Condition (5.18)
The first-order conditions of the program (5.17) with respect to gt and ht are
U¯gt =
(1− α) yt − gt
gt (yt − gt − ht) [(1 + n) (1 + β (1 + b)) + ω] = 0 (5.52)
U¯ht = −
(1 + n) (1 + β (1 + b)) + ω
yt − gt − ht +
ωb
ht
= 0, (5.53)
where U¯x ≡ ∂U¯/∂x. The first condition is fulfilled if and only if gt = (1 − α)yt. Using
this in the second condition and rearranging yields
[(1 + n) (1 + β (1 + b)) + ω]ht = ωb (αyt − ht) , (5.54)
and thus
ht =
αωb
(1 + n) (1 + β (1 + b)) + ω (1 + b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡τPh
yt. (5.55)
Thus, the unique interior solution is given by gt = (1− α)yt and ht = τPh yt as stated in
the main text.
Proof of Proposition 5.1
In addition to what is stated in the text, it remains to be verified that (i) the first-order
conditions are sufficient for a global maximum, (ii) the economy’s relevant variables grow
at the rate γ − 1.
(i) The unique interior solution derived above is a global maximum if
U¯gtgt < 0, U¯htht < 0 and U¯gtgtU¯htht −
(
U¯gtht
)2
> 0, for any (gt, ht),
where U¯xy ≡ ∂2U¯/∂x∂y. First, note that
U¯gtgt = − [(1 + n) (1 + β (1 + b)) + ω]
α (1− α) yt (yt − gt − ht) + [(1− α) yt − gt]2
g2t (yt − gt − ht)2
< 0
U¯htht =
− [(1 + n) (1 + β (1 + b)) + ω]
(yt − gt − ht)2
− ωb
(ht)
2 < 0.
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Then, U¯gtgtU¯htht can be written as
U¯gtgtU¯htht = [(1 + n) (1 + β (1 + b)) + ω]
2
[
(1− α) yt
gt
− 1
]2
(yt − gt − ht)4
+X + Y + Z,
where X, Y, and Z are positive constants. Moreover,
U¯gtht = − [(1 + n) (1 + β (1 + b)) + ω]
[
(1− α) yt
gt
− 1
]
(yt − gt − ht)2
,
and thus
(
U¯gtht
)2
= [(1 + n) (1 + β (1 + b)) + ω]2
[
(1− α) yt
gt
− 1
]2
(yt − gt − ht)4
such that
U¯gtgtU¯htht −
(
U¯gtht
)2
= X + Y + Z > 0, for any (gt, ht).
(ii) First, it is straightforward that, as in the standard AK model, there are no tran-
sitional dynamics such that the economy immediately jumps onto its steady-state
path. Moreover, note that output per worker in equilibrium is linear in the capital
stock per worker k, and thus has to grow at the same rate as k, namely at rate
γ − 1.
Then, output per capita at t is given by
Yt
Lt + Lt−1
=
ytLt
Lt + Lt−1
=
yt
1 + Lt−1/Lt
=
1 + n
2 + n
yt,
and is thus proportional to output per worker and has to grow at the same rate.
Using (5.11) and (5.12), consumption per capita at t obtains as
Ct
Lt + Lt−1
=
cytLt + c
o
tLt−1
Lt + Lt−1
=
Lt
Lt + Lt−1
(
cyt +
cot
1 + n
)
=
1 + n
2 + n
1 + αβ
1 + β
(1− τ)yt,
and is also proportional to output per worker. Similar arguments apply to all other
relevant variables such as government spending and wages.
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Proof of Corollary 5.1
Assume that the economic environment is identical to that of the previous sections,
except in a final period T where there is a generation of newborns that lives only for
one period. The consumption of old and young households in this period are given by
cyT = (1− τT )wT = (1− α)
(
AkαTg
1−α
T − gT − hT
)
, (5.56)
coT = (1− τT )RT sT−1 = α(1 + n)
(
AkαTg
1−α
T − gT − hT
)
, (5.57)
respectively. The policymaker (voters) then chooses gT and hT to maximize the political
objective function UT = (1 + n)U
Y
T + ωU
O
T = (1 + n) ln c
y
T + ω ln c
o
T + ωb lnhT . Omit-
ting terms independent of the policy choices gT and hT , the political objective function
reduces to
UT ' (1 + n+ ω) ln
(
AkαTg
1−α
T − gT − hT
)
+ ωb lnhT . (5.58)
The first-order conditions of maximizing (5.58) with respect to gT and hT yield
gT = (1− α)yT and hT = ωbα
1 + n+ ω (1 + b)
yT , (5.59)
with yT = A(1− α)1−αkT .
Now we can proceed by backward induction. In period T − 1 voters choose gT−1 and
hT−1, correctly anticipating gT and hT , to maximize
UT−1 = (1 + n)UYT−1 + ωU
O
T−1
= (1 + n) ln cyT−1 + β (1 + n) [ln c
o
T + b lnhT ] + ω
[
ln coT−1 + b lnhT−1
]
with coT given by (5.57), c
y
T−1 follows from (5.11) for t = T − 1 and coT−1 from (5.12) for
t = T − 1. Using gT and hT of (5.59) as well as kT of (5.13) for t = T − 1 and omitting
terms independent of policy variables the political objective function at T − 1 can be
written as
UT−1 ' [(1 + n) (1 + β (1 + b)) + ω] ln
(
AkαT−1g
1−α
T−1 − gT−1 − hT−1
)
+ ωb lnhT−1.
(5.60)
After some algebra, the first-order conditions of maximizing (5.60) with respect to gT−1
and hT−1 yield
gT−1 = (1− α)yT−1 (5.61)
and
hT−1 =
αωb
(1 + n) (1 + β (1 + b)) + ω (1 + b)
yT−1 = τPh yT−1, (5.62)
CHAPTER 5. POPULATION AGING: OLG MODEL 169
where yT−1 = A(1−α)1−αkT−1. The policy functions (5.61) and (5.62) correspond to the
equilibrium policy functions of the infinite-horizon economy (see equation 5.18). Pro-
ceeding in the same way for all preceding periods one readily verifies that this equilibrium
policy mix results for all periods t = 0, 1, ..., T − 1.
Proof of Lemma 5.1
First note that the indirect utility of a young agent of generation t given by (5.14) is
additively separable in (ht, gt, kt) and (ht+1, gt+1, kt+1), i. e.,
UYt (ht, gt, kt, ht+1, gt+1, kt+1) = Pt(gt, ht, kt) +Qt+1(gt+1, ht+1, kt+1),
where
Pt(gt, ht, kt) ≡ ln
(
Akαt g
1−α
t − gt − ht
)
and
Qt+1(gt+1, ht+1, kt+1) ≡ β ln
(
Akαt+1g
1−α
t+1 − gt+1 − ht+1
)
+ βb lnht+1.
Then, the Ramsey planner’s objective function in (5.21) can be expressed as
max
{gt,ht,kt+1}∞t=0
W (·) ≡ max
{gt,ht,kt+1}∞t=0
{
βUO0 +
∞∑
t=0
((1 + n) β)t+1 UYt
}
= max
g0,h0,k1
{
βUO0 + max{gt,ht,kt+1}∞t=1
∞∑
t=0
((1 + n) β)t+1 UYt
}
= max
g0,h0,k1
{
βUO0 + max
g1,h1,k2
{
(1 + n) βUY0 + max{gt,ht,kt+1}∞t=2
∞∑
t=1
((1 + n) β)t+1 UYt
}}
= max
g0,h0,k1
{
βUO0 + max
g1,h1,k2
{
(1 + n) β [P0(·) +Q1(·)] + max{·}∞t=2
∞∑
t=1
((1 + n) β)t+1 UYt
}}
= max
g0,h0.k1
{
β
(
UO0 + (1 + n)P0(·)
)
+ max
{·}∞t=1
∞∑
t=1
(1 + n)t βt [Qt(·) + (1 + n)βPt(·)]
}
,
(5.63)
where the argument of {·} is gt, ht, kt+1.
Now let Tt (gt, ht, kt) ≡ Qt (gt, ht, kt) + (1 + n) βPt (gt, ht, kt) and note that from (5.15)
and the definition of Pt follows βU
O
0 + (1 + n) βP0(·) = βQ0(·) + (1 + n) βP0(·) = T0 (·)
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such that (5.63) can be written as
max
{gt,ht,kt+1}∞t=0
W (·) = max
g0,h0,k1
{
T0 (g0, h0, k0) + max{gt,ht,kt+1}∞t=1
∞∑
t=1
(1 + n)t βtTt (gt, ht, kt)
}
.
(5.64)
Defining the value function
V (kt) ≡ max{gt+s,ht+s,kt+1+s}∞s=0
∞∑
s=0
(1 + n)s βsTt+s (gt+s, ht+s, kt+s) ,
standard recursion on (5.64) yields the functional Bellman equation (5.22).
Proof of Proposition 5.2
In order to solve the Ramsey problem, we start by guessing that the solution to the
functional equation (5.22) takes the form of V (k) = a0 + a1 ln k for all k, where a0 and
a1 are yet undetermined coefficients. Then, the Bellman equation becomes
a0 + a1 ln kt = max{gt,ht,kt+1} {(2 + n) β ln
(
Akαt g
1−α
t − gt − ht
)
+ βb lnht
+(1 + n)βa0 + (1 + n)βa1 ln kt+1}
subject to (5.13). Substituting for kt+1, the Bellman equation reduces to
a0 + a1 ln kt = max{gt,ht} {β (1 + (1 + n) (1 + a1)) ln
(
Akαt g
1−α
t − gt − ht
)
+βb lnht + (1 + n)βa0 + (1 + n)βa1 ln B˜}. (5.65)
After some algebra, the first-order conditions with respect to gt and ht yield
gt = (1− α)yt and ht = bα
1 + b+ (1 + n) (1 + a1)
yt, (5.66)
with yt = A
1/α(1−α)(1−α)/α. Using this in (5.65) and collecting the terms that multiply
ln kt results in
a0 + a1 ln kt = β (1 + b+ (1 + n) (1 + a1)) ln kt + (1 + n)βa0 + (1 + n)βa1 ln B˜
+β (1 + (1 + n) (1 + a1)) ln
[
1 + (1 + n) (1 + a1)
1 + b+ (1 + n) (1 + a1)
αA
1
α (1− α) 1−αα
]
+βb ln
[
bα
(1 + b+ (1 + n) (1 + a1))
A
1
α (1− α) 1−αα
]
.
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The functional equation holds for all k if and only if a1 = β (1 + b+ (1 + n) (1 + a1)).
This in turn implies that
a1 =
β (2 + b+ n)
1− β(1 + n)
is required for a solution. This expression can then be used to solve for a0. Thus, it has
been verified that the tentative guess is indeed a solution to the functional equation.
Substitution of a1 in (5.66) then yields τ
R
h of Proposition 5.2.
Proof of Corollary 5.2
The result follows directly from comparing τRh of Proposition 5.2 to τ
P
h of Proposition 5.1.
Proof of Corollary 5.3
1. From Proposition 5.1 we have
τPh =
αωb
(1 + n) [1 + β (1 + b)] + ω (1 + b)
. (5.67)
Partial derivation of (5.67) with respect to n immediately yields dτPh /dn < 0.
Moreover, τg = 1 − α such that dτg/dn = 0. The comparative static result for τ
immediately follows from the definition of τ and from the first two results.
2. Using (5.67) in (5.20) yields the equilibrium growth rate as
γ = αB
[1 + β (1 + b)] + ω/ (1 + n)
(1 + n) [1 + β (1 + b)] + ω (1 + b)
.
Then, partial derivation immediately yields dγ/dn < 0.
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Proof of Proposition 5.3
In the presence of a perfect annuity market, an individual born at t chooses the plan
(cyt , c
o
t+1, st) to maximize her lifetime utility (5.1) subject to c
y
t + st = (1 − τt)wt and
cot+1 = st(1 − τt+1)Rt+1/v. Writing the problem like this uses the fact that the assets
at t + 1 of a member of generation t are equal to st + (1 − v)st/v = st/v. Moreover,
it incorporates the results of Yaari (1965) and Sheshinski and Weiss (1981) according
to which individuals without a bequest motive want to annuitize all their wealth. The
optimal choices of a member of cohort t are given by (5.5), (5.7), and
cot+1 = β(1− τt)wt(1− τt+1)Rt+1/v(1 + β) with β ≡ βvv. Then, one readily verifies that
all other equations in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 remain valid.31
As an increase in the survival probability v raises the effective discount factor β, equation
(5.7) yields ∂st/∂v > 0. Thus, for a given government policy, an increase in v raises
savings per worker. This, in turn has a positive effect on the growth rate of capital per
worker, see equation (5.20). However, we assume that the increase in life expectancy is
unexpected for generation 1 such that it makes its plan (cy1, s1, c
o
2) without anticipating
the increase of the survival probability from v to vˆ. Hence, the positive growth effect
only materializes from generation 2 onwards.
The second effect of an increase in life expectancy is that the effective weight of the old,
ω = ωvv, in the political objective function (5.16) increases. However, this effect only
becomes effective from period 2 onwards too. In period t = 1, the young of generation
1 and the old of generation 0, whose size is determined by the initial life expectancy
v, vote on government policy. Thus, in t = 1 government policy is unaffected by an
increase in the survival probability. This in turn implies that the accumulation rule that
determines the capital stock per worker in period 2 is unchanged. Thus, τˆPh1 and γˆ2
correspond to τPh and γ of Proposition 5.1 with ω = ωvv.
By contrast, from period 2 onwards the relevant effective discount factor and the effective
political weight are βˆ ≡ βvvˆ and ωˆ ≡ ωvvˆ. Then, the politico-economic equilibrium for
31The only exception is equation (5.12) that modifies to cot = α(1 + n)
(
Akαt g
1−α
t − gt − ht
)
/v.
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any t = 2, 3, ...,∞ is characterized by
τˆgt = 1− α ≡ τˆg, (5.68)
τˆPht =
αωvvˆb
(1 + n) [1 + vˆβv (1 + b)] + ωvvˆ (1 + b)
≡ τˆPh , (5.69)
γˆt+1 =
βvvˆ
1 + βvvˆ
(
α− τˆPh
)
X ≡ γˆ (5.70)
where X ≡ A1/α (1− α)1/α / (1 + n) .
Partial derivation of (5.69) with respect to vˆ gives
dτˆPh
dvˆ
=
αωvb [(1 + n) (1 + vˆβv (1 + b)) + ωvvˆ (1 + b)− (1 + n) vˆβv (1 + b)− ωvvˆ (1 + b)]
[(1 + n) [1 + vˆβv (1 + b)] + ωvvˆ (1 + b)]
2
=
αωvb (1 + n)[
(1 + n)
[
1 + βˆ (1 + b)
]
+ ωˆ (1 + b)
]2 > 0. (5.71)
Moreover,
∂γˆ
∂vˆ
=
βv(
1 + βˆ
)2 (α− τˆPh )X − βˆ
1 + βˆ
dτˆPh
dvˆ
X =
Xβv
1 + βˆ
(
−vˆ dτˆ
P
h
dvˆ
+
α− τˆPh
1 + βˆ
)
.
(5.72)
Using (5.71) in (5.72) and rearranging yields
∂γˆ
∂vˆ
=
Xβvα
1 + βˆ
(1 + n)2
(
1 + βˆ (1 + b)
)2
+ ωˆ2 (1 + b) + ωˆ (1 + n)
(
2
(
1 + βˆ (1 + b)
)
+ βˆb2
)
[
(1 + n)
(
1 + βˆ (1 + b)
)
+ ωˆ (1 + b)
]2
> 0.
Thus, τˆPh > τ
P
h and γˆ > γ for all t = 2, 3, ...,∞.
Proof of Proposition 5.4
Substituting (5.27) and (5.28) in the political objective function (5.16) yields the program
to be solved by the political mechanism as max{τcg ,τch} U¯t with
U¯t = [(1 + n) (1 + β (2 + b)) + ω] ln
(
1− τ cg − τ ch
)
+ [(1 + n) β + ω] b ln τ ch
+ [(1 + n) (1 + 2β (1 + b)) + ω (1 + b)] (1− α)/α ln τ cg .
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The first-order conditions of the above program with respect to τ cg and τ
c
h yield
(1 + n) (1 + β (2 + b)) + ω
1− τ cg − τ ch
=
(1− α) [(1 + n) (1 + 2β (1 + b)) + ω (1 + b)]
ατ cg
(5.73)
and
(1 + n) (1 + β (2 + b)) + ω
1− τ cg − τ ch
=
(1 + n) βb+ ωb
τ ch
. (5.74)
Combining (5.73) and (5.74) yields
τ cg =
(1− α) [(1 + n) (1 + 2β (1 + b)) + ω (1 + b)]
[(1 + n) β + ω]αb
τ ch. (5.75)
Substituting (5.75) in (5.74) and solving for τ ch yields
τ ch =
((1 + n) β + ω)αb
(1 + n) (1 + 2β (1 + b)) + ω (1 + b)
< α,
which is τ ch of (5.29). Finally, using (5.29) in (5.75) yields τ
c
g = 1− α.
The policy mix of (5.29) is the global maximizer of the political objective function. To
see this note that
U¯τcg τcg = −
(1 + n) (1 + β (2 + b)) + ω(
1− τ cg − τ ch
)2
−(1− α) [(1 + n) (1 + 2β (1 + b)) + ω (1 + b)]
α
(
τ cg
)2 < 0
U¯τchτch = −
(1 + n) (1 + β (2 + b)) + ω(
1− τ cg − τ ch
)2 − [(1 + n) β + ω] b(τ ch)2 < 0(
U¯τcg τch
)2
=
[(1 + n) (1 + β (2 + b)) + ω]2(
1− τ cg − τ ch
)4
U¯τcg τcg U¯τchτch =
[(1 + n) (1 + β (2 + b)) + ω]2(
1− τ cg − τ ch
)4 +X + Y + Z,
where X, Y, and Z are positive constants. Then,
U¯τcg τcg U¯τchτch −
(
U¯τcg τch
)2
= X + Y + Z > 0, for any (τ cg , τ
c
h).
CHAPTER 5. POPULATION AGING: OLG MODEL 175
Proof of Corollary 5.4
Proof by contradiction. Suppose that τ ch ≤ τPh , then
((1 + n)β + ω)αb
(1 + n) (1 + 2β (1 + b)) + ω (1 + b)
≤ αbω
(1 + n) (1 + β (1 + b)) + ω (1 + b)
⇔ [(1 + n)β + ω] (1 + n) (1 + β (1 + b)) + (1 + n)βω (1 + b)
≤ (1 + n) (1 + 2β (1 + b))ω
⇔ (1 + n) [−β (1 + b)ω + (1 + n)β (1 + β (1 + b)) + βω (1 + b)] ≤ 0
⇔ (1 + n)β (1 + β (1 + b)) ≤ 0,
which is a contradiction. Thus, it has to hold that τ ch > τ
P
h .
Proof of Corollary 5.5
1. Comparative statics for a change in n
Partial derivation of each of the expenditures shares of (5.29) with respect to n
yields
∂τ cg
∂n
= 0
∂τ ch
∂n
=
−αbω [1 + β (1 + b)]
[(1 + n) (1 + 2β (1 + b)) + ω (1 + b)]2
< 0.
Using τ ch in (5.30) we obtain the equilibrium growth factor as
γc = αB
[1 + β (2 + b)] + ω/ (1 + n)
(1 + n) [1 + 2β (1 + b)] + ω (1 + b)
.
Then, partial derivation immediately yields dγc/dn < 0.
2. Comparative statics for an increase in life expectancy
Consider the reinterpretation of the economic framework as described in Sec-
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tion 5.5.2. Then, τ ch and γ
c can be rewritten as
τ ch =
((1 + n) βv + ωv)αb
(1 + n) (1/v + 2βv (1 + b)) + ωv (1 + b)
and
γc =
βvvX
1 + βv
(α− τ ch) ,
where X ≡ A1/α (1− α)1/α / (1 + n) . Then, a permanent increase in the survival
probability v has the following effects on government policy and economic growth:
∂τ cg
∂v
= 0
∂τ ch
∂v
> 0
∂γc
∂v
= αβvX
βv(1 + n)
2 [(2 + b)(1 + 2v) + (1 + b)(3 + b)ω + 2β(1 + b)2]
(1 + βˆ)2
[
1+n
v
+ 2βv(1 + n)(1 + b) + ω(1 + b)
]2
+
(1 + n) [2ωv/v + βvωv + (1 + n)/v
2] + (1 + b)ω2v
(1 + βˆ)2
[
1+n
v
+ 2βv(1 + n)(1 + b) + ωv(1 + b)
]2 > 0.
However, as the increase in the life expectancy is unexpected these effects only
materialize with a period delay; for an intuition see the proof of Proposition 5.3.
Proof of Proposition 5.5
Substituting (5.31) and (5.32) in the political objective function (5.16) yields the program
to be solved by the political mechanism as
max
{gt,ht}
U¯ with U¯ ≡ [(1 + n) (1 + αβ) + ω] ln (Akαt g1−αt − gt − ht)+ ωb lnht.
The first-order conditions of the above program with respect to gt and ht are
U¯gt =
(1− α) yt − gt
gt (yt − gt − ht) [(1 + n) (1 + αβ) + ω] = 0
U¯ht = −
(1 + n) (1 + αβ) + ω
yt − gt − ht +
ωb
ht
= 0.
The first condition is fulfilled if and only if gt = (1 − α)yt. Using this in the second
condition and rearranging immediately yields τmh of (5.34).
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The policy mix of Proposition 5.5 is the global maximizer of the political objective
function. To see this note that
U¯gtgt = − [(1 + n) (1 + αβ) + ω]
α (1− α) yt (yt − gt − ht) + [(1− α) yt − gt]2
g2t (yt − gt − ht)2
< 0
U¯htht =
− [(1 + n) (1 + αβ) + ω]
(yt − gt − ht)2
− ωb
(ht)
2 < 0.
Then, U¯gtgtU¯htht can be written as
U¯gtgtU¯htht = [(1 + n) (1 + αβ) + ω]
2
[
(1− α) yt
gt
− 1
]2
(yt − gt − ht)4
+X + Y + Z,
where X, Y, and Z are positive constants. Moreover,
U¯gtht = − [(1 + n) (1 + αβ) + ω]
[
(1− α) yt
gt
− 1
]
(yt − gt − ht)2
,
and thus
(
U¯gtht
)2
= [(1 + n) (1 + αβ) + ω]2
[
(1− α) yt
gt
− 1
]2
(yt − gt − ht)4
such that
U¯gtgtU¯htht −
(
U¯gtht
)2
= X + Y + Z > 0, for any (gt, ht).
Proof of Corollary 5.6
Proof by contradiction. Suppose that τmh ≤ τPh , then
αωb
(1 + n) (1 + αβ) + ω (1 + b)
≤ αωb
(1 + n) (1 + β (1 + b)) + ω (1 + b)
⇔ 1 + b ≤ α,
which is a contradiction. Thus, it has to hold that τmh > τ
P
h .
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Proof of Corollary 5.7
1. Comparative statics for a change in n
Partial derivation of (5.34) with respect to n immediately yields dτmh /dn < 0.
Moreover, d(gt/yt)/dn = 0. Then, using (5.34) in (5.35) we obtain the equilibrium
growth factor as
γm = αB
(1 + αβ) + ω/ (1 + n)
(1 + n) (1 + αβ) + ω (1 + b)
.
Then, partial derivation immediately yields dγm/dn < 0.
2. Comparative statics for an increase in life expectancy
Consider the reinterpretation of the economic framework as described in Sec-
tion 5.5.2. Then, τmh and γ
m can be rewritten as
τmh =
αωvb
(1 + n) (1/v + αβv) + ωv (1 + b)
and
γm =
βvvX
1 + βv
(α− τmh ) ,
where X ≡ A1/α (1− α)1/α / (1 + n) . Then, a permanent increase in the survival
probability v has the following effects on government policy and economic growth:
∂(gt/yt)
∂v
= 0
∂τmh
∂v
> 0
∂γm
∂v
=
βvX
1 + βˆ
(
−v∂τ
m
h
∂v
+ α− τmh
)
=
Xβvα
1 + βˆ
(1 + n)
(
1 + αβˆ
)(
(1 + n)(1 + αβˆ) + ωˆ
)
[
(1 + n)
(
1 + αβˆ
)
+ ωˆ (1 + b)
]2
+
Xβvαωˆ
1 + βˆ
(1 + b)ωˆ + (1 + n)
(
1 + (1 + b)αβˆ
)
[
(1 + n)
(
1 + αβˆ
)
+ ωˆ (1 + b)
]2 > 0.
However, as the increase in the life expectancy is unexpected these effects only
materialize with a period delay; for an intuition see the proof of Proposition 5.3.
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Existence proof for numerical example of Section 5.6.2.2
To see that a unique τPH exists if ρ is sufficiently small, rewrite equation (5.51) as
(1 + n) (1 + β) +ω = α−ρb
[
ω
(
τPh
)ρ−1 (
α− τPh
)1−ρ − (1 + n) (1 + β) (τPh )ρ (α− τPh )−ρ].
(5.76)
Denote the right-hand side of (5.76) by RHS(τPh , ρ) and the left-hand side, which does
not depend on τh, by LHS. One readily verifies that ∂RHS(τ
P
h , ρ)/∂τh < 0 for any
ρ < 1. Moreover, for a given ρ, RHS(τPh , ρ) > 0 when τ
P
h is sufficiently small (i. e. close
to zero) and RHS(τPh , ρ) < 0 when τ
P
h is sufficiently close to α. Therefore, there is a
unique value of τPh ∈ (0, α) which satisfies (5.76) if and only if RHS(τPh , ρ) for τPh close
to zero is greater than LHS. Now note that for a given τPh
∂RHS(τPh , ρ)
∂ρ
=
b
(
τPh
)ρ−1
αρ (α− τPh )ρ
ln
((
α− τPh
)
α
τPh
)(
τPh (1 + β) (1 + n)− ω
(
α− τPh
))
.
Thus, limτPh →0
(
∂RHS(τPh , ρ)/∂ρ
)
< 0 and limτPh →0RHS(τ
P
h , ρ) is greater the smaller
ρ. Therefore, we can conclude that a solution to (5.76) only exists if ρ is not too large.
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